Is it just a coincidence that, on 21 April, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead ordered the U.S. Navy to begin preparing to mark the 67th anniversary of the Battle of Midway, 4–7 June, while he was in China 16–22 April for the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s 60th aniversary? China used an international fleet review held at Qingdao to show off to the world some impressive-looking (but not their very best) PLAN assets, including two first-generation home-built nuclear subs. Midway marks a decisive American victory over Imperial Japan, China’s nextdoor neighbor and the last Asian country (so far) to quickly build a modern navy — and go to war with it in the Pacific.
Roughead’s order reminds its readers that Midway put America back on the offensive only six months after the disastrous surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, at a time when the IJN outnumbered the USN due to a gap in longterm shipbuilding programs combined with asymmetric battle losses; there is also today real concern about the adequacy of the current USN longterm shipbuilding program. Interestingly, Roughead goes on to reach back to the Great Depression to praise the “innovation and resilience,” in what construction did occur and in tactical development, that during the 1930s lay the groundwork for success at Midway in 1942; current economic conditions are notably more harsh than anything since the Great Depression.
Each fleet concentration area and regional command around the world (such as Pearl Harbor, Guam, and Yokosuka) is to prepare and then communicate, to both sailors and civilian communities, a knowledge base about Midway and its veterans, with a coordinated global wreath-laying ceremony, “to carry their legacy forward.” Roughead’s order charges the Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) and the Chief of Naval Information (CHINFO) with preparing a Battle of Midway lesson plan and a public affairs plan.
These educational products, with their use by local commanders, will be crucial to the success of the CNO’s directive to preserve history, learn from the past, and prepare for the future.
At a time when information is power like never before, and soft power is very real power, this confluence of USN and PLAN anniversaries — if handled properly — could “foster relationships between the two nations and explore areas for enhanced cooperation,” which the CNO’s PAO says was the main purpose of Rougheads’ visit to Qingdao.
– Joe Buff
{ 5 comments… read them below or add one }
Midway was a lucky battle for the USA.
The counter-offensives of 143-1945 were possible only because of the huge shipbuilding effort of American shipyards, the huge output of the other war industries and a huge training program.
Today’s USA would lack the shipbuilding capacity to recover from major blows like that. A typical annual U.S. ship production is some ships for the great Lakes, a few ships for the Mississippi/Missouri, some yachts, two or three warships, some tugs and offshore oil industry ships and about three or four cargo ships.
Countries like Poland and Croatia rank higher in annual shipbuilding than the USA.
China on the other hand has today the shipyards and other war-relevant industries to mimic the U.S. military expansion of 1942-1945.
That won’t weigh heavily in wartime because of strategic bombing, but it counts for peacetime arms races.
Yes this is what happens when you kill steel industries and make it finacialy ruinous to own a shipping company in the US.
Today only about 200 vessels are US flagged. Most of those because they have to be to do a certain function or industry.
like the mersk alabama because it was deliverying US aid.
It would take a looong time to scale up our shipbuilding to WW2-esque levels. At the moment we simply have to hope that our quality versus quantity paradigm is sufficient to turn the tide. However, if our opponents have Russian equipment than that edge in quality begins to melt away.
If worst comes to worst the war we will be comparing things too won’t be WW2, but the War of 1812.
Lotta discussion of possible war with the People’s Republic of China on this board. I truly fail to understand why the PRC would agree to lend the United States the money it would need to launch a war against the selfsame PRC, and why the posters here are so unclear on the concept of how the deficit run up between 2002-2008 was financed.
Cranky
Cranky: Thanks for chiding re clarification on the “dismal science” of macroeconomic machinations! When somebody else owns a trillion bucks of U.S. Treasury bonds, as China does, they can decide to unload those bonds all at once on world financial markets. This would have two really bad consequences for U.S.:
1. U.S. interest rates (borrowing costs) would skyrocket catastrophically, triggering both domestic hyperinflation and a much worse U.S. recession.
2. Value of U.S. dollar would plummet violently against other currencies, vastly increasing the costs of indispensable imported goods — including all the manufactured stuff we get from China.
While China would feel some pain from said “dumping” of T-bonds, it would not be nearly as bad as what agony we’d feel.
Basically, just like we’re seeing every day in the problems with the consumer lending crisis, usury-driven foreclosures, and credit card banking rip-offs, if you owe a ton of money to somebody else (which is what it means when they buy a bunch of your Treasury bonds), they own you.
(I used to be an insurance & investment risk management actuary, and also worked on Wall Street for a while at Morgan Stanley and later Merrill Lynch.)