The Rhodesian Security Forces were arguably the most effective counterinsurgency units in modern history. Rhodesia, a former British colony (now Zimbabwe), unilaterally declared independence from the Crown after a disagreements on a power transition from European colonists to the Africa majority. A fifteen year long Bush War followed, between the Rhodesians and two African nationalist movements: ZIPRA, led by Josh Nkomo and backed by the Soviets, and ZANLA, led by Robert Mugabe and backed by the Chinese. The Rhodesians, the target of the first UN economic sanctions, were backed by no one except apartheid South Africa.
The security forces, therefor, had to cover the area of the size of Texas with highly limited resources and manpower (there were approximately 275,000 white Europeans and 7 million Africans living in Rhodesia during the war). Using South African supplied Alouette helicopters and DC-3 Dakotas (some airframes veterans of Operation Market Garden and D-Day), the Rhodesians developed a highly effective technique of aerial envelopment called the “fireforce” (see photo above).
A fireforce consisted of several “sticks” of troopies, usual one stick of 4 men per helicopter or 5 sticks of 20 men per Dakota. The choppers were designated either K-cars (a command car armed with the fireforce’s commanding officer and a heavy machine gun) and G-Cars, which carried the combat sticks. Fireforce teams were largely drawn from the highly elite Rhodesian Light Infantry –an all European commando outfit– or the Rhodesian African Rifles, also a highly effective COIN outfit, this one all African with European officers. The typical Fireforce was one Dakota, 3 G-cars, one K-car, and modified Cessna called a Lynx (used for close air support). Hawker Hunter jets were also used.
The Rhodesians guided Fireforces onto terrorist (or Terr) targets using mostly human intelligence, stemming from the highly effecitve Selous Scouts (a pseudo infilitration unit which employed “tame” terrorists), observation posts, and spies run by their Central Intelligence Organization or Special Branch of the British South African Police. Once a group of Terrs was located, a Fireforce was dispatched through local Joint Operational Commands (JOCs).
The first wave of a fireforce consisted of eight sticks (also called “stops,” in that they “stopped” terrs from escaping into the bush), with the K-Car always the first responder. The K-Car’s gunner flushed Terrs from their positions –usually a local village in one of the Tribal Trust Lands– while the Fireforce commander evaluated logical escape routes. Once established, G-Cars or Daks dropped troops onto their stop positions, with their troopies quickly forming a sweep line (four men spaced approximately 20 meters from each other). The stops locked their targets into place, while the Lynx dropped frantan (napalm) on the fleeing terrs.
The Fireforce tactic resulted in remarkably lopsided kill ratios in favor of the Rhodesians, while enabling them to patrol vast swaths of territory with a relatively small number of soldiers. Unfortunately for the Rhodesians, their combat prowess didn’t translate into political effectiveness, as they won every major engagement from 1965–1980, but lost the war. Still, their skillful use of airpower as an envelopment technique was as groundbreaking as it was deadly.
–John Noonan
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Today’s Military History Lesson: FireforceLeave a Reply |
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Evaluating a counter insurgency campaign based on its kill ratio is missing the point of COIN entirely.
apply this to Afgan & Iraq & adapt system for & update for Spec Forces & Regular Forces.
Could be viable.
Replace C47s with C17s, C130s & use estd Gunships & now UAV drones.
Very doable with todays Info Tech Systems in place & have C3I.
Very doable Today with our forces & save lives
Exactly right Alex. Most of the post-war critiques of the Rhodesians’ performance centered around their obsession with kill ratios instead of psyops.
This isn’t a post on how to conduct COIN ops, however. It’s simply a discussion of fireforces as a military tactic. Big difference. Cheers, John
The problem with today’s forces isn’t that they’re getting beaten in fire fights.
American Marines have been ambushed by superior numbers outside of CAS and can still come out top consistently.
But this won’t save you from a roadside bomb while on patrol.
Americans don’t need to use fireforce, however I can see a pseudo group like the Selous Scouts being of some use in Afghanistan… the problem is that it’s much harder to flip religious zealots than African Nationalists, many of whom were kidnapped into ZANLA/ZIPRA service during the war.
Well trained fireforces could do well in friendly second-third world nations who are fighting insurgencies, however. We should teach the Iraqis this method.
Um dt. The RAR and the Selous Scouts were almost completely black units. They fought for Rhodesia.
dt: Given that the Rhodesian forces were 85% black and from 1978 on taking orders from a black President in a 2/3 majority black government . . “racist Rhodesians” is both trite and repugnant to reason.
@ Chris C
“Well trained fireforces could do well in friendly second-third world nations who are fighting insurgencies, however. We should teach the Iraqis this method“
Fireforces would do well in places like the Phillpines, Africa, etc. but not in Iraq, it appears a key part in the fireforces success was napalm, which beside the fact the U.S doesn’t use it anymore, which be infective in a place like Iraq.
Quoth one Rhodesian Light Infantry soldier, circa 1978: “Had we been fighting the Viet Cong, we would have lost this war years ago.”
LEP, I think the difference is that with the Rhodesians, it actually worked.
TODAY’S MILITARY HISTORY LESSON
When strategy conflicts with tactics throw away the strategy.
Vietnam was an exercise in mistaken idealism; Iraq in cynical money-making. And there’s no optimism or idealism now — Americans are tired of knowledge. Our leaders, the C-students from Yale, know this. We’re proud of being ignorant; that leaves virtue at our core
– Kurt Vonnegut
The Rhodesians lost.
Bob. Yes. Already noted in the post.
The Fire Force is a remarkable strategy, the RLI took on forces 20 times it’s number and won. When other Rhodesian units were in a pinch, they could call in backup and a Fire Force would be on the scene in 30 minutes.
Discard all the politics and racist BS, and wat you have here is a a lesson to be learned in Counter-insurg. Thier tactics and thier organization, with limited resources, are just unbelivable. Iam not all that familiar with the colonial Africa, but Zimbabwe was much safer when it was Rhodesia. They made thier homes there, and fought for them. Wouldn’t YOU??
There were really only two successful major insurgency suppressions in the 20th Century.
That of the Huk in the Philipines which even then with US assistance took 8 years. c. 1945–1954. The Hukbalahap initially had much support as they had been the main resistance movement against the Japanese occupation. But they lost support of the people and they were never large and also were isolated in their numbers maybe 60–80,000.
The other is the Malayan Emergency 1948–1960. To deal with this insurgency, at least the British did not call it a “war” Sir Robert Thompson became the main driver of the change in strategy and tactics to defeat the MNLA.
At Thompson