Is there any better indication that we’ve got to change the Cold War nuclear alert program we’ve still got in place than this awesome story:
BISMARCK, N.D. — The Air Force discharged three North Dakota ballistic missile crew members who fell asleep while holding classified launch code devices, the military announced Tuesday. Officials said the codes were outdated and remained secure at all times.
The crew members were discharged last Thursday under orders from Air Force Secretary Michael Donley, said spokeswoman Laurie Arellano. They had been barred from working around nuclear weapons and classified material since the July 12, 2008 incident, she said.
Can someone please tell me why we have guys sitting in a tube 24 hours per day ready for a bolt out of the blue nuclear attack from the Soviet Union … er, Russia? I can imagine the mentality of a nuke tube officer these days who must be asking him or herself what the heck is all this redundant process and alert mumbo jumbo for…
Not that I’m into troops falling asleep on duty. That’s a major no-no and it seems from the story it was in a crew rest area. But these secret codes and keys and old-school 1980s processes have to be changed or more incidents like this are going to happen and increasingly degrade the morale of an important segment of our Air Force.
– Christian
{ 44 comments… read them below or add one }
This happens more often than people are willing to admit. This time it just happened to be noticed by someone with ART15 power.
Agreed. I’ve fallen asleep in Missile Control. It’s a reality, PRP or not.
Some ring-knocker had a panic attack, told on himself, and screwed his buddies.
Bad lookin’ out.
After that b-52 nuke incident where a nuke was unknowingly flow across the country, the airforce is trying to hold people accountable. I admit falling asleep at missle command happens… but the AF is trying to fry some butt so people treat nukes with real concern, so they dont look bad again.
I vote we give control of the nukes to this new startup company called Cyberdyne Systems…
It does seem a touch harsh but then again I don’t know the full details.
On that other hand surely its just as important now as ever to have someone ‘in the tube’ 24/7 even though the cold war is over. Technology has made the world a lot smaller since the days of pearl harbour but the fact remains that a surprise doesn’t always occur when you’re expecting it :)
The threat of a massed nuclear attack might be the smallest its been since whenever but showing any sign of complacency in any area can’t be wise.
So what’s the alternative? The Soviet dead-hand system? I think not.
More along the lines of Christian’s comment–
Yes, it’s true. There are two people at the consoles 24/7, no matter if the missile battery you’re assigned to is actually Alert or not. And this is what’s frustrating.
Whatever you want to call it: SIOP, OPLAN 8044, OPLAN 8010, etc., you are assigned targets that may or may not be part of an Alert Target Package. If you’re Alert, you’re potentially ready to launch on a 15 minute warning; if you’re (Navy terms, at least) Mod Alert or Non Alert, you’re hours or days away from putting any birds in the air.
It’s very cool to know you’re making a difference and sitting in The Chair, covering an Alert target package and swapping “what if” stories with the guy next to you.
It’s very lame to sit there with a coffee pot and no bathroom, Mod Alert, knowing that you’re held to the same standards and yet you’re not in the same “performance mindset”.
On a Trident, the Navy should lock and seal all 4 entrances to Missile Control, during Mod and Non Alert periods, and add a line to the Aux Fwd’s watch clipboard to verify the seal integrity. Maybe throw-in a couple cameras, with screens on the Conn. When it’s time to go Alert, pop the seals, conduct a quick search of the space, power-up Fire Control, load the latest targeting & BALPARS updates and conduct a WSRT.
Am I missing something?
Well, if anyone caught the first half of Meteor on NBC last weekend, you will know that we may have less than 24 hours response time to launch every nuke we have in order to blast an asteroid out of the sky. So I guess it’s better safe than sorry…and we can’t have people asleep when this happens…
they were in the break room with outdated codes, is this some kind of entrapment to make some investigator happy???
Christian…you’ve never served in the military have you ? You come across as some holier than thou “know it all” and you have the nerve to question military discipline and attention to duty when it comes to mission standards ???
Those missile crews need to be awake and stay awake on their watch especially considering the mission they have to perform. The “Soviet Union” may be gone but “Russia” is the same old animal with a different name run by the same old “former” communists in power. Just look at Putin.
By the way, do us all a favor and go find another line of work like picking up thrash in the Pan Handle.
ooooh…Kayaker’s back!
You’re so warm and fuzzy all the time, I just can’t help myself but to respond.
Umm, just because I haven’t served in the military doesn’t mean I can’t be holier than thou…especially thou…
ooooo…I’m soooo afraid of Russia’s decrepit nuclear missile inventory…I think we can pretty much guarantee their missile officers are dead asleep from a vodka hangover 23 out of a 24 hour day. Oh, and will that vacuum tube control system actually fire the rocket? I wonder…
Notice I mentioned the whole falling asleep on guard duty rule? Yeah, I can see the dicipline problem Lima Charlie but it’s the larger issue of the 24 hour alert, code book, key turning BS I think is outdated…and torturous on our missileers. And most of the commenters here agree big guy…
up…back to picking up trash in the panhandle (huh?)…
xoxo
How much do you want to bet someone will take this story and come up with a way to paint security forces as DBAs?
At the top if you click “this awesome story”, you can read more about it. The missile crew is a two person crew and they were coming off their shift being down in the capsule. It sounds like they replaced outdated codec devices with up to date codec devices, so they were going to return the old devices to base. That stuff needs to have both crewmwmbers awake at all times until it is returned to the proper people on base. It is called “Loss of two person control.” When dealing with anything nuclear we cannot have any kind of loss of two person control.
That’s right, Charles. Loss of Two Person Control is the correct answer.
I have a balloon animal for you, or a piece of candy if you’d like. Your choice.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
Yes Christian, lets get rid of all these outdated rules and regulations. Those nukes that were “accidentally” flown across the USA in a B-52 without the crew even knowing they were on board really show how needless strict procedures are when dealing with nuclear weapons.
How old are you christen? I’ve seen 11 year olds reply the same fashion as you did.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
Automate ICBM silos (basis for movie Colussus The Forbin Project, 1970)
But some movie (Cold War era) 80s-70s had some computer control the ICBMs & they removed the Missile crews due to then Automation.
Today done by laptop alone & on the surface.
Wake up AF,Upgrade from Cold War status.
Change codes, Remove Men from the Loop.
Now with these threats from North Korea we’ve got to be on our tippy toes. No time for Zzzz’s.
They should have taken a nap before they came to work. When your at work it is important to stay awake. They should have drank coffee for christ’s sake!
Does anyone else who’s actually qualified (and stood) a watch in a Missile / Launch Control Center want to say anything?
I put five years of sea time in. If you want to tell Christian to F off, make sure you’ve passed a board with the Old Man before you open your mouth.
If you’ve never seen a nuclear bomb in real life; if you’ve never typed-in Lat/Long and Height-of-Burst with your own fingers, then this is the article where you read and someone else types.
Christian has good points whether he’s served or not. If you don’t like it, it doesn’t mean you’re right.
As one of the few to who actually has any time in the Minuteman System (351st OMMS/CTT ’74-’78) and also as someone with direct code handling experience, I know what it’s like to spend very long boring hours on alert or on site waiting for a parts run from the support base. SAC alwys teated any violation of code or nuke safety proceedures very seriously. We used to say “to ere is human, to forgive is not SAC policy”. If these guys lost control of the codes by falling asleep they deserve to be punished by Article 15. I think that discharges are a little overboard. It’s time that the USAF brought the pros back to maintain and operate the nuclear forces and let the TAC weenies go back dropping firecrackers on mud huts. It takes serious boys to play with serious toys.
Greetings. I was enjoying readig this exchange when I came to your piece saying you were in 351st OMMS from 1974 to 1974. I was there in EMT from 1973 to 1976, under SMS Ralph Ferioli, if you recall him. I went to OA twice, 1975 and 1976, when Whiteman came within a silver of winning the Blanchard. Fond memories all around. Good to hear another one of us is out there alive and kicking and still has a solid sense of reality! If you want to drop me a note, i am at mfabada@netzero.net.
Having never been in a silo, I can’t really say what goes on there, but I do remember my time at WSRT on a tube team and even for a DASO launch with all the brass looking at us. For just sleeping on watch you could face brig time, but for those with the keys they were automatically removed while the big boys figured out how hard they were going to whip the miscreants. I see some of the changes going on in the military (my son is now on West Pac), but that much still exists; at least in the Navy and even out here in the Merchant Marine side where I am.
As for taking the people out of the loop, that is one of the most stupid things I ever heard of. Two man rules exist for a real and important reason and needs to be continued.
Too bad the both the author of the article and the author of this piece have no clue what they were writing about, and this has resulted in many comments that are completely off target because the people commented on what was written instead of what happened.
No one was sleeping “on duty” — the three officers were sitting in a secure rest area waiting for their ride back to base after finishing their watch. The “classified material” they had with them was the lauch code from their shift which was no longer of any use to anyone.
For some undisclosed reason they did not get to leave immediately, and sitting around after a full shift, they dozed off. Yes, they are supposed to stay awake until they turn in the old codes. Yes, they were responsible for “classified material.” Yes, they violated the SOP.
And exactly how did the Air Farce find out that these officers had dozed off while waiting for their ride? The officers reported it themselves!
So let’s see….
- Someone else screwed up, leaving them waiting for their official ride after their shift;
- No material of any current intelligence value was ever compromised or even at risk;
- The officers honestly reported their own violation of SOP.
It looks to me like the only thing anyone got right in reporting or talking about this story is that fact that the system needs to be revised.
> If the event (offense) occurred after their tour while they were above ground waiting for transport, maybe there should be an authorized storage TPI-compliant container that the off-duty crew can use in cases like this (or if there’s a hold-up getting the relief crew on-duty)?
I think we would be better off without human control of silo’s missle launch codes and only use an advanced more “failsafe” wireless and wired system. All systems are failable but the human element could cause an inadvertant or even possible purposeful nuclear disaster. We also need a better system that would better assure us of being able to abort a missle launched before it hits target. The older system commonly called or refered to as “star Wars” was/is far from infalable. What we really don’t need/or want is even one mistake!
Take away the human element? never heard of The Doomsday Machine? Time to go rent ‘Dr. Strangelove’…..
There is no method to abort a tactical launch. Training, yes; tactical, no.
Well whats one or two more missiles when the 7000 warheads that the USA and former Soviet republics still hold as active weapons in their stockpiles. Point is, after the entire earth is rendered uninhabitable the first time,,,whose going to wake these fellows up and tell them that before they go outside, then need to expend just a few more war heads on the already dead bulk of humanity. Any wonder “Mutually assured destruction” M.A.D. was and still is our National Protocol.
Missile shields will soon render ballistic missiles useless. We need to keep our nukes ready but not with the M.A.D mentallity we have had with WMD’s that we have had.
Mutually-Assured Destruction has become an organic property of our nuclear arsenal, and it isn’t a top-level protocol or policy.
I know you’ve read about it in books and heard about it in movies, but the talk of MAD really has been deprecated to a subconscious understanding among nations and doesn’t exist much on paper.
We won’t be able to return to the status quo ante of no nuclear weapons, because the British, Russian, Chinese, Indian, Pakistan, Korean, Israeli, French, Iranian guys who have or are working on weapons programs would have to agree to that.
Nice idea; not gonna happen.
The USAF really should’ve given that break room a dual-combo safe, and that guy really should have kept his mouth shut.
Maybe they are as tired as the tired technology of the Minuteman III. Let’s get shiney news heavy ICBM’s to replace them like getting a shiney new car, that always excites me.
Yep, this is one of the bigger problems facing the Air Force right now. I’ve got a buddy in Security Forces up at Minot, and when I asked him what Officer careers he suggest I look into, he said “Anything but missile crew”. The alternative is automated systems, but I think that makes everybody a bit queasy..
I spent two tours on a Minuteman Missel crew. From what I read they were not in the Launch Control Center, but topside in the Lanuch Control Facility. Two of them shuold have been awake at all times. The punishment is just. I do not know present procedures, but from the fisrt Minuteman Missile in 1963 through 1982 updates were constantly being made to improve safety and unauthorized launching of missiles. Icould write a book about my crew experience, but enough said.
Does the term “TRIDENT” mean anything to you? The Navy Ballistic Missle Submarine made land based missles obsolete when the USS George Washington, SSBN 598, first went to sea on the first deterent patrol. We now have Trident SSBN Submarines carrying more missles with more warheads than the Air Force owns. Why are we wasting tax dollars and manpower keeping these antiques in service. Junk the missles. Give the silos to anyone who wants one and STOP WASTING OUR TAX DOLLARS!
Many of you responding here have violated security requirements by posting some of the details that you have. So, you have no room to make judgments on the program. Your judegment is obviously not very good. A lot of you have shown more ignorance of national security and the threats we face than intelligence. Know what you’re talking about before you talk about it and then remember that even if you’rr “out” of the service, sensitive information is still sensitive information and you have a responsibility to your country not to discuss it publicly.
I agree with Tim’s comment. The relieved crew was waiting up top in the rest area. There was an on-duty crew in the capsule and no one can get down there without them aware of it and the codes were already superceded. The local commander/unit messed up by not having a TPI safe up top or updated procedures for storing old codes downstairs for instances like this. The blame does not rest entirely on the relieved crew. They knew the messed up and reported it. Their bosses set them up as the scapegoats though.
The majority of those commenting have never served on missile crew, handled nuclear codes or understand the process of annual code change. The crew was topside, most likely waiting for a lift home, after a near all night shift of processing countless teams across their flight(s) of missiles. That’s tiring work, and why there were three instead of the normal two crew bears. They still should have worked out a process to keep themselves alert topside. It’s the AF leadership who have failed to set the example and communicate why nukes are still an important part of our nation’s force structure…Those who served under SAC know there was a method to the rules and procedures. The problem of not taking nukes serious has to be fixed from the top down because that’s where the problem began.
The 32-bit launch codes are set in a mechanical code unit installed in the Launch Control Panel. This mechanical code unit will “dissipate” the launch codes if the MCU, which is held on by two hex screws in the back, is removed. It goes ZZZIIIIPPP.
But since time immemorial, the codes vault back at the wing has always insisted that the crews bring the LCP back intact following annual squadron code change so the MCUs can be “verified.”
There has always been the potential for code compromise due to this inherently risky procedure. Dissipating the two MCUs in the LVP would have left the whole assembly unclassified FOUO.
Fortunately, the launch codes themselves were superseded. Even if compromised it wouldn’t have done anyone any good anyway. It’s just a random string of 32 bits.
This was a serious overreaction to a situation that was absolutely inevitable considering the nonsense policy of keeping the MCUs intact for the multi-hour transport back to base. And as usual the O1s and O2s get screwed.
With five years of SAC Atlas F missile crew duty in the early 60s, I can only wonder about the current UMD versus actual manning status of current missile crews. We were about 70 to 80 percent manned (2 officers, 3 NCOs per crew) UMD-wise in those days and chronic fatigue was always a factor – with 90 to 100 hour work weeks until the happy day when the system was deactivated in June 1965. But work was not boring in those ancient days of yore, which encompassed the “Cuban Missile” crisis; rather the system demanded constant attention and kept 5 crew members constantly employed in order to maintain alert status.
automate everything-its time that we meet the fire we face with REAL fire, ie lets install a soviet-style dead hand system afdter we take-out the man-feature and wire these directly into the oval office-that way, our pres can pull the trigger when he see’s its necessary and if somethings happened to him, let’r fly anyways!
Depending on the year and wing, these MCUs were dissipated in the field before return to base. The issue here was most likely the SDU Keying Variable which while superceded is a hard coded EPROM that cannot be destroyed in the field. BTW, the MCUs have four set screws each.
Could have been the SDU but all the reporting referenced “launch codes.” I can’t remember the classification level of a superseded SDU. Seems to me they’re only secret, not that that makes it any better. Does REACT even use SDUs anymore, or have they gone to a key loader?