That shipboard PZ requires no dip clearances to launch from and can move to threaten any part of the enemy’s coastline.

The Army’s been steadily taking a higher rate of being hit by SAFIRES than Marines. I’m willing to bet their mishap rate is higher, as well, from unnecesarily flying lower than tactically justified.

The aircraft’s size, complexity, and logistical requirements force a MV-22 bed down location farther from the battlefield. MV-22 launched from a carrier PZ 250 miles from the fight, reach the LZ no sooner than helicopters launched from adjacent allied land 140 miles from the fight. How much fuel does the MV-22 need thus eliminating realistically-sized and resourced FARPs close to the battle?

The sole case where Army aviation “got the crap kicked out of it” was a hurried interdiction attack where insufficient fuel and other airspace requirements dictated an inappropriate route. Even then only a single aircraft was forced to land and none crashed.

Two days later a similar deep attack was far more successful, as have been 8 years of combat flying ever since with helicopters.

To reach such speed the aircraft must have a cabin too small to hold normal equipment, big body-armored troops, and supplies. The props create excessive localized downwash and create fires. They don’t allow it to fit in many small LZs or closely adjacent to other aircraft. The capability to hover at high altitude in hot conditions is severely compromised, leaving an aircraft hauling around munchkin trucks and insufficient ammunition for the M-777 thus endangering the ground Marine.

The V-22’s survivability is far better than any helo

Everyone quotes the CH-47 as being so fast–I’ll bet dollars to doughnuts that a fleet configured version does not hit 170 sustained.

That ratio would result in a cost per month for 1800 hours equaling approximately $4.5 million for the 10 MV-22 (450 hrs), $3.7 million for 10 CH-47F (540 hrs), and $2.2 million for 10 UH-60M (810 hrs) or about $10.4 million a month vs. $14.4 million for 30 MV-22s flying only 1440 hours.…360 monthly hours less than the mixed fleet.

If we used Ashton Carter’s $45 per gallon combat cost of fuel, the difference is far greater.

More aircraft (30) flying more flight hours (1800 vs 1440 hrs) for $4 million less a month, with far less procurement cost…and probably using a similar or less deck/hangar space aboard Marine ships. Sounds like a no-brainer.

Sure the UH-60M would carry fewer Marines but the greater aircraft numbers and the CH-47F would make up for it. 24 MV-22 carrying 20 Marines (heavier body armor/center belly gun/ hot/high) = 480 Marines in one lift. Ten aircraft of each carries 200 Marines in a MV-22, 300 in 10 CH-47F, and 100 in 10 UH-60M for 600 Marines in a single lift.

*MV-22: $72 million upfront flyaway cost and $10,000 per flight hour x 60 hours/month in theater = $600,000 per aircraft per month

*CH-47F: $36 million upfront flyaway cost and $6800 per flight hour x 60 hours/month in theater= $408,000 per aircraft per month

*UH-60M: $18 million upfront flyaway cost and $2700 per flight hour x 60 hours/month in theater = $162,000 per aircraft per month

Back in 2005, the UH-60L has flying hour cost of $2700 and the CH-47D had one of around $6800. Newer models of both with better diagnostics and maintenance lessons learned will be comparable in today dollars. Compare that to $11,000 per hour for the MV-22.

Yes, I know the Marines traditionally fly higher than the Army. The Army obviously have proven they can fly lower successfully. I’m not talking about NOE, but the Army does train its utility pilots to fly that low. ;)