I’m going to be talking today at 1400 EST to Andrew Lubin, a freelance journalist, blogger and Military.com contributor about his recent trip to Afghanistan.
Andrew has some rather controversial impressions from his visit — is the Army losing its fighting spirit, can McChrystal win the counterinsurgency fight, what makes the Marines’ strategy so successful?
We’ll answer all those questions and more live today on our Boots on the Ground podcast. Please join us for a listen.
UPDATE: Below you’ll see the final version of the podcast. You can also feel free to subscribe to Boots on the Ground with iTunes.
Andrew paints a pretty bleak picture of Army operations in the East…a contingent of troops who lack the aggression and are unwilling to assume the risks inherent in a true counterinsurgency campaign. Lubin also says that while the overall commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, is a solid Soldier, it’s unclear that he lacks the “Big Army” mentality to streamline the decision making, shift the emphasis from force protection to “clear, hold and build” in a simultaneous way and to win over the Afghans who respect aggression and decisiveness.
Lubin also tells of some pretty harsh restrictions on fire support missions and feeds in some reporing he’s uncovered about what went wrong at Wanat and Camp Keating which were both nearly overrun by Taliban assaults. This is a must listen.
– Christian
{ 16 comments… read them below or add one }
Geez, with all due respect to a 50+ white haired guy humping around the flatlands of Helmand Province with active duty Marines, his basis for comparison is dissimilar and therefore his conclusions about the Marines versus the "bigArmy" (whatever that means) are inept.
He goes to sparsely populated Helmand and walks around on flatlands with thousands of Marines, Then he goes a heavily populated area near Jalabad where 250 National Guard ARMOR troops, many of whom are older like him, are turned into temporary Infantry who will be in country AN ENTIRE YEAR INSTEAD OF THE MARINE'S SIX MONTHS.
That entire year biz coupled with Army units on their 3rd and 4th tours for AN ENTIRE YEAR is the reason they end up converting a National Guard armor unit into an infantry one…to give the active guys on their 3rd and 4th tours a much deserved break. Next time suggest he hangs out with the 82nd Airborne and see if he can hang in the mountains instead of the flatlands. And while he's at it, see if he can get a MV-22 to drop him and 20 of his Marine buddies off at a 7,000' COP.
IT'S ALL BUSH'S FAULT !!!!!1!
Let me add that he owes the men of 2nd Platoon, Chosen Few Company a huge apology for implying that they fell asleep and had their throat cuts. In fact, the troops at OP Topside were wide awake like the rest of the platoon for stand-to. The LRAS systems at the OP was specifically focusing on a detected force west of the COP when the shooting began (page 88-89).
Before relying on rumor and innuendo, suggest your pal reporter consult Douglas Cubbison's 249 page history of Wanat. He can look at page 122 through 138 to learn about events at the OP in detail.
Then he can learn that the first of 52 155mm rounds impacted 6 minutes after the first machinge guns rounds engaged our forces at 0420. The first Apaches arrived and had rounds on target around the OP at 0523 and 0534 after a half hour flight from Jalabad. The pilots were not sleeping and the aerial QRF responded immediately when finally told about the mission. The ground QRF arrived around the same time as the Apaches from 8 kms away. The first CAS rounds from a B-1 impacted 38 minutes after first shots fired on the ground.
Let me make clear what the problem is: there's an idiot impostor commanding the helm.
Because everything in Afghanistan was perfect and rosy on January 19th. Right.
Cole could you provide citations please. im curious to verify what you say.
It appears that much of the details come from the book he mentions and whose pages related to the above post are provided.
I have read that there is a report on this fight but whether it is available to the unbathed masses I can't say. Reports that deflate egos and tarnish carefully nourished images tend to be less than easy to procure, if at all. Some of the details mentioned likely come from this report.
The book sounds like a must read.
Hope this helps, Roger.
Roger, believe a version is still online at Battlefield Tourist if you google Douglas Cubbison. Also, a link is available to the same site from a DoDBuzz post titled "Small Arms Jammed at Wanat" from October 13th. Unfortunately that version does not have pdf page numbers.
Sorry, didn't feel like going back to look each fact up again and had the feeling he was accusing me of lying. One correction to note: First Apache fires were at 0523 and 0524, about an hour after first contact. I had typoed in 0534.
Also recommend reading the battalion commander's "Military Review" article for counterpoints to Mr. Cubbison. See similar counterpoints by Gian Gentile and others at SmallWarsJournal.com. Also recommend finding the CBS News video and drawn illustration of the terrain and compare it to the ABC News enemy's video of the battle to help visualize the terrain.
Great interview, thanks
Cole,
I agree with most of your points. But remember that many of those six month tour Marines are on their 3rd or 4th tour and still on their first enlistment, and many units have been deploying 6 months out of 12 since 2004. I also have no doubt that most Marine grunt battalions can tromp around the mountains as well as the 82nd, if given that mission. And lets see if Army aviation in a UH-60 can drop him off at the same 7,000 foot COP.
Army aviation would be dropping them off in Chinooks, not UH-60's. Wouldn't be a problem.
Regardless of it being a NG Armor unit, it's ridiculous that any Army unit isn't practicing COIN as per the hard lessons learned in Iraq. Why are these guys still in their MRAP's?
With respect to Mr. Lubin, you cannot generalize about the performance, fighting spirit, and COIN tactics of the entire US Army in Afghanistan from spending ten days with a demoralized, undermanned National Guard Unit. I'm quite certain he would find fault with absolutely anything the US Army does.
come on guys….wrong enemy! Let's concentrate and focus on the bad guys not who's better the Marines or the Army. Both have their hands full.
This reporter's generalizations about the Army and Marines are ridiculous. It boils down to leadership at the unit level… some units are better led than others – it has nothing to do with being a Marine or Army. I know what I am talking about, I spent a year as an Army infantryman attached to a Marine division in Al Anbar.
http://www.stripes.com/08/nov08/wanat01.pdf