This article first appeared in Aerospace Daily & Defense Report.
The U.S. Air Force’s ISR chief says a new bomber design will be more about intelligence gathering and non-kinetic weapons than about bombing.
The arsenal of this “long-range, ISR/Strike” aircraft may eventually include directed energy and network attack, says Lt. Gen. Dave Deptula, deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).
Directed energy weapons under development by the Pentagon include a range of lasers and devices that produce pulses of high-power microwaves. Other non-kinetic capabilities include the attack of enemy sensors with very precise, exotic-waveform jamming and the low-power, electronic invasion of networks that link tactical weapon systems such as advanced air defenses.
The new bomber also will reflect experience gained in Afghanistan with operation of Lockheed Martin’s RQ-170 Sentinel unmanned, stealthy, surveillance aircraft. The Sentinel’s identification was first revealed on Aviation Week’s Ares blog (www.aviationweek.com/ares) Dec. 5. That experience also will add currency to a much greater ISR content in the new design.
“Clearly low observability is part of the [new ISR/Strike aircraft] equation,” Deptula says. “It also makes sense to put ‘find and fix’ sensors on the same platform that applies the effect. And not all those effects may be kinetic. Technology has pushed us beyond [the bomber] and fiscal constraints push us toward [multi-role]. The most important part of a future bomber is not to deliver bombs but to assimilate information rapidly and translate it into decisions.”
A non-negotiable element in the formula is that operations and ISR will be tightly fused on a single platform. “To continue to talk about a segregation of intelligence and operations simply doesn’t make … sense,” Deptula says. Moreover, the U.S. has to be prepared for a spectrum of contingencies from the irregular warfare of Afghanistan to conventional conflict against the forces of developed nations.
Read the rest of this story, see why there’s some serious debate about JSF, check out the latest on anti-piracy efforts and see why the Trident decision is slipping from our friends at Aviation Week, exclusively on Military.com.
– Christian
{ 34 comments… read them below or add one }
What we have here is the new airborne battleship – as you say "assimilate information rapidly and translate it into decisions" and then put the wespons and other effects where they have been targetted.
This makes aircraft persistence in the target area an issue but we could reasonably assume there are effective C4I links and tactical picture sharing so aircraft can be relieved on task
Is this decision to move more toward DEWs and intelligence gathering and away from conventional warheads going to be like the Air Force not building a gun into the F-4 Phantom?
The Air Force thought the days of aerial combat were long over and missiles could do the job. Are we banking that DEWs and lasers can do the job in place of a good old 1000lbs bomb?
Before I get jumped on, I know the Air Force didnt 'build' the F-4 Phantom, I'm just saying they decided against the gun being an integral part of the aircraft.
So the new bomber is a glorified electronics platform/spy plane? Like the drunken one night stand child of Wild Weasel and a spy plane?
The spy plane tech is good an all, but I think the ability to carry a MASSIVE bomb load is also critical. Look at our B-52s doing loiter and strike missions over Afghanistan. Massive load with loiter time allows our bombers to perform multiple air support missions against several targets over time using precision weapons. Any new bomber needs to be able to perform that same mission.
The new Air Force bomber is a medium-range stealth / low-observable design. It fills a different niche then the long-range, massive payload capability.
The "2018 bomber" is supposed to be medium-sized (in the vein of the F-111) while the "2037 bomber" should be a heavy strategic bomber to replace the B-52, B-1, and B-2.
True, IF they keep the previous set of requirements, but one of the things that sank the last effort was the glaring inability to hit parts of the globe with enough firepower down the road. If the AF isn't asleep at the wheel this time, the NGB will be subsonic and payload will be at least 30K (60k is optimum) and the unrefueld range will be >4000nm.
Long Endurance, ISR platform and DEWs. Yep this thing is going to be designed to be unmanned, unless they are going to load it with Nukes. As for the move toward DEWS as opposed to the kinetic weapons the reasoning is this. Hit a target without hitting others around it. The ultimate surgical strike. Say you can take out an HVT simply by hitting him with a laser? No explosion, no shrapnel, no splash damage. It will still be able to go kinetic but adding DEWs means it can be more precise when the timing and situation presents itself.
Splash damage lol
From my understanding it is very likely to have nuclear weapons capability, thus it is very likely to manned.
A standoff platform with low-observable missiles would be a smarter purchase.
And, a heavy lifter that can launch iron bombs in non-contested airspace from a high altitude would also be a cheap option.
Neither option would need to be low observable. Nor would they need expensive radar absorbing skin and climate controlled hangers.
Heh. Here we go again….
Got all the way to seven comments before the Cruise Missile Cultist POV showed up. Cruise Missiles are only more cost effective if you never use them, and they are NEVER as efficient as direct attack. The described system in the article above tells me that the AF has likely (and finally!) characterized the probable size and types of target sets they have in mind for planning purposes.
Q: How does one achieve uncontested airspace against a near peer or peer opponent without LO? Other than with sheer numbers and high attrition rates that is? Keep in mind that most first rank air defense systems can reach high and far and their going higher and farther all the time.
Low Observability IS a big part of the price of admission in a modern battlespace.
SMSgt Mac you are exaclty right. Any design that does not include LO features is doomed to failure on future battlefields.
I think the only reason anyone is considering a bomber without LO features is because of our recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan which have not produced any credible air defense threats.
We need to keep in mind enemies with a moderately sophisticated to highly advanced air defense networks.
BTW – I admit it (again), I'm a HUGE fan of General Deptula, and as I've said before, Petraeus is like the Deptula of the Army. If Deptula doesn't get his fourth star it will be because he didn't want it.
I think too many people have been lulled into the mindset that we will always enjoy Air Superiority in every conflict. Afghanistan and Iraq have contributed to this.
There is no guarantee that all future conflicts will be against extremists using non-conventional warfare strategies. We must still be prepared to fight a war against a well equipped adversary like Russia, or china. Low Observability will be key to winning any battle against a modern foreign military.
We can't build another B-52 and just expect to have air superiority secured in order to use it.
Sounds like EWOs got a new toy to fly in coming soon, and btw, i bet it has a B-2 like bomb load, i hope it comes out in time for me to fly on this new bad boy.
In principle, will we really need those kinds of bomb loads in the future? I thought higher precision weaponry would negate the need to drop strips and strips of bombs on target.
Well, in spite of the ambiguity of the phrase "those kinds of bomb loads", the answer is: Yes.
Perspective is required. The NGB will almost certainly be bought in numbers fewer than 100, most probably (from past study findings) fewer than 60, and very possibly fewer than 40. The NGB will almost certainly have a SIOP mission as well, so at anything less than a major war, the warfighters will probably have about half 'available' for conventional warfare. Subtract a handful that are programmed for maintenance/updates at any time andyou are not talking huge numbers of bombs/weapons – just numbers that are heavier and need to be carried farther than a small vehicle can carry.
Quite a shame because I think we really need more than 100 when you consider the B-52s will probably start retiring earlier than planned due to all of the use they are getting in Afghanistan.
Then again we should have gotten 500+ F-22As if you ask me.
Concur on both counts
More perspective: Desert Storm in 1991 presented planners (of which Gen Deptula – then LtCol Deptula -was the Master Attack Planner in the 'Black Hole' in Saudi Arabia) with a planned target set that by the time the air war ended (~44 days) of 772 target sets (Gulf War Airpower Survey DOD, 1993, Volume II Section 2, p. 87) Assuming these target sets averaged two and one half aimpoints per target (Untying the Bloody Scarf, Bowie, 1998, p. 14), the target sets would consist of 3860 aimpoints. Add to that number the approximately 1000 naval strikes by the U.S. Navy and assuming these optimistically averaged one aimpoint per sortie (Bowie, 1998), and add to the sum of those numbers an estimated 23,126 aimpoints for targets struck in Kuwait using the kill-box area assignment method (DOD, 1993, Summary, p. 4). The total ~27000 is then a reasonable approximation of the total number of aimpoints equal to an entire Desert Storm-sized air campaign. This was for a medium sized, moderatley industrilaizedd opponent. Imagine how many aimpoints a near-peer or peer competitor could present. We're working on doing thing smarter all the time, but you still have to make the enemy understand he is lost.
heh – make that 'moderately industrialized'
Good Morning Folks,
It seems that Lt. General Deptula has changed his mind. A few months ago he was strongly supporting the virtues of Cold War Legacy platforms such as the F-22 and F-35 and preaching the gospel according to Saints; Lockheed, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and there disciples of big spending defense contracts. seems Lt. General Deptula has got the word.
This of course is the UAB-1, formally the now canceled B-3 platform, the ISR systems and non-kinetic weapons are no longer Sci_Fi dreams but in fact are being developed and becoming operational. I would like to see a twin engine medium bomber in the range 15-20Kton. weapons load, A bomber that could be home based in CONUS, but could be deployed quickly to and supported in theater level facilities when needed.
Based in theater with in flight refueling the UAB-1 could stay on station for days, not just hours. With the ability to be based and operate locally in theater the AF could buy fewer platforms. This would greatly increase the AF’s ability to get into the fight before it’s over.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Well, its much, much more expensive to make a plane larded to the gills with all manner of high tech, gee-willikers gee-gaws than one that simply drops bombs.
And as we all know, the point of any military procurement program is to spend money. Lots and lots of money. As much money as humanly possible before Congress cancels the program after 17 years of "development". So planes bristling with sensors and death beams are a perfect fit.
IT is much, much more expensive to make guns that arrows.
….And as many (vs ALL) know, using "as we all know" is a form of 'Poisoning the Well' …. and it sounds like someone could use a remedial lesson in Acquisition101: http://photos1.blogger.com/blogger/2509/643/1600/...
GREAT 'Friday Red Meat Post' Christian! The only thing I need to make it perfect is for someone to start blah-blahing about mythical Military Industrial Complexes
To be fair Mac, you can't say the 20 year F-22 development that broke the bank at 200 planes was exactly a success story.
Ah, but I'm not saying that. Nor was the development phase 20 years BTW- the last critical elements of the -22 that were delivered to clear it for LRIP was in February 2001. At that point you could say the initial development was complete, and all the rest have been improvements. With adequate up front funding, EMD would have been done years earlier. Check the history of the development effort – the only massive 'Fail' was how anti-military spending types in Congress kept the program on a starvation $ diet in hopes that it would die of malnutrition. The F-22 (I believe the F-23 was a better plane BTW) had the misfortune of being born during a time when hyperventilating peaceniks were trying to squeeze out a 'Peace Dividend' and it has suffered the its entire existence becasue of it. I kick myself all the time for not downloading a Lockheed brief I found sitting in the background of their public servers circa 2001. It had a beautiful slide (with refs) showing about 80% of cost growth was due to dragging out the EMD and production efforts while slashing total numbers bought.
I just remember growing up in an air force town in high school around 1995-96 all the defense headlines reading "F-22 any day now" and "F-22 next big thing" and the buy went from almost 1000 planes to something like 800 then down every year. After that it just seemed like the can would indefinitely be kicked down the road until they actually fielded a squadron a few years ago. Wasn't the design approved around 1992 or so? At what point did it go from being an air superiority fighter to getting a ground role, an ISR role, and whatever extra missions they've tacked onto it?
If you could ever find that Powerpoint I would love a copy. Indeed the F-22 was mismanaged not by Lockheed but by the government. In my opinion not buying a full complement of F-22s was a massive mistake. Now there is far too much pressure on the F-35 program which has many hurdles to overcome still.
As JMatt brought up, it seems like a lot of our weapons programs would be a lot cheaper and faster to build if we stick with the basics. The army asks for a rifle, and after 10 years and half a billion dollars they're handed a rifle, grenade launcher, rocket launcher, sniper rifle, and an iphone rolled into one that weighs 25 pounds and tells them "no thanks." Same rules seem to apply with the F-35, EFV, Bradley, and probably the last couple ship designs the Navy has churned out. I don't know if its Congress' fault, the services, or industry, but KISS doesn't seem to apply when it comes to weapons acquisition.
The F-22's System Operational Requirements were finalized in March, and the YF-22 was selected for development in August 1991.
RE: Complexity vs. Simplicity.
This again is more a matter of perception than reality. Older systems only seem simple in light of today's technology, and we forget that those older systems were once the 'Advanced' this or that of their time. There is NO advanced weapon system that is mature out of the box, and I would submit the infantryman of 1917 would find the M4 (or AK) as much a complex mystery as a WW1 ace would find the F-22.
Most people don't know that the KISS acronym came out of aerospace (as in Keep it Simple AND Stupid) by the guy who brought us the most advanced (for their day) systems in the sky at the time.
part 2:
What some call Einstein's Razor is most appropriate for Defense: "Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler." It is the complexity of the battlefield that drives the complexity of the tools. The only thing unchanging is the nature of Man. It is now as it always has been, and I contend as it always shall be. OK, whoa -gotta stop. …Must not get me started on philosophy….
Yours in the Common Defense-