Our good friend Bob Cox who writes on the Fort Worth Star Telegram’s Sky Talk blog recognized the irony yesterday in the brutal flogging of the JSF program by SecDef Gates and yet another JSF test plane taking to the sky at virtually the same moment.
One day after being publicly chastised, if you will, by the secretary of defense for its lack of performance on the F-35 joint strike fighter, Lockheed Martin got its fifth F-35 test airplane in the air Tuesday for the first time.
First flight of the F-35B model (BF-3) short-takeoff and vertical landing jet had been held up for several days by the recent spate of cold, overcast weather.
I betcha MGEN Heinz wishes he could blame his troubles on the weather.
Read the rest of Bob’s post here. And all you JSF addicts, be sure to keep tabs on his blog…he’s like the Rainman of all things JSF.
– Christian
{ 12 comments… read them below or add one }
I can't help but wonder where might the F-35 program be had not they insisted on a STOVL version.
No different. The typical view from those in the companies who get these developement contracts is seen as an insentive to do their absolute best to drag their feet in the hopes of getting more dollars for less work. The system going to preformance based payments is better then this other procurement option I just covered.
Without any international partners and with a much more skeptical Congress.
The Navy is already lukewarm and the Air Force isn't nearly as vigorous in its effort to keep the JSF going as the Marines — they wanted more F-22s and were willing to sacrifice F-35s to get them.
Without the F-35B, the program might well have been cancelled.
Wonder no more! We would have had at least two and maybe three independent programs. From a CRS 10/09 report:
PART 1
The JSF program emerged in late 1995 from the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program, which began in late 1993 as a result of the Clinton administration’s Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. defense policy and programs.
The BUR envisaged the JAST program as a replacement for two other tactical aircraft programs that were being terminated (the A-12 program, which was intended to provide a stealthy new carrier-based attack plane to replace the Navy’s aging A-6 carrier-based attack planes, and the multi-role fighter [MRF], which was the Air Force had considered as a replacement for its F-16 fighters).
PART 2 (Same report)
In 1995, in response to congressional direction, a program led by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop an advanced short takeoff and vertical landing (ASTOVL) aircraft was incorporated into the JAST program. This opened the way for Marine Corps and UK participation in the JAST program, since the Marine
Corps and the UK were interested procuring a new STOVL aircraft to replace their aging Harrier STOVL attack aircraft. The name of the program was then changed to Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to focus on joint development and production of a next-generation fighter/attack plane.
Rainman…..Nevermind, I can't do it. it's too easy.
A day late and a dollar short. Well, actually years late and billions of dollars short, but who's counting?
Now, can anyone answer the question with justification as to is it more appropriate to view the 'costs' of the JSF program from the perspective of it being one program or three programs as embodied in one? Is it better or worse VALUE?
(Just Askin')
Most people look at costs on a per unit basis, and distinguish between the per unit costs of different models, so it doesn't make much of a difference. Either way, the planes are about 2.5 times or more the price at which they were originally bid.
The harder issue would be whether to adjust the prices for the fact that Congress has cut the number of units that it plans to buy. But, in practice, the units were cut because the contractors were over budget, and the per unit cost excluding R&D is still much more than the original total per unit price, so it doesn't matter much when trying to determine who is to blame.
I question the '2.5 times cost' figure, unless possibly (and only possibly)it involves then-year vs future-year dollars AND does not allow for material capability differences in different baselines. Authoritative (not CDI, FAS, ELP, etc) sources? Even then we are still required to factor in Congressional manipulation. [Sorry "But, in practice, the units were cut because the contractors were over budget" is not accurate. In the latest round, the impact of Congresional cost drivers were seen coming: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_gene... An excellent foreshadowing of a SMSgt Mac's Acquisition 101 Course exercise come to life] .
We also should note that programs after 'Aquisition Reform' are not managed to control unit cost but Total Ownership Costs: unit costs are an important subset, but not the end-all.
And finally,
Let's all keep in mind that on Cost Plus programs, the Gov't (ostensibly including Congress since it is their rules), recognizes the cost/schedule.performance risk of developing new technology. and there are legal and contractual mechanisms that establish when and what is 'excessive' or 'acceptable' costs and whether or not such technology is worth forging ahead with and fielding.
It is hilarious when this stuff gets thought of as if its like shopping at WalMart. That kind of merchandise gets bought via Firm Fixed Price contracts, again — according to laws passed by Congress.
Sure is pretty,but heck why cant we just get an A-1 that will burn kerosene?-Kevin