The Ganjgal 15–6 investigation levels some pretty heavy blame on the battalion command for being absent during the key moments of an ambush of Army and Marine trainers that left five Americans and eight Afghan soldiers dead. Officers in the battalion TOC failed to “competently track the battle and synchronize efforts” to provide fire support to the ambushed troops, it reads. Timely indirect fire support was not provided, even though repeated calls went out for just that.
The issue of fire support is a big one here. Only four artillery salvoes were fired in the first minutes of the operation and then all other requests for fires were denies. According to reporting by McClatchy’s Jonathan Landay, a field officer in one command post denied fire support because of a lack of “situational awareness” of friendly locations and the location of a village nearby.
The report notes that the ambushed troops blamed the lack of fire support on Afghan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s tactical directive restraining the use of artillery and air strikes. The report says that was not the case.
It’s likely that fear of fratricide was a bigger concern to the fire support officers in the battalion TOC and at higher headquarters than fears of killing civilians. The report repeatedly criticizes the lack of situational awareness of the battle at all echelons.
A good example of the difficulty in getting clarity on a dynamic situation is provided by Josh McLaughlin, at the al Sawha blog site, who recounts a story from 2008 when he was in Iraq serving as the Task Force Fire Support Officer in a TOC when a platoon from his battalion was hit by a complex attack.
Gun runs by OH-58 Kiowas were not enough to run off the insurgents so the soldiers on the ground called in an air strike on a mosque from which they were taking fire. They decided to drop a 500 pound bomb from a pair of F-16s overhead. McLaughlin explains what happened next:
“We checked and re-checked the engagement location with the ground elements, running their grids through our targeting systems to ensure we were about to target the correct building (in this case a mosque). After doing this multiple times, attempting to confirm visually through our sensors, we finally received clearance to engage. As the F-16 began its final run-in, we were told by the powers that be to abort the 500 pound bomb drop. Hellfire strikes from the OH-58s coupled with advancing US and Iraqi elements were able to finally gain control of the situation.
As the event culminated, I sat and watched in amazement as the elements on the ground cleared a different mosque than the one we had seemingly confirmed a dozen times over. The grid my team in the TOC was provided with over and over again was not the location the ground element was clearing. My Fire Supporters in the TOC took the grid from the ground element and the building description and found a match. What we did not realize is that there were multiple mosques in the area matching the description, and one of them was too new to be on our newest and most up-to-date imagery.”
Even with aerial drones orbiting the battlefield they were still unable to get the fire coordinates right. Now think of troops in contact and frantic radio calls and absent officers and no overhead surveillance. I can understand the reluctance of officers to start calling in strikes when they don’t have a good handle on where the good and bad guys are.
{ 26 comments… read them below or add one }
"I can understand the reluctance of officers to start calling in strikes when they don’t have a good handle on where the good and bad guys are."
I completely disagree, thats what the men on the ground are doing telling you when and where or at least should be.
They call for support they should recieve it.
If the Support blows the hell out of the wrong building and turns the whole village over to the other side, what good has it done?
Cost us 8 soldiers thats what good it didn't do!
Let me get this straight. In order to avoid accidentally killing our own troops, command denied them the fire support that allowed the enemy to kill our troops instead. Makes perfect sense to me.
BDwilcox,
I couldn't have said it better myself. We all know what's happening here. No one is saying it —McChrystal's ROE's are getting people killed.
During the current operation, Commanders are complaining about his ROE's. He might be popular with the Afghans…hell they want us there for another 20 years but with the average Soldier or Marine, his orders are a mystery. Seems to me like someone from Headquarters must have tapped DT on the shoulder and spun them a bit.
The other thing that no one is saying is that these aren't McChrystal's ROE's, they're Obama's.
The analysis is all wrong. The issue is a military that still thinks this is 1940. There is absolutely no need for a CO or anyone else to be in the loop between the grunt and the arty/SSMs. The technology exists to make the weapons slave to the grunt. Give each squad Lt or Sgt a targeting device that links directly to an NLOS, GMLRS or arty unit with Excalibur shells. The grunt paints the target, hits the fire button, and Wham Bam Thank You Mam the fight is over 60 seconds later. Instead they have a fire support protocol with the organizational speed of the US Postal Service.
Solomon. Did you EVEN READ the article? It clearly documents-in detail-that despite some troops blaming the ROEs, the situation had NOTHING to do with the ROEs and (as usual) was the result of a confluence of factors. This stuff is not simple. And as much as some people would like to make it simple (It's McCrystal's, Obama's faults etc) it AIN'T gonna be simple. People in charge make difficult decisions in difficult situations. That's why they get paid the big bucks and why they are ultimately responsible…
And this is exactly why each unit should carry at least a few M-72 LAAW rocket launchers on each mission.
No need for Arty or Air for a quick fix.
Of course humpin one would be a pain in the azz…
What makes you think the typical load out doesn't include LAAWs. Have you ever seen what the average Marine grunt carries? It normally includes a LAAW.
We dont use LAAWs anymore, AT4s
I believe we need more FOB's with ADEQUATE defense… we also need to be consistenaly on top of those FOB's. Killing us the way they do… and getting the scoop on us from within… like with the Afghan police, Military personnel and farmer!! Makes them stroger and gives the Taliban an advantage to recruit new faggots to their cause..Unfortunately $$$ makes the world go round… no matter what religion, nationality or belief's.
"My Fire Supporters in the TOC took the grid from the ground element and the building description and found a match. What we did not realize is that there were multiple mosques in the area matching the description, and one of them was too new to be on our newest and most up-to-date imagery………….Even with aerial drones orbiting the battlefield they were still unable to get the fire coordinates right”
We've become to dependent on state of the art equipment that we question the on site ground forces instead of the equipment. Back in the day we relied on coordinates from our FO's, not some outdated pictures from some satellite. After the first four salvo's, the artillery stopped because of a lack of “situational awareness”. They had all afternoon to better that “situational awareness”, send in a helo to verify what was happening on the ground. Get off your lazy A$$ and fly there yourself with a reaction force, DO SOMETHING!
I commanded an infantry battalion in I Corps from 1Jan66 to 25Jun66….then considered a "normal tour." The ROE stated if a unit received fire from a ville fire could not be returned unless the exact source of that fire could be determined. My orders….and I made damned sure every one of my NCOs and officers understood this….was that they would ALWAYS be able to identify the source of fire, and direct the friendly fire in the proper direction. So much for that ROE. On the ground we knew which villes were occupied and which were not. The latter were used as "rest areas" for the enemy. Registration with WP, although not firing directly on the ville itself which would not have been permitted took care of the "rest areas." The VC/NVN might as well get their tails wet as we did whenever it rained.
The problem with any organization with a hierarchal structure is that as career minded members of the organization move up the organizational ladder, the desire to not make a mistake eventually outweighs doing what they are supposed to be doing because that involves a measure of risk. It is easier for those to "explain their decision not to do anything" than to deal with the reality of doing something. There comes a point in the progression where the main goal of such a career minded member is to move further up the ladder and this is accomplished by playing the political game within the organization rather than doing the business of the organization. The military is no different and results a lack of real leadership above the level where the rubber meets the road.
The Department of Defense is run by the ultimate political game player in Gates and that sets the tone all the way down.
hit the nail on the head there mike!!
Career minded and gun shy officers I believe are at fault here but, in my opinion this stems back to the ROE's and has our troops at all levels thinking twice to drop the hammer fearing back lash from the highers.
I personally witnessed a young PFC in Iraq fire on what appeared to be at the time a legitimate and justified threat to his squad and was reprimanded for it. If it wasn't for myself and the team going to his chain for his defense, BN level no less, he would had received further disciplinary action. (comment continued)
(continued) Let’s not forget why we're here! Let our officers fight this war and for those who are in positions of “influence” apologize for us when collateral damage does happen. As for all the service members waking up every morning with death tugging at their shoulder, I and many more like me rather be judged by 12 then to be carried by 6…If it’s our watch when you call for fire, we have your back brother! (End)
Let our officers fight this war and for those who are in positions of “influence” take a serious look at what happen here. As for all the service members on patrol…If it’s our watch when you call for fire, we have your back brother!
(continued) Lets not forget why we're here! If you give a politian or liberal the choice of taking responsibility for ordering FIRE FOR EFFECT or jumping out of the 80th floor window of a high rise building in fear of burning to death, I'm pretty sure he would level the area….twice! BL- Let our officers fight this war and for the politians apologize for us when collatral damage does happen. As for all the service members waking up every morning with death tugging at their shoulder, I and many more like me rather be judged by 12 then to be carried by 6…If its our watch when you call for fire, we have your back brother! (End comment)
Let’s not forget why we're here! If you give a Politian or liberal the choice of taking responsibility for ordering FIRE FOR EFFECT or jumping out of the 80th floor window of a high rise building in fear of burning to death, I'm pretty sure he would level the area….twice! Let our officers fight this war and for the polititians apologize for us when collateral damage does happen. As for all the service members waking up every morning with death tugging at their shoulder, I and many more like me rather be judged by 12 then to be carried by 6…If it’s our watch when you call for fire, we have your back brother!
Let’s not forget why we're here! Let our officers fight this war and for those who are in positions of “influence” apologize for us when collateral damage does happen. As for all the service members waking up every morning with death tugging on their shoulder, I and many more like me rather be judged by 12 then to be carried by 6…If it’s our watch when you call for fire, we have your back brother!
(continued) As long as there are civilians on the battlefield you are going to have collatral damage and I totally agree collatral damage must be kept to a minimum but, not at the cost of American lives. I know modern weaponary is pretty acurate compared to yester years wars when hundreds and thousands of civilian casualties were a result of FS. If you ask me how do I feel for a couple of houses getting damaged or one or two civilians getting hurt in the process of me saving troops I would say "MISSION COMPLETE JACK!" "Oh, BTW sorry about the yard but thats the price you pay for flying planes into buildings and killing civilians in my backyard pal!" (comment continued)
The above article has nothing to do with ROE. It has everything to do with troops being able to accurately call for fire. This is a basic soldier skill which everysoldier in the field should be able to do, not just the officers present (or non present). Working ina MOUT situation is tough, you got to know where you are in relation to a map. Maybe map skills are not what they should be. Get the call for fire right, then there won't be problems with the answer.
This is a difficult situation. All countries before us that invaded Afghanistan lost thousands of troops in the process. The former USSR lost 50,000 in 10 years of fighting in Afghanistan, we have lost less than a thousand. If we start killing civilians the way that previous militaries in Afghanistan did, we would be loosing hundreds of troops a day. If we do not learn from forces that previously occupied Afghanistan, then we will meet the same fate. The former USSR had massive fire power and no ROE and they still lost.
Christ, give it a shot, it cost us good men. they could adjust fire if they needed to.