Last week, Navy Undersecretary Bob Work laid out the sea services’ vision for the Marine Corps post-Afghanistan at CSIS, in Washington, D.C. (audio here). Work echoed the theme outgoing Commandant James Conway, and others, have been repeatedly hammering away for a good year or so: that the Marines must return to their maritime roots to differentiate themselves enough so as not to be mistaken for the Army, as we already have one of those.
Work has some intriguing ideas, most still being refined, on how the Marines intend to operate in anti-access environments where enemies possesses large magazines filled with precision weaponry known as G-RAMM — guided rockets, artillery, mortars and missiles. Military planners have always said ground operations can only be conducted once the Air Force has achieved air superiority over the battlefield. Now, as Work points out, the precondition for conducting future ground operations at the –mid to high-end will be the imperative to achieve “battle network superiority.”
Achieving battle network superiority promises to be more challenging than achieving and maintaining air superiority. The proliferation of reconnaissance strike battle networks, either at the low-end by enemies tapping the potential of Google Earth, GPS, cell phones and guided weapons, or at the high-end with China putting into space GPS and maritime surveillance satellite constellations and building anti-ship ballistic missiles, raises the challenge of not only penetrating those networks but also operating within them, as redundancy and commercial options may allow continuous repair of a degraded recon and strike network.
Work said his is a very different vision of network warfare than the “network centric” ideas propagated by Adm. Bill Owens and Art Cebrowski in the heady “revolution in military affairs” days. Their failure was thinking the U.S. would always monopolize the guided weapons regime.
As it turned out, because of the relatively low cost of guided weapons and often commercially available command and control networks, we’re seeing the rapid and widespread proliferation of battle networks; Hezbollah employed a simple yet effective battle network in the 2006 war in Lebanon. “Any student of history would have anticipated this, in the 90s we drank our own Kool-Aid and we assumed we’d have this monopoly forever.”
Defeating an enemy’s reconnaissance strike battle network will demand a methodical, sustained fight in all dimensions, sea, air and land. The old mantra that “speed kills” doesn’t work in the battle network regime; rushing headlong into an enemy’s battle network, when that enemy has vast magazines of guided weapons, will result in one’s rapid demise.
Achieving battle network superiority will take time, Work said, requiring a phased campaign. The Navy and Air Force, employing operational concepts develop under the AirSea Battle initiative, will counter the higher-end or longer ranged GRAMM threat, while the Marine air ground task force, once ashore, will battle the shorter ranged rockets, artillery and mortars.
Once Marines have been built up ashore, they must be able to survive a counterattack. Yet, the expected counterattack will no longer come in the form of a motorized rifle regiment (for which the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle was originally designed to repel back in the 1980s), Work said, instead it will be a GRAMM threat. So, the Marines must think about how far out they must push that inner counter-GRAMM perimeter so that rockets and mortars aren’t impacting on the assembly area so men and equipment can be offloaded.
Work’s explication of the Marine’s role in theater entry sounded to me like it blew some big holes in the rationale for the EFV armored amphibian. When the EFV’s initial requirements were written, some 25 years ago, the need was to launch from over the horizon and get inland quickly before the Soviet motorized rifle battalion counterattack could pin you to the beach. Perhaps an extremely costly armored personnel carrier with a 30mm stabilized gun isn’t the best solution to the GRAAM problem set.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said, guided weapons in the hands of potential enemies will force Navy ships farther offshore. Work said he’s not so sure. After a period of time in which the joint force can achieve battle network superiority, or at least attrit the enemy’s reconnaissance strike network down to manageable levels, the amphibs might be able to move closer to shore before they launch.
Yet, as ships move closer to shore, they enter into a much dirtier and more cluttered electronic spectrum, they become more vulnerable to enemies in fast-attack craft, mines and they close within the envelope of a host of guided missiles (Hellfire, TOW, etc.) that can be pressed into service as anti-ship missiles fired from mobile or very low signature platforms.
Work made clear that has vision of amphibious landing isn’t the Tarawa or Iwo Jima island fortress assault model. Better, is to land troops where the enemy isn’t doing “littoral maneuver.” The mission the Marines should truly embrace, and one at which they would excel, is providing the amphibious component of joint “theater entry” operations. Work said the Army’s airborne brigades would provide a valuable force for theater entry. Theater entry would also allow setting up bases ashore to conduct land based air operations, always appealing to the Air Force and its short legged tactical fighters.
Yet, as another whip smart former Marine, CSBA’s Dakota Wood, told me, penetrating an enemy anti-access network is one thing. Operating inside it is something else. The real contest will come in close contact with enemy forces where short range GRAMM systems may take us back to attrition warfare, he said. That’s exactly what the Israelis, long the undisputed masters of maneuver warfare, ran into against Hezbollah in 2006.
A discussion I have yet to hear is how the Navy-Marines plan to conduct amphibious operations in heavily urbanized littorals; pretty much every analysis of the future operating environment points to the hyper-urbanization of the littorals. Offloading Marines and their equipment directly into somebody’s neighborhood introduces a host of complications such as restricting freedom of maneuver, canalization, etc. Not to mention that it’s really hard to do anything resembling a covert landing of a large force into an urban area.
Work said he and his staff are working on answers to the many questions surrounding amphibious operations and power projection in a reconnaissance strike battle network regime. We eagerly await the results.
– Greg Grant
{ 37 comments… read them below or add one }
Sounds like a job for the Army and Air Force. Maybe the marines should just fade back to what they were for over half of their history. The Navy's police and guard force, as well as gate guards at embassies.
There should not be a cut to any of the armed services. Each branch provides a valuable specialty to Air, Land, and Sea. Marines are unique in that they excel at all three of these in the form of a MAGTF in conjunction with the Navy. That coupled with the MEU, you have a rapid response force in readiness at your disposal.
Historian, you're an idiot.
oorah, i second that. Historian=idiot.
Nah, the Army would have to re-learn too much of what the Marines already can do. To say nothing of that being a DOA issue in the Congress, too much history to make that happen.
It does sound as though there will be some reduction in personnel. Also a lightening of the load as it were.
The operational scenario sounds good to me, ditching the EFV and buying something in less #s, for less $ would be wiser for the USMC. Roll that savings into additional VTOL lift. It also sounds from their prediction some kind of mobile C-RAM would be in order.
Sounds like B.S. to me. Why is the blue water Navy buying littoral combat ships if they plan on operating far out sea away from guided missile threats. Indeed, the entire blue water fleet is in danger of being minimized to de-minimus. I wish a good reporter would surface some day and develop some contacts and find out what is really going on in DOD-land. Most likely, the even-though-meager budget of the Corps is coveted by someone who wants to buy a DDX or next gen bomber (only one of each after cost overruns).
The Marine mission is vital now, and has been vital for two hundred years. It's most important recent role in major combat (strategically) was holding Iraqi forces in place by threatening invasion of Kuwait from the sea. That took several Iraqi divisions out of the way for the ground invasion. Ask Schwarzkopf, or MacArthur what an amphibious force is good for.
Yes except when you look at the Gulf War that bluff was used thinking the Iraqis were actually going to be a competent fighting force, and they were far from it.
I don't think we have the budgetary leisure anymore to spend billions to maintain a bluff we've no intention of using. The USN is buying the LCS to have a littoral capability it says it lacks now, however, it isn't as though the LCS will be restricted solely to the littorals in operations. Whether or not LCS actually delivers remains to be seen, but it isn't being bought solely as a coastal craft.
Having said all that, it still seems to me the strategy is to maintain the USMC's ability to conduct forcible amphibious entry, just not on the level envisioned by a 600+ EFV buy.
For almost 200 years the marines mission was minor. They were abord ship in order to keep sailors in line and provide some muscle in ship to ship boarding actions, or cutting out operations in an enemy harbor. What was the marine contribution in the civil war? Dispite numerous amphibious assaults, and large scale riverine operations, where where the marines? The few, were sitting aboard ship, letting the Army do the heavy lifting and fighting. It was not until WWI that the marines became a significant land force, and then that was as part of an Army Division.
Listen im not going to bash you or anything like that, but you do need to refresh your history, im not going to name every campaign the Marines have been in but it is important to realize that the Marines sole purpose of being is warfighting, thats what makes us so effective, every Marine realizes that from General to private, that's why we're kept around.
so then the marines dont participate in humanitarian missions, like haiti, the the other services aren't warfighters, might wanna tell the thousands of army infantrymen that they do exist for war fighting. your little morale building saying is just something used to motivate lower enlisted, the marines exist like the other services to complete the missions assigned to them…
Wow- Historian, you may be a self-proclaimed man of history. I would have hoped, though, that you would also be a man of english. "abord"?…aboard. "Dispite"?…Despite. Ok…now that the MINOR ITEMS are addressed, let's figure out why the Marine Corps has morphed into the most respected combined arms force in the world- It is because we actually pay attention to the MINOR ITEMS so as not to make major mistakes. You can spout off about our minor roles in historical formation fighting, but this technique, just as your amateur approach, is meaningless in today's asymmetric world.
the corps is not mistake proof
Well historian, if it was the fate of the USMC to remain security then they would have remained only effective as a security force, the fact is they have proven through out their history to be among the most effective fighting forces among the services it would make no sense to scrap such a force.
I personally so no reason for the Air force to even exist considering every branch has its own aircraft.
If there is going to be a reshuffling of the services I say finally give the marines a separate department from the Navy, dissolve the Air force, and distribute its functions among the remaining services. Navy can handle space and nuclear weapons, Army can handle troop transport with its existing duties and the Marine Corps can make better use of the fire power and recon capabilities.
Hey Tom
-I agree with you on the Air Force, they are a duplicate of a lot of forces already in existence AND they are not team players (don't want to support troops on the ground).
-Give the transports to the Army/Marines, they are the ones who really use them.
-Let the Navy handle the nucs, they seem to do a much better job of it than the Air Force
-But I don't agree with you on splitting the Marines from the Navy, that would be like asking you to give up your arms. The Navy/Marines are basically one entity. The Navy gave birth to the Marines in 1775 and they raised them to be their right arm. They train together, go to the same schools, work side by side, they are on just about every Navy platform, they really aren't a separate force, they are one in the same-that's why they are called Marines and not soldiers.
The Marines are going to take over land-based Air Superiority and land-based strategic bombers? Does not compute.
Face it – even if they did fold up the USAF into the other services, you'd be keeping most of the same leadership and attitudes. Otherwise, you're cutting a huge area of operational capabilities, redistributing the responsibility, and trying to re-cultivate it in totally dissimilar branches. Have fun making that suggestion to the Senate Committee and the Joint Chiefs. :|
Neither Schwartzkopf nor MacArthur could point to operations against an urbanized littoral in a smart-weapons environment, with satellite reconnaisance being supplied to nonstate actors who have state support – or a credit card, and Google Earth. And, given the extent of the cost overruns and performance under-delivery by the V-22 and EFV, I don't know that the Marines are entitled to object that their preferred hardware is being sacrificed for some other operation's cost overruns. They're the major operator of the F-35B, after all.
My bet is that we won't purchase more then a hundred or two hundred EFVs. The Navy isn't willing to commit to the level of amphibious warfare ship investment the Marines want. I could see the Marines becoming more and more a component of SOCOM.
From the platform viewpoint, there needs to be a couple of clarifications. While the LCS cannot realy serve a key role in amphibious assault, LCS could be used for small raiding party ops in the OMFTS playbook. The down side to the LCS usage in the littorals is their lack of significant weapons and in the case of LCS1 a lack of payload margins. Making them big targets.
The other platforms that have NOT been mentioned here are the JHSV and MPS. The JHSV has the capability to lift more troops and some of the tactical equipment AND unload it in a port or offshore via RRDF. Bob Work mentioned that ship in his speech.
The MPS have played a key role in many operations and will continue to do so. Why because that type is the only cost effective means to sustain amphibious operations after the initial assault. There are adequate numbers of such specialized sealift ships to be used unlike the Marines trying to squeeze more exquisite warships out of the SCN budget.
I think those a significant since Bob Work is talking about going into different (not large) scale amphib ops.
EFV is probably DOA but the Marines won't admit.
The Marines grew to become what they are today for two simple reasons:
1-The failure of the US Army to anticipate or develop doctrine for amphibious warfare in WWII.
And before we get to "the Army did more amphibious landings than Marines" remember it was the Marines and Navy who wrote the doctrine and trained the Army to use it.
2-The effectiveness and espirit de corps of the Marines have given them standing with the American people and Congress, who believe that we need a Marine Corps. They perform a set of missions that need to be done, and do so at lesser cost than the Army or Air Force, while providing some "friendly" competition.
I feel we need the capabilities of the Marine Corps and that we will need the EFV's to do it right. While we may never do another Inchon style landing we will need the capability to put smaller units ashore and the amphibious model is still the best all around option. It is quite easy for smaller, low tech forces to create environment hostile to helicopters and other un-armored insertion platforms.
Remember some recent precedents.
In 1975 the Helicopters being used to transport the Marines ashore for the the Mayguez rescue mission were decimated by the Khmer Rouge. The landing zones were covered by heavy machine guns and only 3 of the 11 helicopters remained operational throughout the raid. This limited the rate at which we could insert follow on forces and slowed the extraction.
in 1982, the British in the Falklands were limited by their ability to transport and position troops ashore. With only one ch-46 available and no vehicle support, the British infantry were forced to conduct long overland marches and execute unsupported assaults against prepared positions. The Argentinian forces had anti aircraft units in the Falklands so the lack of helicopters may have actually helped to limit casualties from that threat but offered no support to the troops
In 1993, in Mogadishu (Black Hawk Down) we saw that a decidedly low tech militia could reduce the effectiveness of helicopter support in urban areas. In that situation, armored personnel carriers were required for extraction.
In each of these cases, the lack of organic, amphibious armored vehicles reduced the effectiveness of the attacking forces and led to increased casualties. While amtracs may not have been a strict requirement for Mogadishu the fast moving heavily armed EFVs would have made a considerable difference in al three scenarios.
I would reduce the size of the Army before cutting the Marines Corps. While the Marines can conduct many of the infantry missions of the Army, the reverse is not true. In my opinion, it is far more likely that we will encounter situations like those mentioned above before we see large scale armored battles on land. Further, if urbanized littorals provide a challenge for amphibious operations, the challenges are even greater for airborne or helicopter operations. If we give up on amphibious operations we might as well abandon any hope of operating in, much less controlling, the littorals.
Just my opinion
I don't think anybody is arguing that the Marines should forgo ampbibious IFVs. Rather, the question is the wisdom of a tremendously expensive and large amphibious grunt-mover that may not even be able to make it ashore due to changing access conditions.
Ultimately, I think this problem lives or dies with the Navy and Air Force. It's going to be up to them to knock out recon-strike networks and hardened anti-shipping missile batteries, and let the Marines fight their way ashore. Planners are not going to risk a tremendously expensive amphibious carrier to coastal missiles, EFVs or not.
Good post, though. IFVs are critical.
One last point – Mayguez and Falklands are good examples, but I disagree about Mogadishu. Amtracs would have been shot to hell. If you read "Ambush Alley" by Tim Pritchard, it talks about how the AAV7s were completely trashed in intense urban warfare.
In reality, amphibious IFVs are usually designed to maximize mobility and provide a minimal modicum of protection and firepower. True urban warfare requires something closer to a MRAP, as ungainly as they may be.
Good Morning Folks,
A couple of points that Greg kinda missed. First off it is US policy not to engage troops until the US has COMPLETE and TOTAL air superiority and that would include the eradication of indirect fire weapons.
The fate of the Marines must really be in doubt since al lot of big players in the DoD has publicly come out and said its all OK Marines we love you. This is a Bureaucratic sign that the marines are going to have to endure some major cut backs. One suggestion on the table is that the marines be reduced to a force of about 75,000, and stripped of air and armor. A document releases about a month ago on the size of the Navy in 30 years reduced the current amphibious warfare fleet for the current 31 to 20. It is noted with in the past month a San Antonio LPD haul and a USS America LHA(2) haul have been canceled.
Any future amphibious attempted by the United Stares Army or Marines would not include a pause to consolidate the beach before moving inland. It would be an Army type landing that moves directly inland from the beach and most like would have an inland anvil of an airborne assault for the landing troops to connect with.
Lastly our current foes know this and are avoiding using any country that has a coast line to use as an operational base. For anybody who is interested in this beyond winger ideology I would suggest reading in todays WSJ an article titled: "Chechen Rebel Digs In, Suggesting Rift in Insurgency" by Gregory L. White and Richard Boudreaux.
The Marine amphibious mission is a legacy and very expensive to maintain. Since Vietnam the marines have been little brothers to the Army, the Army does Army better then the Marines can. The time has come to face reality about the Marines and either find mission that needs doing and the Army doesn't want, such as Civil Affairs or Psychological Warfare, that can be uniquely Marines or take them back to their roots as Naval Infantry as is happening in The Russian Federation, UK and China.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Bryon,
You base your entire argument on a 'policy?' Have you forgotten that all policies and plans tend to go out the window once the real shooting starts? Think WWII and every other conflict since.
Wake up Bryon! Who needs a massive lumbering Army designed to do classic land campaigns? Those days are over-we're not going to be taking over any more foreign countries.
If there is a major war in our future it will be in the far east (everybody knows that). It will be primarily a maritime campaign, fast moving, very dynamic, unpredictable, short and very sharp and deadly. It will be a 'come as you are' war, we will not have the luxury of months and months of logistical buildup in friendly/secure ports to move a massive heavy lumbering army into place. There will not be friendly 10,000 ft runways everywhere to bring in the 101st airborne.
This war will be primarily a Navy/Marine battle since all friendly bases nearby (Guam, etc) will be blasted and out of commission in the first few minutes of the conflict. Our land locked army will have no real part to play here because they cannot get there. The only assets we'll have in theater will be Navy/Marine corp assets and long-rang bombers from the states. Anything not mobile and heavily protected will be lost quickly.
Some very smart man (you know who he is) said after WWII that there will never be another amphibious landing-apparently he couldn't predict the future (Korea)-imagine that? The key to winning future wars is mobility and the ability to be unpredictable (remember a guy named MacArthur?), you can't do that with a land locked army that can't kick the doors down and hit the enemy where they least expect it.
For you to say that the Marine "amphibious mission is a legacy" sound very similar to something someone once said.
Dean
they would just move the massive lumbering army over into the pacific like in WWII you know with the ships the army and navy purchased with the express intent of moving the army, you honestly are going to suggest that army forces cant be moved into the pacific but can be moved into afghanastan? the EFV would be useless in the situation you described, which would conclude in a land war in east asia…good thing your just an internet commando
The problem with that is that it's slow and takes lots of time not to mention that in order land these troops you'll need a secure port or at least a secure beach and just who do you think will secure those beaches? The Marine Corps since we're the only ones trained and equipped for that mission and the EFV, or something like it, will be critical to that mission since, despite what a lot of people think, you can't use an LCACs on an unsecured beach head.
It will be slow and take lots of time to move sufficient amounts of troops into position in any kind of numbers to be useful, the fanciful idea of quickly putting an MEU on the ground BY ITSELF, is a great way to kill alot of marines, any kind of land warfare with china will be a national effort. The only practical thing that could be done quickly would be to reinforce japan and Korea, on the secured beaches. Not many people realize this but weapons have advanced since the last time a beach was stormed…If there was a massive need for an amphibious landing the army would be pressed into joining the marines in said landing, like has always been done, somehow the army was able to land troops for the last 200+ years, suggesting the Marines are the only ones who can go from ship to shore is like saying that you can only go in a helicopter if you have a screaming eagle on your shoulder.
Wise and thoughtful words. In a logical world this would be what would happen.
a big target like the ship they came in and the battle group that supports them? where are you geniuses getting this stuff from? Marines have a stealth shield or something and all their vehicles aircraft and ships have no logistical foot print?
The problem on this concept is , while we are making new technologies and continously selling it to our allies. One day it may fall to the enemies hands, like what China have on its new AWACS.
None of that does you any good if your assault boats can't get into deployment range without risking saturation attacks by conventional ballistic missiles and land-launched cruise missiles.
The Marines are self-sufficient on the battlefield, but they still need the Navy and Air Force to enable operations in the theatre, and the Army to consolidate gains so they can keep moving. No branch is an island.
Although everyone here is thinking outside the box as far as the new Anti ship missles and precision guided munitions go, your still not thinking far enough outside. A better way to neutralize the precision missles would be to simply destroy the satelites that guide them with a cost effective system (a nuclear blast does work and emits no radiation below) and then things get much simpler
Why would any future beach assault have any actual people in it. You could swarm the beach with small amphibious unmanned Armored Fighting Vehicles. They could along with all kinds and sizes of unmanned aerial vehicles secure a large beachhead in an urban or rural environment. They could use messages broadcast from speakers and fliers to warn civilians to leave the area. Smaller ground and aerial unmanned vehicles could enter homes and buildings to search for weapons and to investigate pockets of hidden people detected with infrared and other scanning technologies.
Funny, I've heard all thius before…I was a Marine 1956-1960, when I changed to the Army.
The thinking bvack then was the atomic bomb would wipe out the navy task force…so the helocopter was adopted for troop carry…now they have better seacraft for the same…
The Marines in my day(including reserves) was 50,000 people…that';s why;
the few, the proud
and the ones the enemy always tries to avoid.
I'm retired Army, spent Desert Storm training the next divisions due to ship out from Ft Irwin, desert training facility…………used to practice battles for future planning on computers…and nowdays, the army owns more computers.
The Royal Marines are the standard. The USMC needs to shed its US Army(light) costume and get back to basics. What most of the Campaigning is about is the eventual size of the USMC. 40 Commando Royal Marines is the goal. The USMC is headed for reorganization into maybe 4 Brigade sized elements(3000-4000 troops), organic mortars and anti-tank weapons, everything else needs to go. Eventually to be rolled together with the Ranger Regiment as an elite Assault force under the Dept of the Army. Marines need to be Door and Ass kickers. As usual the UK is on the way to a better form first. I love my Marines(had 340 working for me last tour), but at present the Army (as demonstrated in Fallujah and Helmad) is a better fighting force as the USMC has lost it way.
To Brian M. Just a note, It is still 2010 and there are NO major operators of the F-35. Pax River test center, unlike the Manufacture run test sites reports that they can't get the Carrier and VSTOL version to fly to McDonalds without 2 refuels and sometimes they can fly 30-40 minutes without computer overheating problems. With Partner nations(UK, Holland, Turkey, Canada and Australia) jumping ship over costs, the VSTOL version will probaly not see 2011. The new QE2 will have cats installed by December and 14 Rafale are spending all of August at the Turkish Air Force Academy. Here in Tucson Raytheon has already cut JSF folks.
If the Pentagon really wants to save money, they would get rid of all contractors first and foremost. Pay private companies to provide VIP security or to provide logisitics support (e.g. truck drivers) does not make sense. Nor is it fair to the US servicemen and woman who get paid around 1/3 of the salary of a private contractor. The Pentagon should also go back over the figures and look at the true cost of supplies and equipment. Many companies like Halliburton are simply overcharging for their services. Lastly, a robust economy is vital to a healthy nation protected by a strong military. While the economy may not be the business of soldiers. The rest of us must be vigilant and keep our government honest.
There is approximately 217,490 miles of coast line and millions of square miles of littoral, intertidal water zones, and estuaries waters in our world today. To believe we no longer need an amphibious fighting force is a dangerous and ill fated belief to have in an age when world politics is such a deadly game being played by such devious governments.
Completely agreed. Amphibious operations are a core competency for any coastal nation's land forces, in their entirety. The Marines just have the specialized gear.