LCS Mission Modules Not Working As Intended

A recent Pentagon war game that ran the Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship through simulated combat in the Gulf didn’t unfold quite as expected, according to participants. The LCS is custom built with the Gulf combat environment in mind: narrow and congested waters, a wide range of low-end threats from sea mines and swarms of fast attack craft to higher-end air-breathing submarines.

The key to the LCS performing as the Swiss Army knife of the battle fleet is the ship’s interchangeable mission modules. While the “plug-and-fight” mission modules sound like a good idea by providing a range of flexibility within a single hull, the simulated Gulf exercises revealed some potential real-world shortcomings with the LCS concept.

The war game featured the trouble-making Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps navy sending out swarms of fast-attack craft to muck it up with a half dozen LCSs. The LCSs, equipped with the surface warfare mission module which includes the ship’s integral 57mm cannon, a pair of 30mm rapid fire cannons, vertically launched missiles and armed helicopters, were able to beat back the Iranian small boat attack.

Seeing their small boat swarm shot-up, the Iranians dispatched a bunch of small, air-breathing submarines to attack the LCS flotilla. The LCSs were forced to steam down to Diego Garcia to switch out the surface warfare modules with the anti-submarine warfare packages. That scenario repeated itself every time the Iranians changed up their attack and wrong-footed the LCS flotilla.

Beyond the conceptual challenges revealed by simulations, it now appears that the LCS mission modules themselves are in real trouble. The tenacious watchdogs at the Government Accountability Office tell lawmakers that the mission modules aren’t working, face serious delays and that work on the anti-submarine warfare package has been suspended: “Recent testing of mission package systems has yielded less than desirable results. To date, most LCS mission systems have not demonstrated the ability to provide required capabilities.”

The surface warfare package remains unproven, GAO says, in part because of the Army’s recent decision to cancel the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System, which was to provide long-range strike for the LCS. The Navy is looking into alternative missile systems, the report says. There have also been problems with the mechanism designed to launch 11-meter rigid inflatable boats off the stern of the LCS. One Navy source told Defense Tech that it takes more than 45 minutes to launch a RIB boat off an LCS.

GAO said LCS testing remains in its “infancy,” with the first operational testing of a ship outfitted with a “partial” mission package pushed to 2013. A key part from the GAO report:

“Challenges developing and procuring mission packages have delayed the timely fielding of promised capabilities, limiting the ships’ utility to the fleet during initial deployments. Until these challenges are resolved, it will be difficult for the Navy to align seaframe purchases with mission package procurements and execute planned tests. Key mine countermeasures and surface warfare systems have encountered technical issues that have delayed their development and fielding.

Further, Navy analysis of LCS anti-submarine warfare systems found these capabilities did not contribute significantly to the anti-submarine warfare mission. These challenges have led to procurement delays for all three mission packages. For instance, key elements of the surface warfare package remain in development, requiring the Navy to deploy a less robust capability on LCS 1.

Mission package delays have also disrupted program test schedules—a situation exacerbated by decisions to deploy initial ships early, which limit their availability for operational testing. In addition, these delays could disrupt program plans for simultaneously acquiring seaframes and mission packages. Until mission package performance is proven, the Navy risks investing in a fleet of ships that does not deliver promised capability.”

— Greg Grant

60 Comments on "LCS Mission Modules Not Working As Intended"

  1. Good Morning Folks,

    While I'm a critic of the current LCS program, as being, to expensive, to big, and not mission defined. Greg's story is not about the inadequacy of the LCS or its concept but of the leadership of the USN.

    The composition of the package on the LCS is determined by Naval Officers who's job it is, is to anticipate what weapons and operational capabilities an enemy has at it disposal, and what platforms they are carrying them. It is very clear here that the Surface Warfare Officers assigned to this "War Game", failed in this mission.

    This would be no different the air tasking/planning officers planning a strike and not accounting for the AA ground suppression fire and AADM's before sending in the strike package.

    Granted this is only a "War Game" and air cover and SSN's were obviously not included where. In real life it is assumed that the LCS would be operating with these assets in any hostile environment. This exercise does show, and quite clearly that the Navy has let its operational planning degrade to the point of what we see here. Which is not acceptable.

    The LCS program needs new officers who have experience in the "Green Water" war and understand the technological and operational capabilities of future adversaries. The officers who participated in this exercise clearly did not.


    Byron Skinner

  2. Mike Burleson is going to have a field day with this.

  3. Scrap the whole program, give the existing hull to the Coast Guard, buy more submarines.

  4. The story's title should more correctly read:

    "LCS Not Working As Intended"

  5. Better fleet design would have a flotilla of 6 ships with 2 surface warfare modules, 2 antisubmarine modules, 2 air defense modules. That way what ever the threat. two spiffy modules are available to meet-beat it. Of course every ship should have minimal ability in all three fields…so surface warfare module ships would have anti submarine warfare sonar and depth charge/torpedo dispensers, and Stinger air defense capability. ASW module ships would have .50 caliber HMGs, and sonar/depth charge/torpedo dispensers, Air defense ships would have .50 caliber HMG, sonar, and depthcharge/torpedo dispensers.

  6. Visby is good, Absolon is better, as that one has a battery of ready modules available. Those are off-the-shelf and proven former Flyvefisken plug-in modules. Combined with the large hangar and flex-deck, it's a sure winner.

  7. Anyone who's actually used a Swiss army knife can attest that the knife is OK, the corkscrew is too small, and the bottlecap popper doesn't work on actual bottlecaps.

    The LCS is the F111 of the seas (or is that the F35 of the seas?)

    As for the test- why do all 6 LCS's have the same modules?- maybe it should be 2 Surface, 2 minehunter, 2 ASW?

  8. Same problem the Army had with their GCV. Too many capabilities in one vehicle. The plug in module thing is a nice idea but it obviously is not working as intended. Time for a mission review most critical to least, design something baseline that addresses most critical down the line, or consider something OTS that adresses the needs. The whole boat swarm thing always struck me as Hollywoodesque, somehow I think some ISR and carrier based aviation is going to make a mess of Republican Guard speedboats.

  9. Ergo the Qualmed | September 1, 2010 at 2:18 pm | Reply

    I think the plug/play modular-ness of the LCS is a good concept, but ultimately what is the point when all the modules for the ships are the same at once…I guess that was the flaw of the exercise…gotta diversify!

    I also agree with Mr. Templar's suggestion that the speedboats are going to be…ah, blown up. At range.

    Has the navy considered answering small boats, with small boats? Like maybe a remote operated, armored solid-hull small boat of some kind? Perhaps impractical, but like an open-sea, unmanned riverine, or PT or something.

  10. Is anyone really suprised? However, we cannot buy a foreign design. Some manufacturer in Norway would be getting paid to build ships for the U.S. fleet. Talk about sendinng jobs overseas!! Make it in the U.S. and still have to pay royality to a foreign nation. There is no reason a small effective ship cannot be designed and developed in this country. Part of the problem may be Navy higher higher wanting to over complicate and gold plate everything. KISS should apply.

  11. Who put this war game together?

    Haven't some PR types someplace chortled that one of the LCS platforms carry not one–but two (!!) mission modules at once (presuming the mission modules survive the procurement process)?

    And…wait…didn't I read, waaaay back in 2007, some RAND report that strongly suggested we use Bahrain–NOT Diego Garcia–as a point to change out mission modules?

  12. The LCS design is supposed to support mission module change out at sea (like connected underway replenishment). The Navy has leveraged so many requirements on this ship class — minimal manning, mission modules, speed, range, displacement that you an not compare to any existing ship class. The two cruisers mentioned above have enough personnel onboard to man 12-15 LCS ships — big difference.

    The ships are supposed to leverage MH 60R (not yet out there) and VTUAVs (not yet out there) — both should have significant impact on the ability to support any of the mission modules.

  13. Sounds like they need a tender. Something that could swap modules while underway

  14. Good Evening Folks,

    Leesa, your production estimate for the LCS is most likely in the ball park. The price is currently at around $700 million a copy and most likely will go higher as the Navy starts loading the vessel with additional weapons and systems. The report that came out in mid July on what the Navy will look like in 30 years has only 50 "LCS's" of all types planned.

    That figure includes besides LCS's, mine/counter mine vessels, a self deploying costal patrol boat in the 1,200-1,500 Gross Ton range, Special Operations/Small Boat Service Craft (think something like the current Hurricane Class) and what ever else they designers might conceive.

    The USN is already putting out RFQ's for a Corvette size ship in the under $100 million range, and mine/counter mine craft at less the $25 million each.

    The Swiss Army Knife approach has not been successful in weapons platform design. Dedicated platforms are cheaper. more robust, and make for a more successful platform.


    Byron Skinner

  15. It would be one hell of a technology that would allow the navy to win while only reacting to the enemies moves.

    I think that the concept of mission modules in not what is lacking here.

    Issue of implementation are another matter.

  16. We can't even do safe VLS replenishment underway, and I imagine swapping out bigger modules isn't going to be an option either.

    Swiss army knife is a poor analogy…it can't do everything at the /same time/, its a swiss army knife where you have to plug in the bits before you leave home in the morning (and then you better hope you brought the right "modules"!)

    If it turns out to be cheaper to have built a variety of mission-specialized ships on a common hull, that will be the day…

  17. Doesn't LCS 2/4 have the ability to have any two mission modules installed and operating simultaneously… I take it this article relates to LCS 1 only?

  18. Deploy LCSs sounds like play rock-paper-scissor.

  19. Tidbit from wikipedia:

    Austal has proposed a much smaller and slower trimaran, called the Multi-Role Vessel or Multi-Role Corvette. Though it is only half the size of their LCS design, it would still be useful for border protection and counter piracy operations.[22] Navy leaders said that the fixed price competition offered the Austal design an equal shot, in spite of its excess size and cost and limited service.[23]

  20. The GAO is telling us what we already know. The LCS program is a failure.

  21. 1) Cost and problems will come down in mass production. The Navy can't afford 55 more Arleigh Burke destroyers or subs instead from both a cost and personnel standpoint as they have much larger crews. Doubt we will buy a foreign "built" corvette.

    2) A CSBA study had vignettes showing LCS spaced every 50nm to cover a broad area of coastline. That seems critical since small speed boats, pirates, and drug runners could launch from anywhere, choosing any route. Small diesel-electric subs are slow so excel by sitting and waiting in shallows rather than trying to go deep. Would you rather have a 275 sailor destroyer going shallow to find them or a 70 man LCS?

    3) The strength of these things is the ability to carry two multi-function helicopters and unmanned aircraft and underwater vessels. Helicopters have short legs so you want to be in more places with more lily pads. The GAO study shows how helicopters contribute.

  22. 4) Think how much cheaper it will be to upgrade mission modules with new technologies and reliability improvements without having to return ships to port. Flexibility

    5) Unlimited other possibilities for these ships. Envision them sailing in front of carriers to lay a multi spectral smoke screen when ASBM are inbound to prevent IR and radar final acquisition. They can escort JHSV carrying Army and Marine equipment and personnel.

    6) The CSBA study also mentioned the potential for teams of 2 LCS with one DDG to gain better air defense protection for the LCS and counter-sub protection for the large crew, more expensive destroyer. All 3 also carry helicopters and can exploit each others decks. With deck hardening, F-35B could land on LCS. With a 20 foot elevator, a shorter than current 21' HIMARS truck could be elevatored to deck or placed there by crane. Instant 70 km GPS rounds available with more below.

  23. What is it about the USN when it comes to materials handling rqmts, aka Cargo Gear? I have been hammering on the LCS lack of ANY crane to move the modules on & off for years now. One of the advantages of Cdr Hendrix's Influence Squadrons was that he included a forward logistics support ship to help with the problem.

    If the JHSV can have a decent hydraulic crane on it, why can't the LCS? The one crane on the LPD17 class is a joke (I've seen that in operation!)

  24. Bob we CAN buy a foreign design its been done before! BUT with the lock hold the corporate shipyard overseers have on our congressional types, it would have to be built here. Ok I can live with that IF the build contract went to a competent shipyard not necessarily in you know who's backyard.

  25. Anybody want to bet there will ONLY be 14 or 19 LCS built?

  26. Did anyone game out scenario where the Iranians use subs and boats at the same time? Sounds like we would be screwed. Good thing iranians are too stupid to do something like that!!

  27. STemplar there are plenty of good warboats on the market. The problems are:
    how many can be supported by each LCS, and will the USN ever buy a good design NIH.

    The WW2 PT boats were the last time a large number based on UK design were built.

    Event the CB-90 a highly successful warboat has YET to be bought in numbers for NECC as their RCB, why?

    The USCG seems to have few problems with buying foreign designs from companies like VT and Damen.

  28. I just want to give the Navy a little thumbs up for doing a realistic war game BEFORE buying a fleet of the things.
    Wonder if someone's in trouble for not doctoring the game to make LCS look good…

  29. Poor assumption to use Diego Garcia. Poor assumption not to rotate ships and payloads during resupply. 20 boats, 10 on station, 10 resupplying just hours away that can switch out modules if necessary.

    Can't the crane be on the dock?

    Or how about you put rock and paper on one ship, paper and scissors on another and cover twice the area with twice the helicopters and half the crew as one destroyer….and you can still have the destroyer with all three teams exploiting the destroyers air defense radars and ability to reinforce as needed.

    Just asking sans any Navy background but seeing the potential.

  30. GAO tells us what we already know. The LCS program is a failure.

  31. How about changing OUR tactics in combat? Really we have better tech than they do. If they can find a way to beat ours, Then we sure as hell can find a way to counter their tactics and defeat them without the all-in-one weapon and defense system.

  32. And anti missile capability.

  33. How ablut Tony Stark Jericco missiles.

    Even though its just a movie it has it's great idea.

  34. How about Tony Stark Jericco missiles.

    Even though its just a movie it has it's great idea.

    Sorry about my typo

  35. And how many navies around the world have operated LCS's aka corvettes for the better part of a century? Do any of them change out mission modules? No. Wonder why?

    It seems to me that changing out mission modules is "gold plating". What is needed is a basic ship common design specialized in 4 versions:
    Anti Air
    Anti Surface
    Anti Submarine
    Anti Mine
    All 4 would operate together as a squadron. Or you could build an updated FFG capable of handling all 4 assignments, which seems a whole lot simpler. In fact, I often wonder why the USN is scrapping, blowing up or giving away FFG7s that could be updated and reconfigured. Not perfect, but perfectly good enough.

    History repeats itself, particularly when technology is pushed too far. For example, when USS Enterprise, Bainbridge and Long Beach circumnavigated the world, about 1961, the only operational weapon systems on the ships were a pair of 5" 38s and 3" 50s, and torpeados. The big Terrier and Talos systems didnt work and it took until the early 1970s to get them operating.

  36. Rules of engagement issue – you pretty much have to assume that you'll be required to play nice until something acts in such a manner as to classify itself as a clear and urgent threat before you're allowed to blow it out of the water; in any situation where there's unrestricted engagement of enemies, you're kind of outside the realm LCS is supposed to be operating in…

  37. Maybe the LCS modular concept should be used as a carrier group level flexibility tool. Use the modularity to supplement whatever capability is at a particular moment lacking, rather than trying to use it in fleets of LCS flotilla.

  38. Where's the PT boats when you need them? A swarm of PT boats with missile systems could engage an Iraniian swarm more effectively than a large ship. As for the conventional submarine threat, counter it with unmanned underwater hunter/killer drones. They can use active sonar without putting lives at risk. I think the US Navy expects high technology to counter every threat, when there are low tech solutions that costs much less.

  39. Noted the CSBA study had 16 LCS in the Gulf and only 2-3 destroyers during a scenario escorting ships and protecting ports. It also mentioned something like 5 destroyers (273 man crew) needed to have one on station. In contrast, LCS was cited as possibly having 4 smaller 75 man crews for 3 ships to have one on station in peacetime. But LCS has the speed to show up in theater or switch theaters rapidly.

    Obviously the Navy requires destroyers and "something else" because it lacks the money and sailors for an all-destroyer navy. Unless the yards start building again, ANYTHING built will be overpriced. This is by no means just an LCS problem. The helicopters and unmanned systems provide identical capability whether on a destroyer or LCS…and aerial systems key to multiple missions don't fit on a PT boat, sub, or mine sweeper very well.

  40. The German MEKO-class corvettes and frigates have been very successful over the years. Build 'em in America, give 'em our electronics and sensors (most variants use our 5" guns, ESSM, torpedo tubes, Phalanx and Harpoons anyways) and use them. They're about $150 million a hull and are perfect for just about everything short of area air defense. There are stealthy versions too, used by Germany South Africa, Singapore, Malaysia and soon Poland (the A-100, K-130 and A-200 models).

    Maybe use a common US MEKO hull, in addition to the multipurpose/patrol variant, to put on a version of AN/SPY-1F or -1K Aegis like the Spanish or Norweigians with only 32 or 64 cell VLS. You don't need 96-128 launchers to be an effective ship. That said, the USN really doesn't need more area air defense ships. The 80 or so Burkes and Ticos are very capable of that mission. We need more low-cost green water combatants – we shouldn't have $2.5 billion destroyers hunting down a couple of assholes with rifles in a skiff.

    I also really like the idea of the Danish Absalons. Multi-mission, large cargo/vehicle/module bay.

    We should also start looking at replacing the Cyclone-class PCs in the near future as well.

  41. Let's face it, America is no longer a builder of innovative, great ships. Our shipbuilders are former aircraft companies that have deep contacts within the beltway.

  42. Really the mission modules are performing exactly as intended – front load the program. Get the hulls in the water ASAP with all sorts of promised pie int he sky capabilities and then drag out the procurement gravy train to maximize profits.

    This is the process all the contractors are using now – do the easy stuff first, skip as much testing as possible, get the highly visible platforms in place with pork in as many districts as possible, and then hit the DoD for the cash to make them actually do something useful.

    The only way to stop it is to cancel whole programs – call the contractors bluff and make them fear losing everything. Going ahead with programs such as the F35 and LCS will just reinforce their exploitative behavior.

  43. Should it be really this hard to get something relatively cheap, fast, and with a decent amount of firepower?

    It looks like Lockheed's design should be able to fit a 5 inch gun up there.

  44. As I've said many time, the LCS concept if fatally flawed. The idea of mission modules is ludicrous!
    Back in the old days we used to build what were called Frigates, i.e. smaller/cheaper version of a destroyer, something that could do everything; ASW, AAW, ASuW, carry helos, it could do 30 knots and still have great endurance, and it could sail independently, and they were build to take a hit and survive.
    You don't take out boat swarms with $100,000 missiles, you take them out with large guns (min 3in, 76mm). You don't defend yourself with a single RAM system dependent upon short range radar, you don't build warships to commercial standards entirely out of aluminum, you don't need a warship that does 40knots but has only 2 days endurance, and lastly, you don't build a warship and man it with only 40 sailors and send it to war, one hit would take out most of your crew!

  45. The problem is this: we don't know what we need. Are we really that concerned about swarms of Iranian attack boats? Really? Do we actually need 11 carriers? Look at the FCS in the Army, or the F-35/F-22s in the Air Force. We're building weapons systems today because our older stuff needs replacements. But we have no real enemy on the horizon that really requires our focus.

    We are in a holding pattern. There's an old brain teaser that says a car gets X gas mileage at 30 mph, Y mileage at 50 mph, and Z mileage at 70 mph (each getting less efficient). When does the car get the worst miles per gallon? Answer: when it's going zero mph. That's what we're doing right now. We're going zero mph because we're really not sure where we're going. Not that that's necessarily a bad thing, you'd hate to overcommit and buy 100 ships and then find out you don't need them. But we're just sort of hunting for a need right now.

  46. how a bout a multi-puropse missile that is capable of striking targets in the air, on land, and in the sea while utilizing the deck gun for the small, fast attack boats. cut costs as u only need to buy 1 missile instead of 3 and save space with only 1 or 2 dedicated launchers. seems like that would make the LCS concept much more capable if it could use one module for multiple tasks.

  47. The problem is that the USN does not know what they want the LCS to do. They are experimenting. The lesson should be that if you are going to use single mission hulls, then you must have a squadron of ships, each configured to different missions in order to operate in a changing environment. Or, you can use larger ships each configured to handle 2 or more roles. Since the mission modules are not fully developed, it makes sense that whatever platform you put them on should be flexible enough to accept ever changing mission module updates. This is much easier to accomplish in a larger conventional hull than in a small ultra fast hull. From that standpoint, it should be easy to build a conventional 30-35 knot FFG hull desinged to accept mission modules as well as a much stronger basic weapon system. That is a ship we can build right now in large numbers with little risk and they dont need to be built by a specialized shipyard. .

  48. Doesn't anyone think that the LCS module idea is really smart because we can upgrade and switch out LCS's with new roles for everywhere with the latest tech on said mods. Of course the hulls will have to be upgraded as time goes on as well but if it keeps the same slots for said modules they would be able to be used across the board for all LCS hulls. It would allow for variant hulls pretty well which is something that hasn't really been seen before. Plus the LCS's allowing for a cheap way to try out tech on the open seas without committing to making a new platform for the tech.

    It would take a severe investment in faith and hulls but I do think that a module type ship will be always able to keep up with naval combat for the rest of the current type of naval combat. To me I don't see that much a a different between this and the F-35 of the air force once you can think of there separate theaters.

  49. So there's a couple of things to think about here – some of you may be familiar with NDIA's three-Phase SuW study over a period of about eight years as sponsored by the office of the CNO and N76, the most recent of which concluded in about 2 years ago. In essence, they validated that against organic single-ship or even small task force versus dedicated small boat threat – there has to be a certain baseline established. In all phases, they came to many of the same recommendations that TF Hip Pocket did – not only applicable for FP/AT, but also high-level TTP; you still need a speedy vessel (because you need to maintain stand-off distance else you will be overwhelmed in the case of swarms), you need precision guidance and missile capability beyond 2nm self-defense layer, and you need stabilized small-caliber gun systems, a very integrated sensor suite and excellent auto-tracking of targets. In fact in none of those situations did the use of a helo or a remote vehicle system make a difference to positive outcomes. That's good and it validates the first half outcome of this so-called wargame.

    But the reality is anyone sending in a dedicated SuW team without thinking about multi-dimensional threats deserves to have their SWO wings taken away. Type commanders may not have a choice – they're stuck with the LCS package they've been issued; with the low ratio of current MPs to hulls as projected by the GAO report, that's likely to be a reality for years to come. But a TF commander who fails to account for threats other than small boats? Come on. I'm not an LCS fan, certainly not by the vociferous posts made elsewhere, but this really smells like grade-school anti-LCS propaganda to me. Opponents of the program shouldn't have to resort to miserably amateurish FUD like this. There's plenty of material from which to make a polished and coherent argument against the platform's viability. Either someone's pulling someone's leg at DefenseTech or they need to vet their sources better. The "wargame" sounds like an urban myth.

  50. Sounds like those mission modules went from concept straight to production, and skipped testing. Personally I would have had 3 or 4 of the 6 LCS set up for surface warfare, and the other 2 or 3 set up for anti-sub warfare. Seems like 100% common sense to me.

  51. I know 'common sense navy' is something that makes your ears bleed. We are after all talking about a Navy that does NOT want the CG(X) to be nuclear powered… I remember a few years ago they did a war game scenario in which they fought Israel, cause they are the most advanced military in the Middle East. Well the 'Israelis' did a massive cruise missile attack on us, and we lost. But what did the Navy do? They said, "Redue! Pretend that never happend". Then they changed the rules of the war game so that the 'Israelis' couldn't launch a massive cruise missile attack again.

  52. Turn off the X-box and back to reality

  53. I bet off the shelf would be cheaper. As far as swapping out modules, if they are gonna keep building this they better find a solution. Diego Garcia? Damn, thats pretty far.

  54. A half a dozen LCSs? There's only one in combat shape (Freedom) right now. LCS-2 is still wrapping up it's final outfitting stops. LCS-3 and 4 are still being build and the down select to choice which of the two LCS designs will be the design of the future keeps getting puched back (which means LCS-6 is a couple of years away from being build). They aren't kidding when they say sim now are they?

  55. Designing a boat that is expected to be fast, large, and operate in shallow water was probably not good for the LCS design. The "real" littoral version that will be doing the close-up delivery of SEALs and close support will be distinct from the slightly bluer version expected to screen the fleet, fight missile boats, do minesweeping and board vessels.

  56. The whole DoD is going through the same issues more or less. Buying weapons for wars we aren't going to fight. The USAF and the F22, no Soviet airspace left to escort bombers into. The Army and a myriad of systems, Crusader, Comanche. The USMC with the EFV. The USN sees the littorals as an issue, but then it comes up with a billion dollar per solution that isn't working nearly as well as hoped. Too many retired officers and bought off Congressmen in the pockets of the defense industry. What we need for these fights aren't sexy and in many cases aren't expensive.

    As many have pointed out, there are a large number of existing platforms available for the corvette role we could buy/build on license. There are a number of platforms we have tested that have a clear potential, like the HSVs, or the Sea Fighter. Austal's multi role corvette proposal.

    We are just stuck in this spend big mind set, maybe some extreme economic hard times is just what we need. Force some practical low cost thinking on the Pentagon.

  57. It isn’t that the switch-out modules do not work, the squadron was too specialized IMHO. If they had set say 5 hulls for Surface warfare and one for ASW, providing the commander with the flexibility required for a multimission area. It seems they had set the mission orientation as to being too specific for this exercise.

  58. Krotch ScroteGuzzle | January 4, 2011 at 8:21 am | Reply

    It doesn't work because they have to drive somewhere to refit? Here's an idea: 1/2 the squadron anti-surface, 1/2 the squadron anti-sub. Nobody thought of that? Really?

    Also, while the US is bleeding jobs across the water and the economy is in the crapper you guys are seriously suggesting outsourcing ship manufacturing? Building them here in the US is an investment in the US economy. Buying them off the shelf from Europe is flushing the money down the toilet.

  59. Probably if we mix the Aussies ship building with our ship building, steel and materials. We might end up with a cheaper tag price per ship or missile stealth boat. Probably 1 million or less (thousand dollars) per missile/ torpedo boat.

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