After a year in combat the Marine Corps is officially looking at beefing up the capability of its KC-130 Harvest Hawk gunships by adding a 30 mm Gatling gun to the Hercules-based gunships. The Corps’ small fleet of Harvest Hawks currently carry four Hellfire antitank missiles on the outer wing hardpoints and ten GPS-guided Griffin missiles launched from the aft cargo ramp. It also carries a AN/AAQ-30 Targeting Sight System mounted on the left external fuel tank to provide overwatch to troops on the ground and target the weapons.
The Marines are apparently looking at bolting the cannon to the cargo floor and having it fire out the Herk’s paratroop door. If this comes to fruition, it will be interesting to see how the KC-130s compare to Air Force Special Operations Command’s dedicated AC-130 gunships.
More at National Defense.
{ 96 comments… read them below or add one }
Throwing more weapons onto the KC-130 will provoke people into exposing valuable platforms to enemy fire. Nice to have in a pinch, but if it leads to people deciding CAS is no longer important…
Am I understand this correctly?
We have gun ships that work great and now there trying to build the exact same thing with a different plane why?
Yes and no. This is still a tanker first, gunship second. If gunships could perform refueling of other aircraft it might be closer to the "exact same thing."
In addition to the fact that the HAWK can also act as a tanker, it is a bit more lightly armed compared to a full on Spectre. Plus, the whole concept is that it is a modular set of gear that can be plugged into a plane when needed.
The USMC doesn't have access to the AC-130s, those are USAF planes and if the Marines want them they have to get in line. Rather than having to purchase more C-130s in gunship guise, they are purchasing kits that can transform a C-130 already in their inventory into a weapons platform. And the kits don't permanently remove the Harvest Hawk's ability to refuel or fly cargo.
Less expensive then a custom built gunship.
Plus the harvest hawk concept allows a plane serve as a gunship one day and then tanker/cargo/paratrooper craft then next. Allows you to do more with less which is a marine trait.
Refusing to let the airforce do air support for them is also, to be fair, a marine trait.
But yes, it's a sensible concept – you don't need an AC-130 every day. And this upgrade also makes sense because when you do need an AC-130, you've often got enough targets that a cannon is worth it – that's why the 'proper' gunship is pretty much exclusively cannon armed – it can circle for a long time pummelling stuff rather than emptying its weapons load in a dozen attacks. My one concern is that I don't know if this mod kit includes additional armour – as noted, there's a risk of this encouraging people to put a KC130 in a place it really shouldn't go.
We only have a 25 AC 130s spread across three wings. AT LEAST 30% are stateside at any one time.
Its very hard for conventional guys to get AC130 support since the special ops guys get priority. The Air Force system for scheduling CAS is not the most responsive for troops but prioritizies the eficient use of aircraft. Aircraft are in the air but not commonly assigned to ground units like we did in WWII.
The ONLY AC130 to be shot down in combat killing all 14 crewman was supporting Marines.
Wish the law allowed the Army to arm fixed wing aircraft. It has to do with operating the largest rotary wing inventory, slower than fixed wing and carries less ordnance but its the Army version of doing more with less.
Eight -H, Seventeen -U…yeah, 25.
Planned: 16 more.
Having more would be nice, indeed…
Because they can. actually if it is the MC they are going to fire the cannon out the front between the pilots. they just have not figured out out roll down the windshield.
The Air Force gun ship is going away…plus depending on the gun ship overseas is like depending on negative test from a dirty hooker.
30mm Gatling gun? I think some facts got crossed. They are looking at hanging a 30mm version of the Bradley's 25mm M242 cannon (the Mk44) on it, NOT a multi-barrel Vulcan style cannon.
You're right. I wonder if they will fix it. Anyways…
In the 30mm category:
Single-barreled chaingun:
M230 (Apache)+
Mk44 (EFV?)*
Multibarrel:
GAU-8 Avenger (A10)*
*=30x173mm
+=30x113mm
There is the 4 barreled GAU-13 that was hung on the centerline of an F-16. Not sure if it's still used or not.
I'd never heard of the GAU-13, but prelim check shows that it was tried in ODS and shown to have problems.
From the worst place in the world:
"It was briefly tried on some Air National Guard F-16 Fighting Falcons during the 1991 Gulf War, but was removed from service after barely a day of combat use because of its very poor accuracy. Despite the cannon's impressive ballistic characteristics, the pylon mounting was not sufficiently rigid to prevent deflection, and the weapon's heavy recoil exacerbated the problem by causing pylon misalignment. Further, the GPU-5 was not integrated into the F-16's sighting system. The GPU-5 is no longer in U.S. service…"
The USMC is simply trying to recreate the AC-130 w/o having to go through an costly and complex acquisition process. Apparently, re-inventing the wheel is more cost-effective than buying one.
The "U" 's are insanely expensive- every weapon ans sensor they could bolt on- they did (it is a transport)
I just hope the Marines are careful about using it- you might have a modern day battlecruiser here- looks like a battleship- blows up like an ammo transport when hit.
Ha yeah that might be true if it got hit. But remember this is a tanker so if your hit your Fu*ked either way.
Or, it's a transport aircraft, so it'll fly to bits anyways. It's a C-130 at heart, not an A-10….
Not try to recreate the AC-130 gunship since they are at the end of their service life. 2014 they are done. The Air Force is actually trying to come up with a like kit. In fact 110 was more kinetic in Afghanistan than any 3 squadrons there. That is to include the gunships that did not want to fly.
See Unit Fly Away Cost. AC-130U=190 million
KC-130J + HAWK baseline = <80 million. Plus, the tanker can refuel other assets.
The comment about exposing to enemy fire is legit. This idea really only works when we have air dominance AND its a low-threat environment for MANPADS/SAMS and dedicated AA. There is a reason AFSOC only lets AC-130s fly at night after the shoot down over Kafji in Desert Storm.
I don't know if Harvest Hawk can refuel while functioning as a gunship. Those modular attachments sounded interchangeable, and not simultaneous.
It's theoretically possible to leave one refueling pod intact to do both missions, but it would be a bit less than ideal for either mission. But the general point stands that a AC-130U is never anything other than a gunship, while a Harvest Hawk can swap kits on the ramp and fly off with another mission in a few hours.
But if for the mission you are assigning to your KC-130s doesn't require having both refueling pods, then you gain added overwatch and precision fire capability for a very modest increase in price and no loss in capability.
I think it's more than just a matter of refueling pods, doesn't the KC-130 have fuel cells in the cargo hold when conducting refueling ops?
Yep. And won't those interfere with the weapons package?
USMC, ghetto-rigging everything since 1775.
Technically that would be the Continental Marines from '75.
Nothing really new here, Air Force already did it with the MC-130W Dragon Spear
What's interesting is that there are reports about augmenting MC-130's with weapons packages ("Dragon Spear")
AC-130 still has packages that Harvest Hawk would drool over; but for shooting things in the open…
If they want to protect the ground troops they ought to get half the A10s from the Air Force.Air Force doesn't like the slow movers anyway.
Totally agree on this one. They can co-ordinate with ground forces as well imo.
There is one problem with that; the A-10 is in no way carrier compatible. The Warthog would need a major redesign to include an tail hook and be catapult compatible or be able to operate from a LHA, not cost effective. Although, they are looking for a cost effective alternative to fill that role and the role the OV-10 Bronco left behind.
Harvest Hawk isn't carrier compatible either (though C-130s in the early days were tested off of carriers, but this was not fully adopted). They're going to be flying them from somewhere…
Then again, the more pressing challenge is that Marines also operate off of the smaller amphibious ships, which a shorter runway. Unlikely to fly C-130s off of that.
Then again, they did takeoffs on the Forrestal, which is somewhat smaller than a Nimitz and the Fords.
Of course, there's always JATO if you need it. I wonder if JATO bottles work with A-10s…
The problem isn't really taking off from a carrier, it's landing on one
I'll wave the BS flag here. The point isn't that the AF doesn't like slow movers. The point is that the Air Force knows from experience and analysis that low flying slow movers aren't survivable in anything other than the most permissive environments. If the AF only ever had to worry about the easy scenarios they wouldn't mind flying 'slow' at all.
There is no comparison to the kind of lethality the Marines will get out of the bolt-in system vs the AC-130's 'integrated fire controlled' weapons. the bolt-in is nice but it won't come close.
Oh… and load that suckah up with more DIRCM – they're going to need it.
That's why I said only give the Marines half the A10s–the Air Force pilots that they talk to on shows like the Military channel swear by the capabilities of the A10–also they're pretty fond of the A10s titanium cockpit tub.
Its hard enough for the Army to get CAS. Let's keep the A10s in the Air Force or give them to the Army as was considered in the 90's. Nothing against the Marines but they have F18's & Harriers to do CAS. The Army has zilch fixed wing support.
That's Key West for you.
The Marines rarely turn down another service's surplus; and would probably find a home for the A-10. What's a few Hornet squadrons in the big picture, compared to A-10s which are likely to see serious work in CAS?
Actually SGT Mac its a pretty much a historical fact that after WWII the USAF doesn't like slow movers. The A10 was fought tooth and nail and the Air Force almost gave them to the Army just before Desert Styorm showed their utility. The USAF has also blocked every effort by the army to arm fixed wing aircraft. In Nam the Air Force prevented the Army from arming single engine scout planes. Air Force culture has been fighter aircraft oriented for decades. The current UAV development has created an interest in unmanned slow movers. We'll see if it sticks. BTW, the Air Force fought the Army procuring its own predators and wanted to centrally control their use vs. letting Army brigades keep and use their UAVs as they saw fit or as was needed (much more responsive for the ground commander).
Actually, it is pretty much a historical fact that a very large body of inter-dependent CAS myths arose after WW2 (IMHO with the arrival of Airmobile doctrine), of which this one is peripheral to the 'AF doesn't like CAS" myth. http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/2011/07/debun….
SGTMAC – You have a pretty parochial perspective and are forgetting A LOT of history. CAS has always been the third priority in Airpower doctrine (Strategic Bombing, Interdiction, CAS).
I can find numerous quotes by Air Force generals/Secretaries describing the impact that this third priority has had on the Air force's ability to do CAS and its negligence in supporting it.
The Air Force entered the Vietnam War unprepared to conduct CAS. They borrowed 25 L-19 light observation aircraft from the Army to serve as forward air controllers (FAC's), and they borrowed A-1 Skyraider aircraft from the Navy to perform CAS. They also had to convert their primary jet trainer, the T-37, into a CAS platform.
Ref the A10 program, Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans in 1970 told Congress that "we in the Air Force have been neg!igent in not bringjng along such a plane [the A-X] sooner."
I was going to say that the Air Force was dominated by the Bomber Mafia for decades, at least until John Boyd brought about the Fighter Mafia.
Of course, then you need more pilots, more maintainers, more logistics tail, etc. This is basically as close to free as you can get. You already have the staffing and KC-130s in theater for the air refueling and logistics mission, you are just utilizing the existing aircraft to add some additional combat capability as well. It doesn't replace anything or increase the existing footprint in any noticable way.
Yes. What I would have given for A-10s in NAM.
Ed Lindley FAC 1/4 3D HERD 67-68
One thing we should make is a an aircraft dedicated to nothing but tanking. If we could make an aircraft that can carry about a million pounds of fuel. It would be in the AO for longer, it would give more fuel away. Granted it would take about 20 fuel trucks to fill up.
Like the KC-135?
Let's see now… a million gallons @ roughly 6.5 #/gallon equals an entirely unrealistic load for anything smaller than a fuel barge. A big one…Fyi- that other tidbit's just as unrealistic. The largest fuel truck/tanker (stateside on-road use, not Mil-spec field use) is about 8,500 gallons. The fuel trucks wearing theater colors are smaller. :)
Do the math, puhleeze.
Enthusiasm's a good thing, hyperbole ain't.
Does anyone know if the Air Force's Dragon Spears have the 30mm cannon already installed?
Anyways, glad to hear about this, the Marines will soon have their own Spectre lite.
On a related note, it's a shame the AC-27J Stinger II didn't work out.
From the devilpage of the web, Wikipedia:
"In May 2009, following a lapse of plans to acquire and develop an AC-27J "gunship light" to replace the aging, operations-stressed AC-130 inventory, the Air Force began exploring an option of converting MC-130Ws into interim gunships.[110] The Dragon Spears are equipped with a Bushmaster II GAU-23/A 30mm gun (an improved version of the MK44 MOD0 30mm gun), sensors, communications systems, and precision-guided munitions in the Precision Strike Package[111]. The PGMs are to be in the form of the Gunslinger weapons system, a launch tube designed to deploy up to ten GBU-44/B Viper Strike or Griffin (missile) small standoff munitions in quick succession.[112][113] Initial supplemental funds to the 2010 Defense Authorization Bill were for two kits to be installed in 2010.[114] On November 17, 2009, a contract was awarded to Alliant Techsystems to produce 30mm ammunition for use by the Dragon Spear.[115]."
Starting to sound more and more like Harvest Hawks package? Then again, people have been railing for years that "cargo" ground vehicles and aircraft need some teeth, or options for them…
Yes, the Dragon Spears have the 30mm guns installed.
How does it launch the Griffin missiles? Soft-launch them from the ramp?
I was wondering the same thing- you really don't want a rocket (or 10 ) going off near fuel lines, tanks, etc.
http://d3.static.dvidshub.net/media/thumbs/258w/p…
Looks like a logical move in the Afghan war.
The USMC is discovering how versatile their KC-130 Havest Hawk is and adding more firepower to the aircraft is natural as this is why the C-130 aircraft has been flying for so long as it's just a matter of time before someone tries converting one into a flying battleship.
Would the 30mm be hanging over the edge of the back ramp or only have a "cone" view out the back of the aircraft? Seems like it would be pretty useless if you had to orient the aircraft on an upward angle so that the gun would be pointing in the right direction. The gun needs to be able to point in a wide arc on its own without aircraft maneuvering necessary, I would think. Anyone know?
Never mind. I would have deleted the last post, but it won't let me.
I'm surprised they don't just tie down an M-1 Tank to the back ramp, that should give them plenty of firepower
Ha ha, good one.
Don't think they haven't tried!
Doesn't the AC-130 already have the armament equivalent of an M60 MBT with its 105mm howitzer, 40mm autocannon, etc.?
They're also attacking from the top, and would theoretically do more damage to tanks than the equivalent M60, and would probably be immune to attack from Warsaw Pact tanks due to low elevation capability (though at long range and with guided ATGMs…) However, the Soviets ZSUs weren't as bad as Sgt York, and would probably take a bite out of the AC-130s if they operated in the open
They could forget the plane: get an M1 and put lots of balloons on it. It would be carrier launchable!
And also a parachut so that when the ballons are destroyed it deployes and you have your invasion force.
The Air Force sort of already did this with one model of AC-130, it had a 105mm cannon or howitzer mounted along side the other guns. I don't think it was the same gun that was mounted on the older model M1s but it's the same size/caliber though.
it is a 105mm howitzer, a M102. And the round it fires is completely unrelated and incompatible with the M68 cannon used on the M1, M60, and M1128 MGS(Stryker)
perfect!!! hahahaha
I guess this one fooled nobody here, eh?
Gunship?
Spectre, eh?
We gotta have our own?
Get excited! This will be the second time you've paid to have a 30 mm chain gun mounted in these C-130s (not a Gatling gun, that would be the smart thing to do). Who knows, maybe you'll actually get what you paid for this time? It could happen.
What comes around goes around…
Next will be nose guns ala B-25/A-26. Instead of .50's lets go for M61A1…..Marines like multi functional pointy spears.
LOL!
There has been talk of putting a rail gun in a C-130J. Even an inert projectile at Mach 7 or so can raise some dust.
Good idea on mounting a connon, missiles are nice but they take up room and weight.
How about bringing back some old WW2 P-51's or Corsairs to do the job? They would get the job done at a fraction of the price and were tough as hell.
They'd probably get wailed by a Strela just the same as Spirit 03. You need missiles and standoff these days to survive, along with a countermeasure suite too scary to shake a radar-guided or IR-seeking stick at.
I guess we'll find out with the Super Tocano the special ops is looking at.
Anybody in an SF A camp along the Cambodian border remembers the C46 or 47's using heavy supporting fire out the port /only jump door, when A camps were under attack at night and it looked like ther would be a thousand VC/NVA killing everyone (300 Cambode Strike force and all 12 Americans). Puff or Puff the Magic Dragon as it was jokingly called was the fore runner of Spectre when the AF took over. Thousands owe their lives to Puff or Spooky(another name for the same game. By the way as I recall from the !)! in 63 we jumped a huge door on the side, did not tailgate.
Correction, it was the KC135 with the huge door that you ran out. We did tailgate and jump port and starboard doors, sorry about that. Vietnam was a long time ago and I am glad the USMC has improved it's leadership so much since then. They seem to be learning from Spec. Ops exposure that it doesn't always have to be high diddle straight up the middle. That is from an EX Marine, ex paratrooper, Former SF.
team 144
The testing on the Forrestal was take offs and landings; but I wonder if it's possible to put a tailhook onto a C-130.
Then again, Marines aren't putting all of their fixed wing aircraft onto the gator navy, so the question is moot. A-10s and C-130s don't need to be navalized…
Cont. Congressional testimony in Jan '72, General Momyer, the Commander Tac Air Command, stated: "For almost 25 years the Air Force has attempted to develop close air support doctrine for joint operations. This effort, unfortunately, has met with little success and, consequently, our retention of this historical Air Force mission is being seriously challenged."
With the advent of UAVs doing ISR and CAS Gates had to drag the Air Force in line rebuking a top Air Force general for "borderline insubordination" for planning on buying twice as many of the jets — despite orders from Gates and the rest of the civilian leadership. The Air force also had to be directed to devote its Predators to OIF/OEF.
He even had to say at the Air Force's Air University, ""In my view we can do and we should do more to meet the needs of men and women fighting in the current conflicts while their outcome may still be in doubt," he said. "My concern is that our services are still not moving aggressively in wartime to provide resources needed now on the battlefield."
Check out http://www.combatreform.org/armyA10andAH64combina…
Its a little eye opening about the Air Force's centralized control approach and the Army/Marine ground commander focus. It also has the senate law 20 July 1990 that proposed giving A10s away to replace OV1s and 10s.
Heh. Talk about parochial! -with more than a smidgeon of ‘cherry-pick’ on top. I seriously doubt you waded through my series of posts on the topic (especially the part about the Army not even bothering to even TRY to coordinate AF support for helicopter escort missions even BEFORE major US ground operations in SEA) much less the source documentation referenced in under 3 hours.
The ‘tell’ is the cherry pick of the ‘Momyer quote’. View your selected quote through the prism of his most widely read work: “Airpower in Three Wars”. Momyer was the most strident advocate of centralized control of airpower under one Air Commander and the friction in his dealings with Marine Air is legendary –even though he is probably the single most important player in making Airpower with a capital A work during Khe Sanh. He can be considered the ‘Ur-JFACC’ IMHO.
I have trouble with your assertions vis a vis the Gates’ quote as well (aside from my problem with Gates in the first place as probably the second-worst SecDef I’ve seen in my short half-century of paying attention to these things).
I read the paper you linked to a loooong time ago (elsewhere). Aside from the premature euphoria over a Congressional pique that was more about the Army losing the OV-1 and OV-10 with no planned replacement than anything else, as things actually transpired other arrangements and guarantees were made, and then of course the ‘Airpower As It Is’ successes of Desert Storm swept such political silliness away The paper epitomizes the classic Army Myopia of the ‘air-is-support’ POV versus the reality of ‘Air’ being a ‘Maneuver’ element. I doubt you would have brought it up if you had read my CAS Sidebar on AF-Army Views of CAS which covered the way these POVs play out in life.
BTW: It is also my considered professional opinion as a retired military man and active military operations research practitioner- that the ‘Combat Reform’ website is, to be kind, run by ‘someone or someones’ in serious need of a reality check.
It is all OK though. I ‘GET’ it. As I wrote in the opening of my post at my place on this topic: “I also realize that there is no moving some people off a well dug-in position (especially some–not all—of my brothers-in-arms on the ‘grunt’ side of the family who seem to have employed the mental equivalent of a stainless-steel nuclear-powered trenching tool.)”.
Odd. my part 3 didn't take. Let's try again:
It is also my considered professional opinion as a retired military man and active military operations researcher/practitioner- that the ‘Combat Reform’ website is run by ‘someone or someones’ in serious need of a reality check.
It is all OK though. I ‘GET’ it. As I wrote in the opening of my post at my place on this topic: “I also realize that there is no moving some people off a well dug-in position (especially some–not all—of my brothers-in-arms on the ‘grunt’ side of the family who seem to have employed the mental equivalent of a stainless-steel nuclear-powered trenching tool.)”.
I actually read through your stuff. Having been a customer of CAS I have great respect for it. I also know it isn't as responsive to the ground commander as are assets he owns. That's why the Army has invested so heavily in attack helos and the Marines have their own air. Niether do strategic bombing and the Marines do Interdiction only when working for the Air Force or it impacts the ground commander.
You can quote air theorists out the wazoo. I'm not the only one that believes the Air Force has given CAS short shrift and have cited AIR FORCE generals/secretaries to go along with the numerous comments here.
BTW, after DS the Air Force back pedaled quite quickly on the A10 keeping it from going to the Army and investing in the air frame to last decades beyond what was envisaged. If you want to continue to claim the Air force really cares about CAS go ahead. The facts tell quite a different story.
Coordinating AF support for air assaults? Its obvious you don't understand the problem. Having executed dozens and dozens of air assaults with less than 12 hours from warning order to execution there's no time for the Army to put in the request (let alone get it confirmed) to the Air Force. In that same time I sat down with Army pilots, planned the route, the suppression of air defense, downed aircraft procedures and command and control procedures. Then went back to prep the company for the real operation AFTER the air assault.
You proved my point. Like most Air Force guys you don't understand the problem and why commanders get more response when they own the assets. The same reason the Army wouldn't give the Air Force its Predators. You can't schedule the enemy. You have to be there when he shows up.
Odd, my part 3 didn't post. Oh well -moving on.You claim to have read my stuff, yet still write as if you haven't. If you are speaking of the SEA era, the coordination SHOULD have been made via the liasons the AF was willing to provide. No special effort neccessary. If you are speaking of the modern era, the ATO cycles post-DS move much faster than anyone even imagined possible by the end of DS, and in any case the rule of thumb now is Push-CAS -putting assets overhead ahead of need instead of waiting for something to happen. The AF 'gets it' just fine. But you misstate the problem. All of your perspective concerns itself with the 'understanding of the need' – which gives absolutely no insight into the BEST way to 'satisfy the need' — and still satisfy the needs of others. Giving CAS to the Army would only give the illusion of solving the problem because Army commanders never publically b*** about the quality of their organic fire support.
Yes, you mentioned LeMay put LNOs at Corps and BDE level. Did you read what I said about air assaults are planned/conducted at BN level and below (that's two headquarters away from where the Air Force LNO is at.) You aren't understanding that by the time the request gets up there and back the mission is over.
Request times have lessened. Really? Where did you get that one? The air force planning cycle still requires at least 24 hours from request to execution. Fine for an operation planned way in advance but not for the majority of operations that are executed as intel develops.
The Army doesn't complain about organic support? You aren't looking at the professinal journals that discuss it. I would suggest the Infantry or Artillery Journals. You'll find manuever combat arms find organic support that takes longer than 5 minutes gets a failing grade.
I've quoted Air Force sources stating CAS hasn't been a prority. I've explained the planing cycle for air assaults and why the Air Force system doesn't mesh with the timeline. Now you want to say the Army doesn't complain about its own support. You can believe what you want to believe and continue moving the goal posts. The facts are what they are and I'm not the only one saying it.
I was speaking of my Part 3 post attempt here. No matter – all but the last of it is OBE.
RE: ATO. Yes, if I were writing in a peer-reviewed journal the definition of the term I would have used the full naming convention of ‘Daily ATO’. I was speaking earlier of the whole process: from entry through servicing being far faster. But I also noted (and do so again): “in any case the rule of thumb now is Push-CAS -putting assets overhead ahead of need instead of waiting for something to happen”. If we need to get even MORE specific, then I’ll also note here that the method for applying on-call Airpower for immediate demands is via the joint tactical air strike process – a decentralized execution process (from the JFAAC). The Air Force and Army have also jointly developed the Joint Fires Observer (JFO) concept to speed up CAS (and other fires) response. JFO soldiers and JTAC airmen now work in tendem to get CAS o nthe scene. To parse Airpower to any lower level would essentially guarantee the most urgent needs would go unmet as a more routine occurrence than as exception.
RE: SEA experience. The AF’s (LeMay’s) first overture was in 1962(!) during the advisory era when it would have been better and easier to work the problem. You reinforce my point: “It is anyone’s guess how an alternative history would have unfolded if the Army planners had chosen to seriously seek a joint solution by working with the Air Force instead of persistently planning the Air Force out of the solution’. (my place – Part 4).
BTW: You didn't by chance miss in my opening of Part one at my place the part about " I also realize that there is no moving some people off a well dug-in position (especially some-not all) of my brothers-in-arms on the ‘grunt’ side of the family who seem to have employed the mental equivalent of a stainless-steel nuclear-powered trenching tool).
G'night!