Report: Pentagon Made Hasty LCS Fleet Cut to 32

This is LCS.

A new Congressional report suggests the Pentagon may face further scrutiny over its direction to issue no new contracts for the controversial Littoral Combat Ship program beyond 32 ships.

The August report questions whether the Pentagon did the proper analysis before making the decision to truncate the Navy’s planned buy of 52 ships down to 32.

The LCS vessels are currently being procured under a 2010, 10-ship deal with each of the two contractors — the Lockheed design is a steel semi-planing monohull and the General Dynamics/Austal USA design is an all-aluminum trimaran hull.

Designed for shallow-water multi-mission assignments such as countermine warfare, surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare, the LCS has been criticized for not being sufficiently survivable to meet current and future threats.

Advocates have countered that the ships high-tech “mission-packages” or groups of technologies and 40-knot speed will enable it so succeed in a variety of high-threat scenarios.  Furthermore, officials maintain that the ship is not intended to function like an open water or deep water destroyer in terms of survivability but rather serve in littoral areas with different kinds of near-shore threats.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced this past February that the Pentagon would offer no new contracts for the LCS platform beyond 32 ships. The report seems to ask for analytical justification for this decision.

“Has DOD conducted a formal analysis to show that the Navy now needs only 32 LCSs to provide sufficient capacity for fully addressing the fleet’s requirements in these three mission areas? What are the potential operational implications of attempting to perform these missions with a Navy that includes 32 rather than 52 LCSs?” the report asks.

In response to Hagel’s directive, the Navy has formed a special Small Surface Combatant Task Force designed to examine the needed requirements and available technologies sufficient for a new ship to replace the last 20-planned LCS vessels.  Navy officials said the task force has completed the first segment of its work but has yet to announce any findings regarding what their deliberations might mean for the development of a new ship.

In addition, the report mentions Hagel’s announcement directing the Navy to examine potential alternatives for a new small surface combatant generally consistent with the characteristics of a frigate.  The report asks about whether there is an existing requirement for such a ship in light of anticipated mission needs.

“Has DOD performed a new analysis of mission needs to identify what capability gaps the Navy might need to address through a new shipbuilding program? If not, then how can DOD know that it needs a new ship generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate? Where is the properly validated requirement for such a ship?” the report asks.

The report questions the rationale informing why the Pentagon said the new ship would need to be generally consistent with a Frigate and wonders if there is sufficient analysis to inform the decision.

Overall, the report says that the LCS program could have benefitted from more rigorous analysis on specific mission needs at its inception prior to 2001 and highlights a handful of strengths and weaknesses of the platform.

The report criticizes the cost growth of the LCS sea frames, saying they have turned out to be much more expensive to procure than the original target of $220 million each in constant

fiscal year 2005 dollars. Some of the LCS missions could be successfully performed in a more cost-effective manner by other platforms such as Joint High Speed Vessels, amphibious ships, cruisers, destroyers and attack submarines, the report says.

“There are alternative and potentially more cost effective ways to perform the LCSs’ three primary missions of countering mines, small boats, and diesel-electric submarines, particularly in littoral waters,” the report states. “Possibilities include extending the service lives of existing mine warfare ships and mine warfare helicopters, equipping cruisers and destroyers — and their embarked helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles — with small anti-ship weapons for countering small boats and using anti-submarine aircraft as well as attack submarines.”

The report also echoes some of the survivability concerns expressed by critics of the LCS platform, claiming that the LCS does not compare well against frigate and corvette designs used by other navies.

While the report does say the LCS anti-submarine warfare package is potentially well-suited to counter diesel-electric submarines far from shore and in littoral waters, it criticizes the platform for not being optimized to address Chinese maritime threats such as anti-ship cruise missiles and larger surface ships.

The high-speed surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare capabilities of the LCS mission packages’ technology could prove effective, to some extent, against Iran’s small boat, mine and submarine threat, the report adds.  The LCS is also likely to be effective in anti-piracy operations, the report claims.

The report also questions the Navy’s fiscal year 2015 budget decision to purchase three ships for the year instead of four.

On this question, the report wonders how will the Navy decide which of the two contractors’ respective designs – Lockheed or General Dynamics/Austal USA – to use for a two-ship buy instead of sticking with the previous plan to purchase two ships of each model in the year 2015.

About the Author

Kris Osborn
Kris Osborn is the managing editor of Scout Warrior and a former associate editor at

21 Comments on "Report: Pentagon Made Hasty LCS Fleet Cut to 32"

  1. Jesus just junk the LCS program, and buy an off the shelf frigate design and stop feeding pork to defence contractors!

    Is Frigate a swear word in the USN now?

  2. How does this article neglect to mention the source (although I assume it is CRS) or name of the report it describes?

  3. What an amazing story. They spent a fortune designing these tubs, more than it cost to design an Iowa Class battleship, the first few of these pieces of crap cost more than a battleship each and by the time all of the "modules" are designed and produced probably all of the ships will cost more than a battleship, and then when the high cost and poor quality of these pieces of garbage is "exposed" then we are THANKFUL the program gets cancelled after producing only a few "ships". We are thankful even though this basically plays right into the game plan of the defense contractors who would much rather design ships than build them anyway, because the profit margins are higher that way.

  4. The Navy, it it recent wisdom, because of all of the unjust critique and unfounded rumors, has decided that a fresh start is called for therefore they have decided to rename the LCS the

    BATTLE FAST FRIGATE or BFF for short

    The motto of the BFF is:
    what we cannot outfight we can outrun
    what we find we will outrun
    what we cannot see we will outrun
    what we cannot outrun we will shout "like, OMG, we're really to die, like for sure, where's my cell phone, I need to get a selfie and tweet about this…"

  5. 32 more of these useless ships than we need

  6. Stealthy frigate. think 21st century Knox. Box missle launchers. helo deck. asroc. done.

  7. I think their going to be challenging situation given US Navy can barely get anything of a brand new design produced without it getting clogged up in the government bureaucracy of trying keep one state from making money while other is trying show it making jobs.

    A ship with frigate capacities will not necessary be able to do what original framers of the LCS had needed to do. Be a modular vessel, capacity of doing light combatant tasks while not necessary confronting enemy head on.

    They should do two ships Classes, one a traditional escort type frigate and other a Corvette, that does anti-mine warfare, anti-pirate patrols, have ability to armed with usual package of Harpoon II style anti-ship missiles like those of ship you'll encounter in a close to shore situation the LCS were meant for, but didn't get design to be setup for.

  8. LCS may not been what people were expecting it to be. I remember the Street Fighter project, which I believe this design concept was suppose to be part of and the DD-1000, there was a middle-size ship suppose to be doing "Frigate" style missions, while the LCS did that light combatant stuff like the MCM, ocean mapping, etc.

    Too many times the leadership has changed what they want long-term project to be. That's what I think why LCS is not cutting the mustered. LCS will need be used in place of the MCMs we have left in service. I wish they had built them from better materials, non-steel ships are big time hazard to their crews if they have a fire, no matter how good your halon gas is.

  9. Congress who gets money off this is still having temper tantrums over the cut.

  10. Give the LCS to the GATOR navy and buy a real frigate should be the next step.
    The Perry class frigates lost their air defense capability, with it they would still be relevant.

  11. The original concept for LCS was fine: it was good enough to have several allied navies interested. It was what LCS turned into that killed it for the other navies: a large, oversized speed boat of extreme expense that couldn't deliver a punch, defend itself, or take a hit. Every independent auditing agency (including the Navy's own inspectors) investigating LCS scorched it. Every other allied nation initially interested walked away, saying it was far too much money for too little benefit.

    Too expensive, too big for the littorals, not really big enough for blue water operations: LCS became a sure loser. The LCS design should've started with the PC class (very heavily armed for their size, at approx 600 tons) and worked its way up from there – maybe 1500-2000 tons (max), a modular design, and built to the Navy's level-2 standard.

  12. As european i think it is too big for littoral missions. This is what the netherlands now has as a lcs like ship (call it Ocean going Patrol Vessel (OPV)) i think the lcs would end up in this file also, good agains anti piracy and drug missions…

  13. These things are nothing more than floating targets and we have to buy 32 of them? I hope the Russians copy it because we'll set them back 40 years!

  14. Navy Powerpoint: "It must be small, it must be big, it must have long range, it must have high speed"

    Manufacturer: "Perfect, we'll strip down the weapons to the bare minimum (we are fighting "small boats", after all, and if anyone asks we mean Boghammars and not Fast Attack Combatants because they're easier to kill), reduce crew berths to free up space, maximize internal bay, then put on maritime diesels for range /and/ gas turbines for speed. Then because we stripped down the crew we'll buy new untested automation systems, and since we don't have to actually learn anything from the Todd Shipyards FSF-1 we'll just do it again and send the navy a cost-plus bill".

    Against a swarm of FACs, what are the odds that they'll just fire anti-ship cruise missiles at the LCS before going for the prize? Even after the LCS is killed they need to punch through the screen, so any serious FAC threat will be bringing lots of anti-ship missiles.

  15. The questions that are not being asked but should be the first two;

    1. What program office reviewed and approved the LCS HM&E designs and why?

    2. If the two flights are so wrought with discrepencies and UNSAT equipment, what program office has assessed and is assessing the feasability and what were the justifications?

  16. Guess the Navy forgot about the Falklands War and how aluminum burns when hit with HEAT rounds. AND how deadly vaporized aluminum is (one breath and you’re dead) to the sailors of a ship. The military is full of F’n morons.

  17. Proven method to stop this pig in it's tracks

    Make it a requirement that the CO's of the LCS has to be no less then 1-start admirals, the XO needs to be an O-6 and then send them off on 'detached' duty.

    You can bet your admiral's stars that they will suddenly develop major mechanical issues and have to return to port

  18. Is it me or is there a problem with the USN and USCG in obtaining functional ships? With the Coast Guard Cutter problems and the Navy LCS – how much money are we taxpayers losing?

  19. It occurs to me that the authors of this "congressional report" must've been from Lockheed and/or Austal. No one else has had *anything* favorable to say/report/etc. regarding LCS, unless its someone working on the project.

  20. Little Crappy Sh tbox!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

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