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Osprey Air Assault in Afghanistan

Ospreys-on-assault

We’re work­ing the Operation Cobra’s Anger story for more inside gouge, but one thing the wires are report­ing is that 3/​4 and other ele­ments of this morning’s assault on Now Zad involved air assaults using MV-​​22 Ospreys.

As you all know, the birds from VMM-​​263 just chopped from the Bataan to Camp Bastion in Helmand province Afghanistan and fell in on VMM-​​261 who’ll do a pump there. Many Osprey crit­ics hounded the pro­gram for not push­ing the assault enve­lope in Iraq. Well, it seems as if the Corps has put the birds to quick use on a 3am lift of Recon troops, infantry grunts and Brits.

I’m work­ing on get­ting more details from this on the Osprey’s role, but I thought I’d bring this to your atten­tion early on while work­ing the sources…

– Christian

US Defense Exports Still Dominate Market

This arti­cle first appeared in Aviation Week & Space Technology. 

DUBAI, UAE — China, France and Russia are increas­ingly aggres­sive in court­ing cus­tomers for their mil­i­tary prod­ucts, but it is the U.S. that is rak­ing in the big dol­lars — and increas­ingly so.

What’s more, the U.S.’s improv­ing rela­tion­ship with India could sig­nal that record high lev­els of mil­i­tary exports are not just an aber­ra­tion but are sus­tain­able. This prospect would bring relief to U.S. defense com­pa­nies, which face the pos­si­bil­ity of shrink­ing mod­ern­iza­tion projects when Washington starts focus­ing on cut­ting its mas­sive bud­get deficit.

A decade ago, the U.S. booked about $10 bil­lion in for­eign mil­i­tary sales (FMS). When those con­tracts reached $28 bil­lion in fis­cal 2008, many in the Pentagon thought it was an aber­ra­tion, espe­cially given the $10 bil­lion jump from the year before. But there has been no sign of a letup. Vice Adm. Jeffrey A. Wieringa, direc­tor of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, says the value of FMS com­mit­ments signed dur­ing the last fis­cal year reached $38.1 bil­lion, and this year’s total could top $50 bil­lion based on esti­mates of deals in the nego­ti­at­ing pipeline.

Bucking a trend

Is the U.S. buck­ing a trend? Some defense sup­pli­ers, such as Saab, have sug­gested that sales are suf­fer­ing because poten­tial buy­ers are hold­ing off on big-​​ticket spend­ing deci­sions; oth­ers, such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri), note that nations such as Thailand or Malaysia are curb­ing expen­di­tures. But at a broader level, Sipri sees “few signs that the global finan­cial cri­sis is sig­nif­i­cantly affect­ing decision-​​making” among major arms importers.

Moreover, the amount of money being spent under the so-​​called Section 1206 author­ity — a mech­a­nism cre­ated in the fis­cal 2006 bud­get to train and equip for­eign mil­i­tary forces — has risen steadily.

Read the rest of this story, get Ares gouge on the “mys­tery drone,” check out the A400M and Grizzly and read Obama speech reax from out friends at Aviation Week, exclu­sively on Military​.com.

– Christian

H&K Wins Infantry Automatic Rifle Competition — Or Does It?

H&K-IAR-web

Gunner Eby is at it again.

A man who holds more knowl­edge about small arms (and crew served weapons) in the tip of his pinky fin­ger than most “experts” will learn in a life­time, Chief Warrant Officer 5 Jeff Eby had one of his usual “couldn’t care less what peo­ple think” con­ver­sa­tions with my alma mater, Marine Corps Times, which ran with a story from him say­ing that H&K had won the com­pe­ti­tion for the Corps’ Infantry Automatic Rifle.

Our friends at Soldier Systems piled on, say­ing they’d heard that shoot­ers actu­ally liked one of the Colt ver­sions tested rather than the FN or HK ones.

I love Gunner Eby and have worked with him on sto­ries in the past. He’s a trea­sure for the Corps as an insti­tu­tion and a boon for reporters try­ing to cover it. He’s a CWO5, so he’s safely in place and couldn’t care less what his com­man­ders think about who he talks to or what he says. But he’s an advi­sor, not the final decisionmaker.

So Syscom wrote me back a vaguely-​​worded email response to a query about all this, seem­ingly deny­ing that the ser­vice had made a final deci­sion on the IAR and stat­ing only that the Corps had ordered “24 weapons” from an “exist­ing con­tract” that was let back in December ’08. That would most likely be the orig­i­nal con­tract to Colt, FN and HK for the IAR downs­e­lectees. They have not answered my fol­low up ques­tions on which weapons (make and model) and whether, defin­i­tively, they have or have not decided on an IAR winner.

You could ask them your­self, maybe you’ll have bet­ter luck.

This vague­ness could also stem from the service’s inter­nal debate over whether to even go through with the IAR pro­gram. Loud voices within the Corps and the joint com­mu­nity argue against lim­it­ing a SAW gun­ner to 30 rounds, despite the weight boon from a rifle-​​style machine gun. Syscom seems less than enthu­si­as­tic about the pro­gram from the start, but one shouldn’t read their incom­pre­hen­si­ble responses (or total lack thereof) to ques­tions about this pro­gram as emotional.

UPDATE: Just got an email from Syscom stat­ing that the order was for 24 more HK 416s and that the Marine Corps is “still test­ing the IAR” what­ever that means.

– Christian

To Camouflage Your Weapon or Not, That is the Question

painted-weapons

The Army is con­duct­ing yet another review of the cam­ou­flage pat­tern of its com­bat uni­forms.  This makes it what, the third or fourth such review on the pat­tern du jour?  What I find inter­est­ing though, is not so much how much atten­tion is being paid to the debate around the cam­ou­flage pat­tern, and whether or not we need one “one pat­tern works nowhere” uni­form, or sev­eral regional/​seasonal uni­forms to max­i­mize local effec­tive­ness, but how lit­tle atten­tion we are pay­ing to cam­ou­flag­ing every­thing else but the uniform.

One of the first things that leaps out at you about the ACU pat­tern is its lack of black.  “Black is not a nat­u­rally occur­ring color” the Army says, and its use on the bat­tle­field defeats the effec­tive­ness of cam­ou­flage. Yet we’re all pack­ing at least one piece of black equip­ment; our weapons.  As a scout look­ing for bad guys, one of the things you look for is black angu­lar objects, which are uni­ver­sally man made, and on the bat­tle­field usu­ally mean weapons. 

So why do we still have black weapons?

I’m not talk­ing about send­ing all our guns back to the fac­tory to get some sort of high speed “real­tree” pat­tern retro added, but rather just address­ing the issue at the unit level and paint them some color other than black.  I searched and searched TRADOCs web­site look­ing for reg­u­la­tions regard­ing cam­ou­flag­ing equip­ment, and other than a cir­cu­lar detail­ing how to apply CARC paint and what pat­tern to use on the wood­land cam­ou­flage pat­tern on tac­ti­cal vehi­cles (which, by the way, still includes the color black), the only guid­ance I could get on the sub­ject was to ensure that what ever cam­ou­flage you use does not inter­fere or degrade the per­for­mance of the equip­ment, which seems a no brainer to me.

So, hav­ing not found any­thing that expressly for­bids paint­ing weapons, I decided to do the fool­ish yet admin­is­tra­tively cor­rect thing and broach the sub­ject with my food chain.

“No” was the answer I got.  The ratio­nal behind the deci­sion was varied. 

“Let joes paint their weapons, and they’ll be tag­ging them with gang signs.”  Ok, a valid con­cern, so to mit­i­gate that you limit their color options to, say, tan, and you have their team leader super­vise them.  Better yet, let the team leader do all the painting. 

Read the rest of this post at Military.com’s KitUp!

– Eric Daniel

Boots on the Ground: Afghanistan Edition

afghan-training-team

I’m going to be talk­ing today at 1400 EST to Andrew Lubin, a free­lance jour­nal­ist, blog­ger and Military​.com con­trib­u­tor about his recent trip to Afghanistan.

Andrew has some rather con­tro­ver­sial impres­sions from his visit — is the Army los­ing its fight­ing spirit, can McChrystal win the coun­terin­sur­gency fight, what makes the Marines’ strat­egy so successful?

We’ll answer all those ques­tions and more live today on our Boots on the Ground pod­cast. Please join us for a listen.

UPDATE: Below you’ll see the final ver­sion of the pod­cast. You can also feel free to sub­scribe to Boots on the Ground with iTunes.

Andrew paints a pretty bleak pic­ture of Army oper­a­tions in the East…a con­tin­gent of troops who lack the aggres­sion and are unwill­ing to assume the risks inher­ent in a true coun­terin­sur­gency cam­paign. Lubin also says that while the over­all com­man­der, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, is a solid Soldier, it’s unclear that he lacks the “Big Army” men­tal­ity to stream­line the deci­sion mak­ing, shift the empha­sis from force pro­tec­tion to “clear, hold and build” in a simul­ta­ne­ous way and to win over the Afghans who respect aggres­sion and decisiveness. 

Lubin also tells of some pretty harsh restric­tions on fire sup­port mis­sions and feeds in some repor­ing he’s uncov­ered about what went wrong at Wanat and Camp Keating which were both nearly over­run by Taliban assaults. This is a must listen.

 

– Christian

Terrorists Within our Borders

My ears perked up at this line last night in the president’s speech about Afghanistan. It’s one sen­tence that has poten­tially huge implications:

This is no idle dan­ger; no hypo­thet­i­cal threat.  In the last few months alone, we have appre­hended extrem­ists within our bor­ders who were sent here from the bor­der region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to com­mit new acts of terror.

Has any­one heard about these appre­hen­sions? Who are the per­pe­tra­tors and what were they plan­ning? This is explo­sive news. Am I just miss­ing something?

Surely this is not a ref­er­ence to the Somali gangs rounded up here and in Canada. “Last few months,” “within our bor­ders,” “sent here … to com­mit acts of terror.”

Whoa. I’ll do some dig­ging but if any read­ers have some insight into this please let me know.

– Christian

UK Will Send 500 More Troops to ‘Stan

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown con­firmed Nov. 30 that an addi­tional 500 U.K. per­son­nel will be sent to Afghanistan, and said that another eight coali­tion nations – besides the U.K. and the U.S. – are will­ing to pro­vide fur­ther mil­i­tary sup­port for the operation.

Brown said the lat­est increase takes London’s con­tri­bu­tion to more than 10,000 per­son­nel, if the U.K.‘s Special Forces are included. The min­istry has pre­vi­ously said that the addi­tional troops would raise the num­ber of British forces deployed to 9,500, though it now appears this fig­ure did not include the Special Forces.

The addi­tional British forces will be deployed to Helmand in south­ern Afghanistan in December. Brown declined to iden­tify which part­ner nations had already indi­cated they would be will­ing to pro­vide more personnel.

U.S. President Barack Obama is expected to unveil a revised Afghanistan strat­egy dur­ing a speech Dec. 1, includ­ing a sub­stan­tial increase in U.S. forces.

Brown, with United Nations Sec. Gen. Ban Ki-​​moon, announced Nov. 28 that the U.K. is to host a con­fer­ence on Afghanistan at the end of January 2010. Brown said: “The con­fer­ence will cover both our mil­i­tary and our polit­i­cal strate­gies, but con­cen­trate on the polit­i­cal strat­egy for Afghanistan.

“We will need fur­ther troop and train­ing com­mit­ments from part­ners. I expect to see 5,000 fur­ther troops com­mit­ted by other nations, and the London con­fer­ence will be also an oppor­tu­nity for some to make new com­mit­ments,” he added.

The British and U.S. gov­ern­ments face grow­ing oppo­si­tion to the war in Afghanistan, and the empha­sis on ‘Afghanization’ – in which the Afghan mil­i­tary and secu­rity forces increas­ingly take over from the International Stabilization and Assistance Force – is an effort to address such con­cerns, and to pro­vide an exit strategy.

“I hope we will see this process of Afghanization hap­pen­ing in a way that peo­ple can feel more secure, that side by side with the British troops, the Afghans are tak­ing respon­si­bil­ity for them­selves,” said Brown, “so we can look for­ward to a time in the future, for which there is no timetable at the moment, when Afghan forces can take respon­si­bil­ity in new areas and British forces are able to come home.”

One of the cri­te­ria Brown had set to pro­vide addi­tional British troops was that all mem­bers of the U.K. deployed force would be “fully equipped for the oper­a­tions they are asked to undertake.”

Read the rest of this story, see yet another Russian stealth frigate, check out Ivan’s land­ing on a Frog car­rier and tick off JSF’s December goals from our friends at Aviation Week, exclu­sively on Military​.com.

– Christian

Send in the Jarheads

More than 90 days of this “con­sult­ing” and “delib­er­at­ing” and “solemn duty” stuff and Obama comes up with a Bush-​​esque surge…and oh, yeah, it’s gotta be over in three years (by the time he’s run­ning for a sec­ond term).…

And why 10K less than McChrystal asked for? Anyone won­der why 30K is a bet­ter num­ber than 40K?

Military​.com|by Christian Lowe

marines will lead surge

President Obama’s Afghan surge of 30,000 addi­tional U.S. troops will include an imme­di­ate infu­sion of California-​​based Marines, with the first ele­ments set to be on the ground in south­ern Afghanistan around Christmas.

The Leathernecks will bol­ster a force of about 8,000 Marines who deployed to the region in July to knock back Taliban gains in Helmand and Kandahar provinces where insur­gents linked to Mullah Mohammed Omar threaten Afghanistan’s sec­ond largest city.

“The first troops out of the door are going to be Marines,” said Marine Commandant Gen. James Conway, accord­ing to the Washington Post. “We’ve been lean­ing for­ward in antic­i­pa­tion of a deci­sion. And we’ve got some pretty stiff fight­ing com­ing.“
 
Sources also tell Military​.com that the Army will likely send three addi­tional Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, or about 9,000 more com­bat forces and 5,000 sup­port troops — includ­ing police and mil­i­tary train­ers, bomb squads and engi­neers — as well as around 7,000 head­quar­ters staffers to man­age the war more effectively.

The Soldiers will likely deploy to east­ern Afghanistan, which is under the com­mand of Maj. Gen. Curt Scaparrotti from the 82nd Airborne Division. According to Gen. McChrystal’s strate­gic review, RC-​​East includes the key provinces of Khost, Paktia and Paktika where Taliban insur­gents are vying for control.

Gen. Conway, who recently trav­eled to the region, said that the Corps is poised to send as many as 9,000 Marines to bol­ster efforts in south­ern Afghanistan, where the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade has been deployed since July to back up British, Canadian and Dutch forces who com­mand oper­a­tions there. McChrystal’s analy­sis shows that Taliban insur­gents led by Mullah Mohammed Omar are mak­ing a strong push to con­trol Kandahar, the country’s sec­ond largest city and a key logis­tics hub for RC-​​South forces.

“The [Taliban] has been work­ing to con­trol Kandahar and its approaches for sev­eral years and there are indi­ca­tions that their influ­ence over the city and the neigh­bor­ing dis­tricts is sig­nif­i­cant and grow­ing,” McChrystal wrote in his August 30 assessment.

Sources say the addi­tional Marines will likely come from 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade based in Camp Pendleton, Calif.

While Army offi­cials won’t say on the record what units are included in the Obama surge, recent his­tory in Iraq gives an indi­ca­tion of how the ser­vice might carry out the new plan — a com­bi­na­tion of trun­cated turn­around sched­ules, redi­rec­tions, and extended deploy­ments. Army doc­u­ments pro­vided to Military​.com show sev­eral infantry brigade com­bat teams that have more than a year back home that could be part of an esca­la­tion, includ­ing the 2nd IBCT of the 82nd Airborne, the 1st IBCT of the 10th Mountain Division and nearly all of the 101st Airborne Division.

Read the rest of our story HERE

– Christian

Pyracy on Parade — Part 2

pirates-getting-busted

EDITOR’S NOTE: This is part two of Joe Buff’s story on the rise of mod­ern piracy and the inter­na­tional response to swash­buck­ling ban­ditry. Read part one HERE.

Is mod­ern piracy a con­tain­able nui­sance, a regret­table but accept­able cost of doing busi­ness for ship­ping com­pa­nies?  And should it also be allowed to con­tinue as an unfor­tu­nate but bear­able bur­den on var­i­ous navies’ nations’ tax­pay­ers? Would a land inva­sion to clear out the strong­holds by force be very effec­tive, or would it turn into a bit­ter blood­bath that back­fires? Barring such a land­ward force-​​based solu­tion, could the ongo­ing fight again Somali piracy turn into a new type of quag­mire, at sea? Or need it best be viewed as any other crime-​​solving prob­lem, as some­thing that will more or less always be there, fluc­tu­at­ing in inten­sity with local eco­nomic con­di­tions and with the vary­ing extent of fund­ing made avail­able for law enforce­ment? The lat­ter is not an attrac­tive out­come. Nor does erect­ing a float­ing secu­rity wall, in the form of a close-​​in block­ade along Somalia’s entire 2,000 miles of coast­line, seem prac­ti­ca­ble or desir­able to the author­i­ties polic­ing the piracy problem. 

In a video just released by the pirates who hold them hostage, the British cou­ple Paul and Rachel Chandler, seized with their yacht in October, expressed fear that unless the UK pays ran­som very soon, they might be killed or sold to ter­ror­ists. Is this just an imag­ined con­cern of the Chandlers, or the lat­est bar­gain­ing tac­tic by their cap­tors, or do the pirates really mean it? The specter of pirates sell­ing hostages and/​or cap­tured ships to ter­ror­ists, if that becomes their only resort to raise cash from their efforts, is dis­turb­ing indeed. While the Somali pirates are inspired by the profit motive, not extrem­ist ide­ol­ogy, they might have no com­punc­tions about doing busi­ness with ter­ror­ists for cap­i­tal­ist rea­sons. That busi­ness might even come to include live oper­a­tional train­ing of Al Qaeda sui­cide pirates by Somali instruc­tor pirates, prepara­tory to cap­tur­ing an inno­cent mer­chant ship as plat­form for a hor­ren­dously costly WMD attack against some strate­gic strait (Malacca or Gibraltar?) or canal (Suez or Panama?) or pop­u­lous har­bor or oil ter­mi­nal (Singapore or Galveston?).

It’s prov­ing dif­fi­cult for for­eign coun­tries and coali­tions to deter Somali piracy. The over­all phe­nom­e­non results from dis­parate extended fam­ily groups send­ing out expend­able small units to first infil­trate, dis­guised as fish­ing boats, and then threaten a very wide area. Put this way, mod­ern piracy sounds almost like a water­borne guerilla insur­gency, a type of enemy that on land is noto­ri­ously dif­fi­cult to dis­suade by “third gen­er­a­tion war­fare” means.  This is espe­cially an issue when, at least so far, inter­na­tional law and for­eign gov­ern­ment poli­cies alike have given the pirates sanc­tu­ary within their own ter­ri­to­r­ial lim­its. The pirates do have a sig­nif­i­cant tech­ni­cal advan­tage as well, in that each mother ship’s or skiff’s arbi­trary and eva­sive maraud­ing path con­sumes food and fuel at a lin­ear rate, whereas mar­itime secu­rity units need to pro­tect a vast area that goes up with the square of the range of any indi­vid­ual pirate sor­tie. If pirates increase their prac­ti­cal oper­at­ing range from 300 miles to 1000 miles, for instance, which is by a fac­tor of 3–1/3, the area they bring under threat, which for­eign navies and coast guards need to patrol, increases by a fac­tor of more than 10. Another prob­lem in deter­rence lies in the rather poor tar­get clas­si­fi­ca­tion capa­bil­i­ties of the pirates them­selves. When they close in and open fire with auto­matic weapons and rocket pro­pelled grenades, not real­iz­ing that a war­ship is a war­ship, Sailors can get hurt or killed.

Read the rest of this entry »

Cyber Arms Control

The sub­ject of inter­na­tional cyber arms con­trol (ICAC) has risen in con­ver­sa­tion around the belt­way and beyond, and it’s an issue has polar­ized many in the tech­ni­cal and pol­icy mak­ing communities. 

The argu­ment among experts revolves around whether an inter­na­tional cyber arms con­trol treaty might reduce the plethora of crim­i­nal and national secu­rity threats, while pro­mot­ing greater cyber secu­rity for all.  The very first argu­ment is that cyber crime should be han­dled sep­a­rately than cyber war­fare and cyber terrorism. 

Once you get past that, there are those that firmly believe it is crit­i­cal that an ICAC be devel­oped and imple­mented as soon as pos­si­ble given the increases we have seen in cyber attacks, cyber crime and the grow­ing fear of cyber ter­ror­ism.  Those opposed to the idea feel that imple­ment­ing a cyber arms con­trol treaty will be dif­fi­cult and enforc­ing it will be nearly impos­si­ble due to the facts that no spe­cial mate­ri­als are needed to cre­ate cyber weapons and all that is needed to man­u­fac­ture a cyber weapon is a cre­ative tech­ni­cal per­son and a com­puter that is con­nected to the Internet.  The oppo­si­tion is quick to point out that com­pli­ance ver­i­fi­ca­tion and ongo­ing mon­i­tor­ing would require a level of open­ness for inspec­tion that few gov­ern­ments would find acceptable.

What do you think?:

Kevin Coleman

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