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Disaster Tech Pushes Ahead

Monday, August 28th, 2006

So many things went wrong in the government’s suck­tas­tic response to Hurricane Katrina, it’s hard to know where to begin to make fixes. One place might be the basics — com­mu­ni­cat­ing, and get­ting a sense of the scene.
saIII_up.jpgIn the days after the storm, while the feds and local offi­cials floun­dered, ham radio oper­a­tors and teams of guer­rilla geeks took it upon them­selves to keep Katrina sur­vivors informed. Drone-​​makers sent unmanned spot­ters into the skies above New Orleans, to get a look at the dev­as­ta­tion.
The efforts — and so many oth­ers like them — were beyond inspi­ra­tional. But the impact of these self-​​starters was muted, because they couldn’t share infor­ma­tion or resources all that well. The infra­struc­ture (both hard­ware and soft) just wasn’t in place.
That’s the prob­lem a dis­as­ter response drill, con­ducted last week in San Diego, aimed to cor­rect. Everyone from IBM to Sprint to Google to U.S. Joint Forces Command par­tic­i­pated in the test, called Strong Angel III. And every­thing from inflat­able anten­nas to high-​​speed wire­less net­works to text-​​message news feeds to games for human­i­tar­ian aid was tried out.
It didn’t all work per­fectly, as the New York Times notes.

Last Monday, the group began to assem­ble a makeshift com­mand cen­ter at an aban­doned build­ing near the San Diego air­port. But a state-​​of-​​the-​​art wire­less net­work, intended to route video images, satel­lite map coor­di­nates and other data from an impres­sive array of mobile com­put­ers, soft­ware analy­sis tools and com­mand pro­grams failed to come to life.
“Finally I said, ‘Lights out! Everyone turn every­thing off and lets start over,’” said Brian D. Steckler, a com­puter sci­en­tist at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., who was in charge of more than a dozen inter­lock­ing net­works at the heart of the com­mand cen­ter.
Hundreds of com­put­ers and even cell­phones were shut down, and then the net­work was slowly turned back on, seg­ment by seg­ment. Too many high-​​bandwidth appli­ca­tions had clogged the net­work, includ­ing a pow­er­ful video cam­era and “rogue” trans­mit­ters set up by par­tic­i­pants intent on cre­at­ing their own mini-​​networks.

But Strong Angel did meet its #1 goal — to “map­ping and devel­op­ing” rela­tion­ships for dis­as­ter response. Programmers from Microsoft and Google, for exam­ple, teamed up “to allow shar­ing [of] a sin­gle set of dig­i­tal satel­lite maps seam­lessly and to over­lay event data relayed from emer­gency work­ers through­out the San Diego area,” the Times said.
Most observers, like Defense Tech pal John Scott, agreed if these projects take the main lessons of the drill to the heart — by keep­ing col­lab­o­ra­tion tools sim­ple, low-​​bandwidth, and platform-​​agnostic — they should be “hugely help­ful for the next dis­as­ter.”

Hybrid Truck’s Katrina Duty

Wednesday, March 29th, 2006

Diesel-​​electric hybrids vehi­cles are all the rage at the U.S. Army’s Tank-​​automotive and Armaments Command in Warren, Michigan. Rising fuel prices and attacks on fuel con­voys in Iraq have inspired a num­ber of pro­grams to develop more fuel-​​efficient trucks. The idea, accord­ing to indus­try, is to cut the Army truck fleet’s fuel con­sump­tion by 20 per­cent by 2010.
HEMTT ARMOR.jpgBut there are other advan­tages to hybrids, accord­ing to Gary Schmiedel at Oshkosh in Wisconsin, which builds the Army’s Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck. HEMTTs are tough moth­ers. During the January elec­tions in Iraq, I talked to HEMTT crews who bar­reled through AK fire to pick up bal­lots (see photo for the result). Schmiedel says a new breed of HEMTT, the A3 model, will retain all the rugged­ness and com­bat util­ity of its pre­de­ces­sor, but with the added capa­bil­ity to export up to 100kW of 3-​​phase AC power, thanks to its new capacitor-​​based hybrid engine.
To test the A3, and as a pub­lic ser­vice, in the after­math of Hurricane Katrina, Oshkosh sent a pro­to­type to New Orleans to serve as a mobile gen­er­a­tor. Since it uses the same stan­dard of elec­tric­ity as our pub­lic grid, export­ing power is as sim­ple as fir­ing up the HEMTT and plug­ging in your appli­ance. The New Orleans-​​deployed A3 enabled work­ers to pump out the flooded base­ment of a hos­pi­tal.
Hybrids are more expen­sive than their con­ven­tional coun­ter­parts. But they promise over­all sav­ings over their life­times thanks to reduced fuel con­sump­tion. And they offer many ben­e­fits besides, includ­ing those demon­strated by Oshkosh’s HEMTT A3 after Katrina. These days I’m on the hybrid beat for National Defense, so expect more on the sub­ject in com­ing weeks.
– David Axe

PM’s “Lessons of Katrina”

Saturday, March 4th, 2006

You won’t like, or agree with, every con­clu­sion — espe­cially not if you work for the mayor of New Orleans. But Popular Mechanics’ ridicu­lously com­pre­hen­sive cover pack­age on the “Lessons of Katrina” is really worth a read.
PMX0306leveefailpresc-lg.jpgEspecially nice is how Pop Mech lever­ages its DIY home-​​builder know-​​how to offer up fixes for future hurricane-​​fighting. Here’s an example:

In 1965, the same year Hurricane Betsy swamped large sec­tions of New Orleans (includ­ing the Lower Ninth Ward), the Army Corps of Engineers pre­sented Congress with an auda­cious blue­print for pro­tect­ing the city from a fast-​​moving Category 3 storm. The $85 mil­lion Barrier Plan pro­posed seal­ing off Lake Pontchartrain from the gulf with mas­sive, retractable flood bar­ri­ers. The goal: Stop storm surges 25 miles east of the lev­ees that encir­cle New Orleans. After Betsy, the plan was expanded to include gates on two of the four drainage canals that slice into the city from Pontchartrain (two of which breached their flood­walls after Katrina). But, envi­ron­men­tal groups objected to the impact that the Pontchartrain flood­gates might have on wildlife and wet­lands. The Sewer and Water Board of New Orleans vetoed gates on the canals. So the Corps instead built higher lev­ees and flood­walls.
Now, 40 years later, the Corps is again study­ing how to design gates for Pontchartrain and the New Orleans canals that will have min­i­mal impact on the envi­ron­ment and nav­i­ga­tion, but will still be able to block Katrina-​​strength storm surges. The report’s due date: January 2008. Meanwhile, engi­neers are also study­ing how to strengthen the exist­ing lev­ees. One idea is to replace frag­ile I-​​wall bar­ri­ers with more robust T-​​walls, which use three rows of foun­da­tion pil­ings that can with­stand pres­sure gen­er­ated by hurricane-​​force flood­wa­ters. A wide con­crete slab, or “skirt,” on the pro­tected side deflects over­flow­ing water that could oth­er­wise wash away sup­port­ing soil. T-​​walls held through­out Katrina with­out a leak.

Next month’s cover story might not be half-​​bad, either. I hear they got some defense tech­nol­ogy dork to look at the Pentagon’s big weapons pro­grams, and try to fig­ure out who things are meant to fight.

Katrina Smoking Gun (or Not)

Wednesday, March 1st, 2006

Remember when the President said he didn’t think “any­body antic­i­pated the breach of the lev­ees”? Never mind.
bush_katrina_briefing.jpg“In dra­matic and some­times ago­niz­ing terms, fed­eral dis­as­ter offi­cials warned President Bush and his home­land secu­rity chief before Hurricane Katrina struck that the storm could breach lev­ees, put lives at risk in New Orleans’ Superdome and over­whelm res­cuers, accord­ing to con­fi­den­tial video footage” obtained by the AP.

Bush didn’t ask a sin­gle ques­tion dur­ing the final brief­ing before Katrina struck on Aug. 29, but he assured soon-​​to-​​be-​​battered state offi­cials: “We are fully pre­pared.“
The footage — along with seven days of tran­scripts of brief­ings obtained by The Associated Press — show in excru­ci­at­ing detail that while fed­eral offi­cials antic­i­pated the tragedy that unfolded in New Orleans and else­where along the Gulf Coast, they were fatally slow to real­ize they had not mus­tered enough resources to deal with the unprece­dented disaster.

Watch the tape, if you can. It’s absolutely gut-​​wrenching.
UPDATE 10:45 PM: Some of you are already ask­ing, “What does Katrina have to do with defense?” It’s pretty self-​​evident to me. But click here for an expla­na­tion.
UPDATE 03/​04/​06 5:09 PM: The AP issued this clar­i­fi­ca­tion to the story yesterday:

In a Wednesday story, The Associated Press reported that fed­eral dis­as­ter offi­cials warned President Bush and his Homeland Security chief before Hurricane Katrina struck that the storm could breach lev­ees in New Orleans, cit­ing con­fi­den­tial video footage of an Aug. 28 brief­ing.
The Army Corps of Engineers con­sid­ers a breach a hole devel­op­ing in a levee rather than an over­run. The story should have made clear that Bush was warned about flood­wa­ters over­run­ning the lev­ees, rather than the lev­ees break­ing.
The day before Katrina, Bush was told there were grave con­cerns the lev­ees could be over­run.
It wasnt until the next morn­ing, as the storm made land­fall, that Michael Brown, then head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, said Bush had asked about reports of breaches. Bush did not par­tic­i­pate in that briefing.

To me, the “top” ver­sus “breach” argu­ment is largely seman­tic; what mat­ters here is that the folks at the top were told in advance how bad Katrina was look­ing. But, check out the com­ments, and you’ll read a lot of peo­ple telling you otherwise.

Katrina Tech: What Worked, What Sucked

Wednesday, October 26th, 2005

cane.jpgIn this month’s Wired, Mike Keller has “the inside story of how one hur­ri­cane” — that’d be Katrina — “wreaked telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions havoc. Check out his (all-​​too-​​brief) arti­cle on “what stayed online, what didn’t — and why.” DSL and cells drowned. TV sta­tions and emer­gency radios rose to the surface.

FEMA Official: Feds Snoozed Through Katrina

Thursday, October 20th, 2005

AP: “Federal Emergency Management Agency offi­cials did not respond to repeated warn­ings about dete­ri­o­rat­ing con­di­tions in New Orleans and the dire need for help as Hurricane Katrina struck, the first FEMA offi­cial to arrive con­ceded Thursday.“
brown.jpg

Marty Bahamonde, a FEMA regional direc­tor, told a Senate panel inves­ti­gat­ing the government’s response to the dis­as­ter that he gave reg­u­lar updates to peo­ple in con­tact with then-​​FEMA Director Michael Brown as early as Aug. 28, one day before Katrina made land­fall.
In most cases, he was met with silence. In an Aug. 29 phone call to Brown inform­ing him that the first levee had broke, Bahamaonde said he received a polite thank you from Brown, who said he would check with the White House.
“I think there was a sys­tem­atic fail­ure at all lev­els of gov­ern­ment to under­stand the mag­ni­tude of the sit­u­a­tion,” Bahamonde said…
Later, on Aug. 31, Bahamonde fran­ti­cally e-​​mailed Brown to tell him that thou­sands are evac­uees were gath­er­ing in the streets with no food or water and that “esti­mates are many will die within hours.“
“Sir, I know that you know the sit­u­a­tion is past crit­i­cal,” Bahamonde wrote.
Less than three hours later, how­ever, Brown’s press sec­re­tary wrote col­leagues to com­plain that the FEMA direc­tor needed more time to eat din­ner at a Baton Rouge restau­rant that evening. “He needs much more that (sic) 20 or 30 min­utes,” wrote Brown aide Sharon Worthy.
“We now have traf­fic to encounter to go to and from a loca­tion of his choise (sic), fol­lowed by wait ser­vice from the restau­rant staff, eat­ing, etc. Thank you.”


No won­der DHS Secretary Chertoff now says that FEMA bungling, and not an inept local response, was the pri­mary prob­lem with the han­dling of Katrina.
THERE’S MORE: The LA Times has Bahamonde’s clas­sic response to a FEMA flack’s urgent request to give Brownie some more time for dinner:

“OH MY GOD!!!!!!!” Bahamonde mes­saged the co-​​worker. “I just ate an MRE” mil­i­tary rations “and crapped in the hall­way of the Superdome along with 30,000 other close friends so I under­stand her con­cern about busy restaurants.”

Drones on Hurricane Hunt

Friday, September 23rd, 2005

One of the promises of unmanned air­planes has been that they would han­dle jobs that were too dan­ger­ous for flesh-​​and-​​blood pilots to han­dle — not just over a bat­tle­field, but here at home, as well.
drone_storm_small.jpgHere’s a mis­sion which fits that per­fectly: Last week, an Aerosonde drone took off from south­ern Florida, rode through Tropical Storm Ophelia, and “pro­vided the first-​​ever detailed obser­va­tions” of a killer storm’s “near-​​surface, high wind… environment.”

“Today we saw what hope­fully will become ‘rou­tine’ in the very near future,” Joe Cione, a researcher at the National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration’s Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory, said in a state­ment. “If we want to improve future fore­casts of hur­ri­cane inten­sity change we will need to get con­tin­u­ous low-​​level obser­va­tions near the air-​​sea inter­face on a reg­u­lar basis, but manned flights near the sur­face of the ocean are risky. Remote unmanned air­craft such as the Aerosonde are the only way…“
While the suc­cess­ful use of NOAA’s WP-​​3D Orion, its Gulfstream-​​IV air­craft and the U.S. Air Force Reserve’s WC-​​130H air­craft have been impor­tant tools in the arse­nal to under­stand trop­i­cal cyclones, detailed obser­va­tions of the near-​​surface hur­ri­cane envi­ron­ment have been elu­sive because of the severe safety risks asso­ci­ated with low level manned flight mis­sions. The main objec­tive of the Aerosonde project addresses this sig­nif­i­cant obser­va­tional short­com­ing by using the unique long endurance and low-​​flying attrib­utes of the unmanned Aerosonde observ­ing plat­form, fly­ing at alti­tudes as low as 500 feet…
The Aerosonde plat­form that flew into Ophelia was spe­cially out­fit­ted with sophis­ti­cated instru­ments used in tra­di­tional hur­ri­cane obser­va­tion, includ­ing instru­ments such as mounted Global Position System (GPS) drop­wind son­des and a satel­lite com­mu­ni­ca­tions sys­tem that relayed infor­ma­tion on tem­per­a­ture, pres­sure, humid­ity and wind speed every half sec­ond in real-​​time. The Aerosonde also car­ried a down­ward posi­tioned infrared sen­sor that was used to esti­mate the under­ly­ing sea sur­face tem­per­a­ture. All avail­able data were trans­mit­ted in near-​​real time to the NOAA National Hurricane Center and AOML, where the NOAA Hurricane Research Division is located.
The envi­ron­ment where the atmos­phere meets the sea is crit­i­cally impor­tant in hur­ri­canes as it is where the ocean’s warm water energy is directly trans­ferred to the atmos­phere just above it. The hurricane/​ocean inter­face also is impor­tant because it is where the strongest winds in a hur­ri­cane are found and is the level at which most cit­i­zens live. Observing and ulti­mately bet­ter under­stand­ing this region of the storm is cru­cial to improve fore­casts of hur­ri­cane inten­sity and structure.

Back in ’02, I wrote a story for the Times on civil­ian UAVs. The star of the story: an Aerosonde over the Arctic Circle, mon­i­tor­ing the frozen seas and skies.
THERE’S MORE: American spy sats will be watch­ing Rita from above, the AP says. Meanwhile, NASA has trans­ferred con­trol of the International Space Station from Houston to Moscow.
(Big ups: UV Online, Sploid)

Rita: Watch This Blog

Wednesday, September 21st, 2005

Defense Tech pal Kris Alexander works for Texas’ home­land secu­rity depart­ment. Which makes his blog absolutely essen­tially read­ing, now that a cat­e­gory 5 killer hur­ri­cane is about to put the whomp on the Lone Stars.
Rita3.JPGHe runs down the rea­sons to hope and the poten­tial “fric­tion points” as the state gets ready for a rum­ble — from Texas’ 375,000 Katrina refugees to the hos­pi­tals that have already cleared out. Bottom line:

All of this is hap­pen­ing with­out one bit of fed­eral resources being com­mit­ted. FEMA is at the state oper­a­tions cen­ter, but its a state and local show right now. We never planned on FEMA sav­ing our bacon. And no this plan didn’t hap­pen overnight. It has taken years of detailed plan­ning to reach this point. Will there be screw-​​ups? Yes. Will we do bet­ter than LA and NOLA? Probably.
This isn’t meant as hubris. I feel that too many peo­ple, espe­cially in the left side of the blo­gos­phere, have rushed to defend the LA state and local gov­ern­ments. I dis­agree. I think they screwed up regard­less of whether or not FEMA/​DHS was slow on the draw. I don’t think, knock on wood, that any­one is going to drown and die in a nurs­ing home on the Texas Coast. 

THERE’S MORE: Kris reas­sures us that the big hos­pi­tal on Galveston Island is being evac­u­ated. But what about the “hot zone” biode­fense lab there?
AND MORE: The Journal runs down the gagdets you need to make it through an emer­gency (too bad they didn’t do it before I re-​​stocked my dis­as­ter kit). And Xeni has pics of the sonic blaster we’ve dis­cussed here before.
AND MORE: “Is it my imag­i­na­tion,” asks Kathryn Cramer, “or isn’t the use of sonic blasters as weapons to delib­er­ately inflict pain on crowds ‘tor­ture’ as defined in arti­cle 1 of the UN Convention Against Torture?“
AND MORE: John Little, from Blogs of War, works in down­town Houston. “I have a win­dow office on the eight floor of a build­ing in the Texas Medical Center. I have to assume that in a cou­ple of days I’ll have a win­dow­less office on the eight floor of a build­ing in the Texas Medical Center.” He’s got a great list of resources for folks look­ing to track the storm.

Pentagon’s Homeland Priorities

Wednesday, September 14th, 2005

Spencer’s arti­cle on the military’s home­land secu­rity mis­sion got me think­ing. So I did a lit­tle dig­ging, and found this Pentagon “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.” It rein­forces the money quote from Spencer’s Katrina response story, that “the sys­tem that we have worked as it was designed. It was never designed to get masses of aid into place in 24 hours. And that’s the prob­lem.“
strat_doc.jpgCheck out the teeny-​​tiny empha­sis that the gen­er­als place on respond­ing to a dis­as­ter that doesn’t have to do with WMD:

Key Objectives of the Strategy
Within the lead, sup­port, and enable frame work for home­land defense and civil sup­port, the Department is focused on the fol­low­ing para­mount objec­tives, listed in order of pri­or­ity:
Achieve max­i­mum aware­ness of
poten­tial threats.
Together with the Intelligence Community and civil author­i­ties, DoD works to obtain and promptly exploit all action­able infor­ma­tion needed to pro­tect the United States. Timely and action­able intel­li­gence, together with early warn­ing, is the most crit­i­cal enabler to pro­tect­ing the United States at a safe dis­tance.
Deter, inter­cept and defeat threats at a safe dis­tance. The Department of Defense will actively work to deter adver­saries from attack­ing the US home­land. Through our deter­rent pos­ture and capa­bil­i­ties, we will con­vince adver­saries that threats to the US home­land risk unac­cept­able coun­ter­ac­tion by the United States. Should deter­rence fail, we will seek to inter­cept and defeat threats at a safe dis­tance from the United States. When directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, we will also defeat direct threats within US air­space and on US ter­ri­tory. In all cases, the Department of Defense coop­er­ates closely with its domes­tic and inter­na­tional part­ners and acts in accor­dance with applic­a­ble laws.
Achieve mis­sion assur­ance. The Department of Defense per­forms assigned duties even under attack or after dis­rup­tion. We achieve mis­sion assur­ance through force pro­tec­tion, ensur­ing the secu­rity of defense crit­i­cal infra­struc­ture, and exe­cut­ing defense cri­sis man­age­ment and con­ti­nu­ity of oper­a­tions (COOP).
Support civil author­i­ties in min­i­miz­ing the dam­age and recov­er­ing from domes­tic chem­i­cal, bio­log­i­cal, radi­o­log­i­cal, nuclear, or high-​​yield explo­sive (CBRNE) mass casu­alty attacks. The Department of Defense will be pre­pared to pro­vide forces and capa­bil­i­ties in sup­port of domes­tic CBRNE con­se­quence man­age­ment, with an empha­sis on prepar­ing for mul­ti­ple, simul­ta­ne­ous mass casu­alty inci­dents. DoDs responses will be planned, prac­ticed, and care­fully inte­grated into the national response. With the excep­tion of a ded­i­cated com­mand and con­trol ele­ment (cur­rently the Joint Task Force Civil Support) and the Army National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Teams, DoD will rely on dual capa­ble forces for the domes­tic con­se­quence man­age­ment mis­sion. These dual capa­ble forces must be trained, equipped, and ready to pro­vide timely assis­tance to civil author­i­ties in times of domes­tic CBRNE cat­a­stro­phes, pro­gram­ming for this capa­bil­ity when directed.
Improve national and inter­na­tional capa­bil­i­ties for home­land defense and home­land secu­rity. The Department of Defense is learn­ing from the expe­ri­ences of domes­tic and inter­na­tional part­ners and shar­ing exper­tise with Federal, state, local, and tribal author­i­ties, the pri­vate sec­tor, and US allies and friends abroad. By shar­ing exper­tise, we improve the abil­ity of the Department of Defense to carry out an active, lay­ered defense.
(empha­sis mine)

Northcom’s Muddy Mission

Tuesday, September 13th, 2005

Spencer Ackerman has a dyna­mite arti­cle in this week’s New Republic about the Defense Department’s Katrina response.
honore.jpgBottom line: “The sys­tem that we have worked as it was designed. It was never designed to get masses of aid into place in 24 hours. And that’s the problem.”

Four years after September 11, the Pentagon’s home­land secu­rity appa­ra­tus still pos­sesses more Qs than As. National Guardsmen, under the com­mand of Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco, didn’t reach New Orleans until Friday. Northcom [U.S. Northern Command] estab­lished a joint task force to facil­i­tate help, but many of the ships it ordered to the Gulf Coast just reached the area this week. It’s true that the Defense Department doesn’t bear the lion’s share of the blame for the dis­as­trously shift­less response to the hur­ri­cane: Its domes­tic oper­a­tions, jus­ti­fi­ably con­strained to limit the use of the mil­i­tary in the United States, sup­port state gov­er­nors and the Department of Homeland Security, which spec­tac­u­larly failed its first major post-​​September 11 test last week. But its uncer­tain response to Katrina under­scores [Heritage Foundation home­land secu­rity guru Jim] Carafano’s long-​​standing con­cern that home­land secu­rity still isn’t the pri­or­ity in the Pentagon that it needs to be…
[After 9/​11, the Pentagon cre­ated its Northern Command, to pro­tect the con­ti­nen­tal United States.] But, in prac­tice, the Pentagon didn’t seem to pri­or­i­tize poten­tial domes­tic mis­sions. Northcom, for exam­ple, was given respon­si­bil­ity for direct­ing mil­i­tary oper­a­tions in the event of a domes­tic dis­as­ter but was not given com­mand over any troops and hard­ware for its imme­di­ate use…It took another two years for [Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense Paul] McHale to issue a Defense Department strat­egy for home­land secu­rity…
[When Katrina hit, Northcom had a] lack of imme­di­ately deploy­able mil­i­tary assets. By Thursday… [Northcom’s] JTF Katrina’s ini­tial con­tri­bu­tion of about eight naval ships and 50 heli­copters had yet to arrive, nor had the hos­pi­tal ship Comfort left its Baltimore port…
What’s more, in at least some cases, a lack of coor­di­na­tion between north­com and the Guard ham­pered the relief effort. Colonel Roy Nomey of the Louisiana National Guard’s 256th Infantry Brigade eagerly awaited the arrival of JTF Katrina’s addi­tional vehi­cles for his food-​​distribution mis­sion, since his 300 men (the remain­ing 3,700 troops in his brigade are in Iraq) didn’t have suf­fi­cient equip­ment to get them to New Orleanians in need. “My peo­ple are ready. We’re poised around New Orleans to set up food dis­tri­b­u­tion cen­ters, but we don’t have enough vehi­cles that sit high enough to get through the flooded streets,” Nomey told
The Dallas Morning News.