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Cops and Robbers

Cop Tech Key to Iraq Fight?

Saturday, January 13th, 2007

All the talk is about more U.S. troops. But if there’s going to be a shot in hell of win­ning the war in Iraq, it’ll be up to the Iraqi police, argues Bing West in the cur­rent Atlantic. And those cops will need to be equipped with the lat­est crime-fighting gear.
police_car_computer.jpg

In the United States, a cop who pulls you over calls up your record and finds out where and when you were last stopped, and what the charge was. The Chicago police [well, some of ‘em — ed.] carry a device that takes fin­ger­prints and trans­mits them over the radio, with the results of a data­base search received in min­utes.
In Iraq, the police have no detec­tive equip­ment; no reli­able iden­ti­fi­ca­tion sys­tem has been widely fielded. As a result, American sol­diers on patrol futilely call in [if they can even call — ed.] the pho­netic spelling of Iraqi names on what­ever ID card they are handed…) A few enter­pris­ing American rifle com­pa­nies have con­ducted their own inde­pen­dent cen­suses, employ­ing rudi­men­tary spread­sheets and per­sonal dig­i­tal cam­eras. But no cen­tral infor­ma­tion sys­tem exists.
This is the great­est tech­ni­cal fail­ure of the war. For all of our efforts, we have ignored one of the most fun­da­men­tal axioms of coun­terin­sur­gency war­fare: an insur­gency can­not be defeated if the enemy can­not be identified.

Now, of course, tech alone isn’t a solu­tion. There needs to be a major upgrade of the Iraqi police, which West calls “among the most wretched in the world. New York City cops send some 26,000 crim­i­nals to prison every year; in Baghdad, with twenty times the mur­der rate, that num­ber is at best 2,000.” And the local cops are often in bed with mili­tias like the Mahdi Army.
But “when U.S. mil­i­tary man­power and tech­nol­ogy work hand in hand with” com­pe­tent Iraqi cops, “the com­bi­na­tion can be effec­tive,” West says.

Every day, aer­ial cam­eras hover over Anbar; some are mounted on unmanned aer­ial vehi­cles (UAVs) and oth­ers on heli­copters; some are infrared, oth­ers stream down video in sharp, bril­liant col­ors. I was in a com­pany oper­a­tions cen­ter in Haditha when Captain Bert Lewis, the air offi­cer, pointed at a screen show­ing a video feed… On the screen, we watched a man in a white dish­dasha hastily scoop­ing dirt over a boxy pack­age, while cars passed by with­out slow­ing down.
“FedEx deliv­ery,” Lewis said, to gen­eral laugh­ter. “I don’t believe this dude.” The Nissan drove away as the man fin­ished pack­ing dirt around the impro­vised explo­sive device, or IED…
“Nail that sucker,” Lieutenant Joshua Booth said… The man looked up and down the street, and then ran south. The pic­ture tilted, then zoomed in, hold­ing him in the cen­ter of the frame. A series of black num­bers scrolled along the right edge, updat­ing the GPS coor­di­nates. The tar­get, solidly built and in his mid-thirties, had left the road and was now run­ning along the river­bank…
As a Quick Reaction Force patrol closed on the GPS coor­di­nates, the fugi­tive sat down in the shade of a palm tree, beck­on­ing to some­one on the river. Just as a square-nosed wooden skiff punted up to the man, the QRF, mounted in two Humvees, con­verged on the river­bank. The man scram­bled to his feet, saw he had no place to run, and half-raised his arms to show he had no weapon.

(Big ups: PC)

Net Smuggling Ring Exposed

Wednesday, November 29th, 2006

Over the last few weeks, the Philadelphia Inquirer has been slowly spool­ing out one of the most inter­est­ing, most ambi­tious jour­nal­is­tic under­tak­ings of the year: an 8-part series — com­plete with a ton of online extras — on an Internet drug-smuggling ring, import­ing ille­gal phar­ma­ceu­ti­cals into this coun­try from India. Here’s a snip­pet from the first install­ment. But, when you’ve got some time, do your­self a favor and read the whole thing.
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Whenever DEA super­vi­sor Jeff Breeden grew ner­vous, he would rub his fore­head with his left hand. Now, as the arrest brief­ing began, Breeden dug deep into his brow.
Tomorrow’s world­wide take­down of the Bansal net­work was to be mon­i­tored from this drab con­fer­ence room over­look­ing Independence Mall.
The net­work sup­plied a rain­bow of pills — painkillers, sleep aids, seda­tives, stim­u­lants, steroids, psy­chotrop­ics, erectile-dysfunction med­ica­tion. Thousands of orders a day.
Who knew who made this stuff, where it came from, what was in it? The pub­lic health risk that Internet drugs posed, Breeden thought, was incal­cu­la­ble.
Yet no one in DEA had ever worked a major global online phar­macy inves­ti­ga­tion. He knew it was a career case, one col­leagues would always link to his name. Breeden? Yeah, he’s the guy who super­vised the Internet pill case out of Philly.
To take down the net­work, agents were using a num­ber of weapons — sur­veil­lance, under­cover buys, cell-tower pings, trash pulls, e-mail wire­taps, bank sub­poe­nas, immi­gra­tion reports, even pro­vi­sions of the Patriot Act. Agents here had flown to Australia, Costa Rica and India.
As Breeden lis­tened to the arrest brief­ing, he thought about every­thing that could go wrong.
Would for­eign banks and gov­ern­ments coop­er­ate? Or would they pro­tect the tar­gets, allow­ing Akhil and oth­ers to flee with mil­lions? Would mag­is­trates in sev­eral states autho­rize search war­rants in time? Would the bad guys be there when agents raided their homes at dawn? Had any of them got­ten wind of the pre­ma­ture arrest in New York? Did Akhil, as he implied in e-mails, really have a mole inside U.S. Customs?
Had they over­looked anything?

The MySpace Murders

Tuesday, November 28th, 2006

varo_distance.jpgOver the sum­mer, I spent months inves­ti­gat­ing a triple-homicide in Tacoma, Washington. The results are in this month’s Wired mag­a­zine; it’s my first arti­cle as a con­tribut­ing edi­tor there.
The story cen­ters around Daniel Varo, one of three friends shot in the head by a buddy from the MySpace online social net­work. When Varo died, his far-flung col­lec­tion of rel­a­tives and friends gath­ered on MySpace, to con­sole each other, to plan his memo­r­ial, and to vent their rage over his mur­der. People who had never met face-to-face sud­denly became the most trusted of con­fi­dants. Along the way, they dis­cov­ered that Varo didn’t com­pletely dis­ap­pear when he died. Varo had had spent so much time online that scraps of his life lin­gered on the Web — a ghost in the net­worked machines.
I’m really proud of the piece. I hope you’ll give it a read.
And if you want to dive fur­ther into Varo’s story, you can check out court doc­u­ments, the killer’s now-deleted MySpace pages, and a reporter’s note­book.
Lastly, think about giv­ing some money to Varo’s memo­r­ial fund. You can make dona­tions through PayPal to danielvaromemorialaccount@yahoo.com. Finish the story, and you’ll see why this matters.

Poulsen Busts MySpace Perv

Monday, October 16th, 2006

Five months ago, hacker-legend-turned-Wired-News-editor Kevin Poulsen wrote an auto­mated script that searched MySpace’s 1 million-plus pro­files for reg­is­tered sex offend­ers. Soon, the pro­gram fig­ured out that one — 39-year-old Andrew Lubrano — “was back on the prowl for seri­ously under­age boys.” Suffolk County, NY cops were alerted. And Poulsen got to go along with them, as they busted the scum­bag. Reason # 987 why Poulsen is my hero.

World Cup: Time to Whoop Ass

Wednesday, June 14th, 2006

I don’t like foot­ball (read: soc­cer) any more than you do. But we can prob­a­bly agree that the arrival of those lust­ful foot­ball fans on German soil for the World Cup is a good test for a multi-national secu­rity force.
littledutchboy.jpgA com­bi­na­tion of Stella Artois, 30 degree heat and dis­cus­sion about my native England’s “chances” cre­ate a men­tal state capa­ble of (and fit for) quite a lot of pun­ish­ment. And it’s not just the Germans that want a chance to beat the crap out of these morons.
13 Countries have queued for an oppor­tu­nity to get on the action with about 80 uni­formed British offi­cers tak­ing part in the largest joint police oper­a­tion in European his­tory. Its also worth not­ing the threats to this World Cup are roughly com­pa­ra­ble to those in a mod­ern bat­tle­field — peace­ful and vio­lent demon­stra­tors, far right/left wing groups, multi-ethnic /multi-religious group ten­sions and pos­si­ble for­eign ter­ror­ism will make affec­tive secu­rity and polic­ing a chal­lenge.
Along with the usual sur­veil­lance equip­ment asso­ci­ated with mod­ern sport­ing events, some of the 2006 World Cup tech­nol­ogy includes:

* Fast Fingerprinting devices allow­ing German police to trans­mit iden­ti­fi­ca­tion data to be matched against archives stored in the cen­tral data­base of the German Federal Intelligence Service.
* Facial recog­ni­tion CCTV in the sta­di­ums will allow cam­eras to record bio­met­ric facial fea­tures of sus­pected hooli­gans which can be checked in real time against pho­tos stored in the cen­tral data­base.
* RFID chips in more than 3 mil­lion tick­ets will include iden­ti­fi­ca­tion infor­ma­tion that will be checked as hold­ers pass through entrance gates. Those with the tick­ets have had to pro­vide per­sonal data such as name, address, nation­al­ity, and pass­port num­ber (with minor out­rage)
* NATO AWACS planes and the German Air Force will patrol the skies above Germany through­out the tour­na­ment main­tain­ing an exclu­sion zone around the sta­di­ums.
* 5,000 pri­vate secu­rity, 7,000 German army troops and 30,000 German police (luck­ily unarmed) are sup­ple­mented by vol­un­teer groups; most notably the now mil­i­tant “Die Hasselhoff, Die.”

The Germans are being quite coy on the cost of all this, other than it’s “less” than the $1 bil­lion spent in the Athens Olympics. They actu­ally seem more impressed with their new ball and the game’s motto: “a time to make friends”.
For me, the World Cup just wouldn’t be the same with­out Henry “4–4-2″ Kissinger, so for you ner­vous first-timers here’s a snip­pet of his 2000 word coma-fest explain­ing the game — you should wake up around mid-July, well after the end of the tournament:

In eight groups of four, each team plays the oth­ers in its group. The top two teams of each group advance to a sudden-death round…Manipulating a ball by foot along a 110-yard-long field into an oppos­ing goal requires skills anal­o­gous to ballet…This turns the game into a kind of geom­e­try of find­ing uncov­ered open spaces from which to launch an unim­peded shot on the goal…The result was a kind of total foot­ball: what­ever the assigned posi­tion of the player, he had the addi­tional task of rein­forc­ing the cen­ter of grav­ity, attack or defense, depend­ing on the situation.

Steven Snell

Draft Patrick Fitzgerald?

Monday, June 12th, 2006

Right now, mil­i­tary “pros­e­cu­tions only hap­pen when a com­man­der decides to have them,” writes Defense Tech pal Eric Umansky in today’s Slate. “If an offi­cer believes some­body under his com­mand might have done wrong, then the com­man­der can go after him and bring charges. Or not. It’s all up to his dis­cre­tion.”
In light of the Haditha, Abu Ghraib, and other inves­ti­ga­tions, Umansky argues, “What we need is an inde­pen­dent prosecutor’s office, a place where a Patrick Fitzgerald-type can hang his hat and go after wrong­do­ing wher­ever it may be in the chain of com­mand.”
What do you guys think? Is Eric on to some­thing, or not?
UPDATE 06/13/06 07:32 AM: “Umanksy isn’t nec­es­sar­ily wrong, but he isn’t exactly right either,” says John over at Op For.

It is true that com­man­ders have excep­tional power when it comes to the pros­e­cu­tion and pun­ish­ment of their troops, but the way Umansky spins the story makes it sound like indi­vid­ual com­man­ders are the end all/be all for mil­i­tary jus­tice. In real­ity, the mil­i­tary legal sys­tem –from inves­ti­ga­tion to pros­e­cu­tion– is an incred­i­bly com­plex, multi-layered entity, in which the unit com­man­der is a sin­gle stone in the tech­ni­col­ored mosiac

Chicago Cops Crack Heads, Ride Scooters

Wednesday, May 31st, 2006

Chicago cops have a well-deserved rep­u­ta­tion for being the tough­est guys in a tough town. But you’ve got to won­der how many heads they are going to have to crack to keep that rep­u­ta­tion up, now that more and more offi­cers are rid­ing around the Windy City on Segway scoot­ers.
segway_cop.jpgThe CPD is spend­ing about a half-million dol­lars to buy up 100 scoot­ers and parts. That’s on top of the 50 Segways already in use at O’Hare and Midway air­ports, and around the lake­front.
Cops have become a key mar­ket for the scooter-maker, after the machines failed to catch on with the gen­eral pub­lic. Around the coun­try, 125 law enforce­ment agen­cies now use Segways, the com­pany claims.

In Los Angeles County… offi­cers prize it because it allows them to stand a head taller than they would on foot, so they can see over crowds and cars and project a more promi­nent pres­ence at events like the Rose Bowl parade.
The scoot­ers, which travel as fast as 12.5 mph, also allow an offi­cer on patrol to cover a much greater dis­tance than on foot, and go indoors, onto ele­va­tors and other places big­ger vehi­cles can’t. Blair said the added effi­ciency allows a force to cut down on the num­ber of patrol offi­cers on each shift and recoup the Segway’s cost in as quickly as a month.
Several bomb squads such as those in Ventura County, Calif., and Little Rock, Ark., use Segways to trans­port offi­cers in bulky bombproof and hazardous-material suits that can weigh as much as 100 pounds. The Segway allows them to scoot in and out of a scene quickly, with­out hav­ing to wad­dle in on foot. 

Last year, Segway came out with its i80 police model, which fea­tures a longer bat­tery life, giv­ing the scooter the an energy effi­ciency equiv­a­lent of 450 miles per hour gal­lon — with no emis­sions. The machine also boasts “Reflective Trim [that] helps estab­lish your pres­ence and enhance offi­cer vis­i­bil­ity” and a “Comfort Mat [that] alle­vi­ates fatigue that can occur when stand­ing for long peri­ods.” Not that Chicago cops get tired. Ever.
(Big ups: Gizmag)

Anybody Got a Decent Explanation…

Wednesday, May 24th, 2006

… for this?

The Veterans Affairs Department learned about the theft of elec­tronic data on 26.5 mil­lion vet­er­ans shortly after it occurred, on May 3, but waited two weeks before telling law enforce­ment agen­cies, offi­cials said Tuesday.
The offi­cials said inves­ti­ga­tors in the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were furi­ous with the lead­ers of the vet­er­ans agency for ini­tially try­ing to han­dle the loss of the data [pos­si­bly the largest data theft ever] s an inter­nal prob­lem through the agency’s inspec­tor gen­eral before com­ing for­ward.
Officials said the inves­ti­ga­tors in the Justice Department and F.B.I. had com­plained that the delay might have cost them clues to the where­abouts of the data, stored on com­puter disks that were stolen in a bur­glary on May 3 at the home of an agency employee in Maryland.

UPDATE 3:09 PM: This gets even bet­ter. VA Secretary Jim Nicholson “was not told about the miss­ing data until the night of May 16, or 13 days after the discs con­tain­ing the data were stolen in a bur­glary at the res­i­dence of a depart­ment employee who had taken them home with­out autho­riza­tion… [T]he sec­re­tary called the Federal Bureau of Investigation once he learned of the theft.”
UPDATE 4:40 PM: Axe has a killer piece for Military.com today on Iraq vets’ strug­gle to adjust to post-war life.

Cell Phones Full of Clues

Wednesday, May 3rd, 2006

I’ve got a story in today’s New York Times. Here’s how it starts:
The case against Dan Kincaid was strong. A home­owner in north­ern Boise, Idaho, had iden­ti­fied Mr. Kincaid, 44, as the per­son who had bro­ken into his sub­ur­ban house. But eye­wit­ness tes­ti­mony isn’t always rock solid, and Mr. Kincaid was refus­ing to talk. The police wanted more. So they searched Mr. Kincaid’s BlackBerry e-mail-capable phone elec­tron­i­cally, and found all the evi­dence they needed.
cell-phone.jpg“Just try­ing to find a way out of this neigh­bor­hood with­out get­ting caught,” Mr. Kincaid wrote to his girl­friend on Aug. 1, 2005, shortly after he had been spot­ted. “Dogs bark if I’m between or behind houses. … ”
“Cops know I have a blue shirt on,” he con­tin­ued. “I need to get out of here before they find me.”
Faced with his e-mailed admis­sion, Mr. Kincaid agreed to a deal with pros­e­cu­tors over that crime and a string of oth­ers. In February, he pleaded guilty to five counts of grand theft, resist­ing arrest and bur­glary.
“We seized his phone,” said Detective Jeff Dustin of the Boise Police Department, “and instead of a jump shot, this case is a slam dunk.”
Cellphones are every­where: 825 mil­lion were sold last year, accord­ing to the mar­ket research firm IDC. And the phones do more than just dial num­bers. With expanded mem­o­ries, increas­ingly sophis­ti­cated orga­nizer tools and sharper cam­eras, they are play­ing ever larger roles in the lives of almost every­one includ­ing crim­i­nals. Drug deal­ers, rapists and mur­der­ers across the coun­try have been caught based, at least partly, on the elec­tronic gad­gets they carry around.
But extract­ing clues and leads from mobile elec­tron­ics is no cake­walk. Unlike per­sonal com­put­ers, 90 per­cent or more of which use the Windows oper­at­ing sys­tem, cell­phones rely on a con­fus­ing jum­ble of soft­ware that varies from man­u­fac­turer to man­u­fac­turer and even phone to phone. Data is often hid­den or encrypted. And as long as a phone is con­nected to its cel­lu­lar net­work, there is always a chance that its call his­to­ries and text mes­sages will be erased, delib­er­ately or oth­er­wise.

Read the rest here.

Top G-Men: Terror Ignorance is Bliss

Tuesday, May 2nd, 2006

A few weeks back, I wrote about the seem­ingly unshake­able cul­ture of techno­pho­bia at the FBI — and how nearly a third of Bureau employ­ees still don’t have e-mail accounts, as a result.
ace_g_man_stories_194304.jpgBut that’s not the only bad habit that the G-Men are hav­ing trou­ble break­ing. As Jeff Stein reports in his must-read CQ Weekly cover story, there’s still a will­ful igno­rance about ter­ror­ists and their meth­ods — even at the FBI’s high­est levels.

Now lis­ten to the tes­ti­mony of Gary M. Bald, the FBIs top coun­tert­er­ror­ism and coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence offi­cial, in a legal depo­si­tion last year. Questioned under oath in a whistle­blower law­suit brought by an Arab– American FBI agent, Bald was asked whether he knew the dif­fer­ence between Sunni and Shia, the two strains of Islam at war with each other as much as with the United States.
Bald waved off the ques­tion. You dont need sub­ject mat­ter exper­tise, he said. The sub­ject mat­ter exper­tise is help­ful, but it isnt a pre­req­ui­site. It is cer­tainly not what I look for in select­ing an offi­cial for a posi­tion in the coun­tert­er­ror­ism [pro­gram]. In other words, he didnt know the answer: that a 1,400-year-long schism over who should lead Islam, orig­i­nat­ing in fierce suc­ces­sion bat­tles after the death of Mohammed in 632 A.D., is still being played out between nuclear aspi­rant and Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia, not to men­tion the armed fac­tions bat­tling for con­trol of U.S.-occupied Iraq. The reli­gious pas­sions that drive the dif­fer­ent branches of the Islamic world and the fer­vor that leads some to vio­lence against the West was not on his radar screen.
Nor could Bald, or other top FBI coun­tert­er­ror­ism offi­cials ques­tioned last sum­mer, explain the web of rela­tion­ships of Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tion with other key fun­da­men­tal­ist fig­ures and groups
hat its tech­niques for recruit­ing infor­mants change on the basis of a per­sons eth­nic back­ground, cul­ture or lan­guage, accord­ing to tes­ti­mony by John E. Lewis, another top coun­tert­er­ror­ism offi­cial at the bureau. It doesnt make any dif­fer­ence whether some­bodys from the Middle East or a white suprema­cist or from Australia, Lewis said, mean­ing that Middle Eastern ter­ror­ists rat out their brethren for the same rea­son Klansmen do: for money, revenge and dis­en­chant­ment with the cause.
That the FBIs American recruits spoke the Klans lan­guage in Mississippi and under­stood its cul­ture and pol­i­tics was not seen as any kind of spe­cial advan­tage thats being lost in the bat­tle against for­eign ter­ror­ists. Under fur­ther ques­tion­ing, Lewis also admit­ted that he had no pre­vi­ous coun­tert­er­ror­ism expe­ri­ence himself.

UPDATE 1:48 PM: “The salient fact is that, approach­ing five years after 9/11, we still do not have a domes­tic intel­li­gence ser­vice that can col­lect effec­tively against the ter­ror­ist threat to the home­land or pro­vide author­i­ta­tive analy­sis of that threat,” John Gannon, a for­mer CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, told the Senate Judiciary Committee today. “It is not enough to say these things take time. It could not be clearer from the Intelligence Communitys expe­ri­ence over the past 25 years that it is extra­or­di­nar­ily dif­fi­cult to blend the fam­i­lies of intel­li­gence and law enforce­ment, and that the Bureaus orga­ni­za­tional bias toward the lat­ter­for deep-seated his­toric reasons–is pow­er­ful and per­sis­tent.”
Read more tes­ti­mony here.