Last week, Taiwan stepped up pressure on the Obama administration to sell the country new, upgraded F-16s, something this administration, like the Bush administration before it, refuses to do to avoid antagonizing China. The latest Taiwanese move came from its defense ministry, which released a report saying that China’s continued modernization of its fighter fleet has shifted the cross-strait military balance decidedly in China’s favor.

The report says Taiwan’s ageing fleet of some 400 locally built fighters, French made Mirage 2000s, and 146 F-16A/Bs, are outmatched by China’s massive fighter fleet, particularly with China’s growing numbers of Russian built Su-30s. Only Taiwan’s F-16A/Bs have an edge over Chinese fighter aircraft, the report says. Taiwan requested some 66 F16C aircraft from the U.S. in 2006.

Over at right-leaning think tank AEI’s defense blog, Michael Mazza raises the alarm:

“Are policymakers considering the implications of this? The smaller and more antiquated the Taiwan air force is, the greater the number of American pilots in harm’s way should the U.S. ever need to go to the island’s defense. It’s not clear that anybody is doing this math, as simple as it is.”

Actually, RAND did the math on this one in a report last year, in typical RAND style, using sophisticated modeling to simulate a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the 2010–2015 timeframe. RAND’s conclusion was that the addition of a few dozen upgraded F-16s would have little to no impact on the cross-strait balance. In fact, RAND found that in the event of a Chinese attack, “the air war for Taiwan could essentially be over before much of the Blue air force has even fired a shot.”

It’s not the Chinese air fleet that would deliver the knock out blow to Taiwanese air power. Rather, its China’s massive arsenal of ballistic missiles that in an opening salvo would destroy most Taiwanese aircraft, even those in hardened shelters, and wreck its runways before Taiwan was able to launch its fighters.

Adding new F-16s to China’s inventory does little to change the ultimate outcome. Well, more Taiwanese aircraft would make a small contribution RAND found: “Taiwan’s air power can at least contribute to the anti-invasion defense by absorbing as much of China’s air effort as possible in the process of being put out of action.” In other words, parking more fighters on Taiwan’s ramps would make the Chinese deplete more of its missile magazines.

The answer to the cross-strait military balance will not come in the form of more short range tactical fighters sat on ramps within range of China’s massive missile force. As the RAND study conclusively shows, selling Taiwan more capable F-16s does nothing to change the military balance.

– Greg

Interesting reports out of China on projected defense spending: only a 7.5 percent increase, the smallest in two decades, according to Chinese officials. The NYT reports that Chinese budget documents peg 2010 defense spending at $78 billion, an increase of $5.4 billion over last year’s defense budget.

Now, there has always been much debate over the veracity of Chinese defense spending claims and various sources put the annual amounts considerably higher than Beijing’s official figures. That same NYT article says this year is the first time in 21 years that the rate of defense spending has fallen below double digits. Spending had risen an average of 12.9 percent annually from 1996 to 2008.

China is investing mightily in its own domestic stimulus package that has so far gotten the country through the recent economic turmoil in amazingly good shape. China’s economy grew at around 10 percent last year. Like most centrally planned economies, when the Chinese want to stimulate demand they do it through massive infrastructure projects, the colossal Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River being a good example.

China is spending billions on its high speed rail network, highways, airports, housing, etc. All of which is to say that the slowed rate of defense spending increase, may be a one-off phenomenon.

– Greg

“China’s carrier has gone to sea” was the headline of one Asian newspaper. The event — the story implied — marked the long-awaited operational debut of the former Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag. In reality, the ship got underway with harbor tugs providing the power, moving the ship from a pier in the port of Dalian to a nearby dry dock, a “voyage” of about two miles.

As of this writing, no major work on the ship has been observed since she arrived at Dalian in northeastern China on 3 March 2002. The ship was painted a few years ago, but little other effort has gone into the unfinished giant despite periodic press claims that the carrier was being “clandestinely” completed.

While the ship was being towed to the dry dock on 27 April the Varyag was extensively photographed. Those photos reveal much about the ship: She rode high in the water and, with the lack of “patches” on her flight deck, it is obvious that engines had not been installed in the ship. Her flight deck lacks arresting cables and operational markings, and her island structure is void of the aerials, electronic domes, and radar antennas that inundate aircraft carriers.

The question is: Why has the Varyag moved into a dry dock. A number of reasons are possible for her brief voyage and dry docking. These include:

(1) Completing the carrier — which was laid down at the Nikolayev South shipyard as the Soviet Riga in the Ukraine in 1985. This would involve the complex task of installing engines and other machinery (assuming that they are now available), auxiliary equipment, messing and berthing facilities, radars and other electronic equipment, etc.

(2) Carrying out general maintenance on the hulk, including cleaning her underwater hull, and taking other measures to simply preserve the Varyag until a definite decision is made concerning her eventual fate.

(3) Permitting naval architects and others to examine the ship’s underwater hull, possibly to assist in efforts to design and construct an indigenous Chinese aircraft carrier.

There can be no question but the Chinese Navy’s leadership wants to acquire aircraft carriers, primarily to provide air cover for naval operations in the South China Sea, an area of great interest to China because of offshore oil activities. In long-range planning, the Chinese may also be considering their increasing political and economic interests in Africa and South America. However, despite periodic press reports — some saying that the first Chinese carrier will be completed this year — there is still no publicly available evidence that construction of such ships has begun in China. Indeed, even commercial satellites would have detected such efforts.

Chinese shipyards, which are producing advanced missile destroyers and nuclear-propelled submarines as well as large merchant ships, can certainly build a large aircraft carrier. Completion of the ship — which would take probably four years or more from the start of construction — would have to be followed by a lengthy working up period, with extensive ship and then aircraft trials and qualifications. Thus, with at least a year from the decision to build such a ship until actual construction would start because of the need to order components and materials, if that decision were made today the first Chinese carrier could be ready in about six or seven years.

– Norman Polmar

A supercruising combat aircraft is a high priority of the Chinese navy, the country’s top admiral says in a revealing official interview that gives strong clues of perceived shortcomings and future directions for the maritime force.

Adm. Wu Shengli also says China must step up work on precision missiles that can overcome enemy defenses, and the nation should move faster in developing large combat surface ships — probably meaning the aircraft carrier program that looks increasingly imminent.

Wu’s demand for supercruise — supersonic flight without afterburner — hints that such performance will be available from the next Chinese fighter, sometimes called the J-XX.

“One possibility is that the J-XX is being designed for supercruise and that Wu is trying to build support for a naval version of the aircraft,” says Richard Bitzinger, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

The design of the J-XX is unknown. It could be a new aircraft or quite possibly a development of the J-10, a fighter now entering service.

The J-10’s configuration is similar to that of the Eurofighter Typhoon, which the manufacturer says can supercruise at Mach 1.5, although it is likely to be somewhat slower with a useful external load.

For the Chinese navy, one advantage of supercruising would be the ability to cover a large defensive area in less time — quite useful if the imagined target is a U.S. carrier group at long range.

Importantly, Wu lists a supercruising fighter among a series of technological demands that all look quite achievable for the Chinese navy over the next decade or so, suggesting that he does not regard such flight performance as a pie in the sky.

“Sophisticated equipment is the key material basis for winning a regional naval war,” says the admiral, evidently referring to the possibility of a confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. “We must accelerate and promote steps to work on key weapons.

Read the rest of this story, check out Turkey’s new AW149, see a Russian fighter go down and read about the Poseidon’s first flight from our friends at Aviation Week, exclusively on Military.com.

– Christian

This is not the first time we’ve covered this issue…

From the US Naval Institute:

With tensions already rising due to the Chinese navy becoming more aggressive in asserting its territorial claims in the South China Sea, the U.S. Navy seems to have yet another reason to be deeply concerned.

After years of conjecture, details have begun to emerge of a “kill weapon” developed by the Chinese to target and destroy U.S. aircraft carriers.

First posted on a Chinese blog viewed as credible by military analysts and then translated by the naval affairs blog Information Dissemination, a recent report provides a description of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) that can strike carriers and other U.S. vessels at a range of 2000km.

The range of the modified Dong Feng 21 missile is significant in that it covers the areas that are likely hot zones for future confrontations between U.S. and Chinese surface forces.

The size of the missile enables it to carry a warhead big enough to inflict significant damage on a large vessel, providing the Chinese the capability of destroying a U.S. supercarrier in one strike.

Because the missile employs a complex guidance system, low radar signature and a maneuverability that makes its flight path unpredictable, the odds that it can evade tracking systems to reach its target are increased. It is estimated that the missile can travel at mach 10 and reach its maximum range of 2000km in less than 12 minutes.

Read the rest of this story on Military.com…

– Christian

In offices in the Pentagon and the State Department, China-Taiwan experts are scrutinizing the latest reports from the Far East of the changing relationship between China — officially the People’s Republic of China — and Taiwan, the offshore island “state.” For more than a half century the United States has anticipated a possible Chinese assault on Taiwan. But the situation is changing rapidly.

Taiwan became the Republic of China after 1949. Communist armies had overrun most of China and the surviving Nationalist troops, led by Chang Kai-shek, fled to the island, then known by its Japanese name of Formosa.

There followed several decades of intense animosity between the “two Chinas.” Initially, there was concern in the West that the Nationalist armies, rested and rearmed, could invade the mainland, some 100 miles away. Subsequently, there was concern for several decades that Chinese armies would cross the Taiwan Strait to invade Taiwan.

During the latter period the United States gave considerable military assistance to Taiwan in anticipation of a Chinese assault across the strait. And, U.S. war plans called for defending Taiwan against such an invasion, although the difficulties of such an amphibious operation should have been obvious to all parties.

Indeed, China did not build a massive amphibious fleet or a large airborne assault force. Further, China’s marines — currently two brigades in strength — are assigned to the South Sea Fleet rather than to the East Sea Fleet, which faces the Taiwan Strait. While detailed data are not publicly available, it appears that the East Sea Fleet is the smallest of China’s three fleets.

While strong words are still voiced by some leaders of both China and Taiwan, there has been a remarkable rapprochement between the two entities during the past few years. There is now direct postal service, commercial air transport, and, most recently, shipping between China and Taiwan. Also, Taiwan businessmen are investing in China.

And, in early January the China News Agency announced that representatives of China and Taiwan were are expected to meet after the Chinese New Year holidays to hammer out the technical details of several agreements to be signed during the third round of high-level, cross-Taiwan Strait talks. According to Straits Exchange Foundation Chairman Chiang Pin-kung, the new set of agreements will address issues such as cooperation on financial supervision and regulation, prevention of double taxation, intellectual property rights protection, and cooperation on combating crime.

These “semi-official” talks have seen unprecedented agreements between China and Taiwan, certainly a means of “defusing” the previous, danger-fraught relations between the two. Thus, there is increased reason for optimism that conflict in the Taiwan Strait is increasingly unlikely.

At the same time the Chinese armed forces, and especially the Navy, are undergoing an extensive modernization and — to a limited extent — expansion. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the naval modernization, with the largely unsubstantiated reports that China is preparing to construct aircraft carriers, is intended for missions other than a cross-strait assault. These missions are undoubtedly to insure access to offshore oil resources in the South China Sea, the safe passage of Chinese merchant ships through the various world straits, support to overseas Chinese economic and political interests (especially in South America and Africa), and, most recently, supporting anti-piracy operations.

This rapidly changing situation is causing U.S. government experts on Far Eastern issues to reevaluate official views and plans related to the Taiwan Strait.

– Norman Polmar

It appears that the structure of the PLA’s New Heavy Corps will be similar to the British 1 Corps in Northern Germany during the Cold War. The PLA Corps will be structured around brigades and I believe the Corps itself will contain a heavy artillery group, a ground manoeuvre group, an aviation group and a battlefield support group which would include bridging, electronic warfare and logistics.

An early version of the corps envisioned a total of 500 Model 96 or Model 99 main battle tanks in two armoured and two mechanised brigades; 586 ZDB-97 tracked infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 126 155mm PLZ-45 self-propelled guns; 96 120mm turreted self-propelled mortars; 36 Type 89 30 tube 122mm and 27 300mm 12 tube A-100 multiple rocket launchers; 12 DF-15D tactical missiles and 48 attack, 18 multipurpose and 60 transport helicopters and around 2,000 other types of vehicles.

This was clearly outside what the PLA is currently able to afford with armored brigades now have three armoured battalions for a total of 99 main battle tanks, one mechanised infantry battalion, one artillery battalion with 18 self-propelled guns and one air defence battalion of 18 AAA guns. Each armoured battalion will have three armoured companies, each of three platoons with each company having 11 main battle tanks; three in each platoon and two headquarters vehicles. There are no tanks at the battalion or brigade headquarters. This is a total of 33 main battle tanks.

The new mechanized infantry brigade is to have four mechanised infantry battalions, one armoured battalion, one fire support battalion, one engineer battalion and one communication battalion. Each mechanized infantry battalion has three mechanized infantry companies, each of three platoons with each company having 13 infantry fighting vehicles; four in each platoon and one headquarters vehicle. A complete brigade contains approximately 4,000 soldiers.

By comparison the British Army’s armored regiment (battalion) had tank squadrons (companies), each with four platoons of three Challenger 1 main battle tanks for a total of 58 tanks including headquarters vehicles. The mechanised infantry battalion had four companies of FV432 armoured personnel carriers, each of four platoons with four vehicles per platoon and one or two and the company and battalion headquarters. These vehicles were the direct equivalent of the PLA’s current ZSD89 APC and its family of vehicles, and the recent Type 96 and Type 99 main battle tanks. Similarly the battalion battle groups envisaged by the PLA are similar to the British Army battle groups of 1981. Each British army battle group was built around a battalion headquarters, a close reconnaissance troop (platoon) with eight Scimitar reconnaissance vehicles, an anti-tank troop with four to six armoured long range anti-tank guided missile vehicles, six self-propelled guns and one or two armoured vehicles with man portable surface to air missile systems.

This comparison quickly shows two glaring deficiencies in the PLA’s current structure and move towards modular combined arms battle groups. The first is the lack of a dedicated scout/close reconnaissance vehicle and the second, which in many ways is far more important, is the shortage of in-house infantry in the armored brigade and the mechanized infantry battalion.

The mechanised infantry lacks a fourth company in the infantry battalion meaning the armored brigades cannot create balanced battalion battle groups. Besides being unsuited to operations on complex terrain (urban and high altitude), armored forces that have neglected proper infantry support and have suffered large casualties include the Russian Army’s 131st Maykop Brigade on New Year’s Day 1995 in Grozny, and the Israeli tank forces during their initial counterattacks along the Bar Lev in the first morning of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Reconnaissance in the New Corps

Unlike the German and British Armies, the PLA like the United States Army does not have a dedicated mechanised brigade reconnaissance element. Under the new corps/brigade structure there will be a reconnaissance element as part of the corps. In the tracked units, the medium reconnaissance vehicle will be the Model 03 amphibious reconnaissance vehicle, which is replacing the Model 62 light tank and the Model 63 amphibious tank in PLA service. It will operate ahead of the main forces; and provide a flanking screen up to four km on the flanks. It is too bulky and large for scouting and close-in reconnaissance which could be performed by the ZBD05 airborne vehicle which besides having a 30mm automatic gun can carry a scout section. This role may have been trialled with aviation and other armoured vehicles by the composite reconnaissance/cavalry brigade in the Peace Mission 2007 joint exercise. The Model 02 100mm assault gun would have provided medium reconnaissance and explain the large amount of assault guns compared to the number of armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles.

– Martin Andrew

The Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group in 1986 was looking at creating a ‘Shock Division’ of three regiments, with each regiment containing two tank and two mechanised infantry battalions. Armoured divisions are too unwieldy in complex terrain and an armoured battle group (battalion sized) is easier to control and execute its mission.

The Peoples Liberation Army, following on from their experience with the Operational Manoeuvre Group, can now deploy the new mechanised infantry division and using modular forces have created a composite cavalry brigade for use in complex terrain.

Utilising the deep operation theory, they can employ am air mechanised and/or fast wheeled force as a ‘lance’ followed up by the mobile force (tank heavy) to exploit the breach in an enemys defences followed by a holding force (heavy mechanised), that is the dozer blade.

An article in the 1/2008 issue of Tanke Zhuangjia Cheliang (Tank and Armoured Vehicle) is titled ‘News From Overseas– Chinese Built Many Light Type Mechanised Units.’ The article was written to correct the mistakes that appear in non-Chinese media about the structure and equipment of these new light mechanised units.

The mechanised infantry brigade has four mechanised infantry battalions, one armoured battalion, one fire support battalion, one engineer battalion and one communication battalion. Each mechanised infantry battalion has three mechanised infantry companies, each of three platoons with each company having 13 infantry fighting vehicles; four in each platoon and one headquarters vehicle.

Each armoured brigade has four armoured battalions for a total of 132 main battle tanks, one mechanised infantry battalion, one artillery battalion with 18 self-propelled guns and one air defence battalion of 18 AAA guns. Each armoured battalion has three armoured companies, each of three platoons with each company having 11 main battle tanks; three in each platoon and two headquarters vehicles. A complete brigade contains 4,000 soldiers.

The 112th Mechanised Infantry Division, part of the 38th Army Group, uses the Model 99 main battle tank and the Model 86 infantry fighting vehicle. The 3rd and 116th Armoured Divisions, part of the 39th Army Group are to be equipped with 198 Model 99 main battle tanks each, meaning at present they will stay with the three tank platoon structure and two regiments.

The 54th Regiment, part of the 127th Mechanised Infantry Division uses the Model 96 main battle tank as do the independent 20th Tank Regiment and 58th Tank Brigade.

The 113th Mechanised Infantry Division of the 38th Army Group is equipped with both Type 92 and 92A wheeled infantry fighting vehicles. Other vehicles based on the chassis include command, anti-tank with the Hong Jia– 8 ATGW, the Yi-Tian self propelled SAM system and the wheeled 122mm self-propelled gun is close to approval.

– Martin Andrew

[Editor’s Note: Our good friend Martin Andrew, who publishes an investigative blaster chronicling Chinese military development called the Gi Zhou Newsletter, has some interesting tidbits for us this week. And please note, the picture at left is an earlier Type 89 self-propelled gun.]

New 122mm Self-Propelled Gun

In 1966, Luo Ruiqing, the PLA’s then chief-of-staff criticised the defence industry because it was concentrating on R&D rather than on production. He was accused in the official Report of Luo’s Mistakes that, ‘he still frantically attacked our national defence scientific research work as going from data to data, from design to design, without completing anything’. Luo believed China was in imminent war with the United States, and advocated Soviet assistance. His criticism of the Chinese defence industry could well have applied into the 1990s as well as today with too many designs that achieve little.

A new 122mm self-propelled gun has been shown in the online version of PLA Daily. Titled ‘Artillery troops enhance combat effectiveness with new equipment’, it shows a battery of these guns. The vehicle uses the chassis from the new ZBD97 infantry fighting vehicle with a turret, most probably a modified version of the one used on the Model 89 122mm self-propelled gun.

WZ731 Tracked Scout Vehicle

Identified as a xinxihua zhanchang (Informationalised battlefield) system, the WZ731 tracked scout developed from the ZSD89 hull with a low profile turret mounting two armoured sights, one with a laser rangefinder and CCD daylight sight and the other a thermal imager. The WZ731 had a crew of up to six including a three man scout team. It was 6.62m long, 2.626m wide and 1.88m high at the hull and 2.556m at the top of the armoured sights. The combat weight was only 8.1t which gave it a maximum road speed of 80.5 km/hr.

The armament comprised eight 76mm smoke grenade dischargers, four mounted in a row on each side of the turret and a pintle mounted Model 59 12.7 x 108mm heavy machine gun on the left side if the commander’s cupola which is directly behind the driver on the left hand side. This single machine gun on its open pintle mount was deemed insufficient in the event of the vehicle coming under attack. The lack of an automatic cannon was one reason the vehicle was not introduced into service. The British Scimitar tracked reconnaissance vehicle is similar in weight, is better armoured, smaller in size, more mobile and m mounts a 30mm cannon.

The basic design was sound and a new scout version of the ZSD89, using the enlarged rear hull of the ambulance version, with a modified low profile turret from the WZ731. This incorporates flat transmitter panels on the turret roof, and on top of this is a compressed gas catapult for a small UAV.

New Unmanned Air Vehicle

The Wenchuan Earthquake has seen the use of at least one Chinese developed and manufactured unmanned air vehicle (UAV). It was to survey the extent of the damage.

It is only 2.1 m long and has a wingspan of 2.6m. It weighs 20kg and is of pusher configuration with twin booms connecting a ‘V’ shaped rear fin. It can travel at 110km/hr, reach an altitude of 3,500m and has GPS assisted guidance. Its photographic images are excellent.

– Martin Andrew

I didn’t really understand it until I noticed the seriousness in the source’s eyes. I hadn’t given it much thought recently, what with all the other stuff going on around us … MRAP, Air Force shakeup, body armor, tanker — you name it.

But when the far-ranging discussion we were having came around to the subject of aircraft carriers, this guy said (and I paraphrase) “you think carriers are irrelevant in a contested environment now, just wait til someone gets an anti-ship ballistic missile capability. That’ll be a game-changer.”

To me, this seemed implausible. Shooting a ballistic missile at a moving ship?

“Did you see the ASAT test? That was 10-times more difficult,” he replied. “And they’re a lot closer than anyone thinks.”

He wouldn’t tell me the country that’s so close to getting this capability, but it’s not hard to guess which one it is.

From the 2008 Chinese Military Power report:

China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) based on a variant of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) as a component of its anti-access strategy. The missile has a range in excess of 1,500 km and, when incorporated into a sophisticated command and control system, is a key component of Chinas anti-access strategy to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships at sea, including aircraft carriers, from great distances.

That’s subtle — not a whole lot there. But my guy tells me this country that he would not mention could plausibly demonstrate that capability “very soon.”

According to our friends at Globalsecurity.org:

Work is believed to be ongoing to provide this missile with a sophisticated terminal guidance system. According to some reports the Mod 2 version of the CSS-5 will be comparable to the US Pershing II IRBM, employ advanced radar guidance to achieve extremely high accuracy.

Now, here’s what it means: carriers must stay at least 1000 miles off this enemy’s coast. Think how that affects strike planning, surveillance, rescue…any number of factors that go into naval aviation planning. And how do you defend against such a strike? I’m not sure about all the details, but it seems to me there’s a pretty short flight time in which to generate a solution for an anti-ballistic missile interceptor. Maybe ABL could handle this one, but how many can it shoot down at any one time? A salvo of even five or 10 of these could be devistating.

Another source tells me there have been tests of the system but they have so far been unsuccessful. But the source also told me the Russians might have recently delivered a key component to the Chinese to make this system more effective.

We’ll have more on this as it develops and I’ll be interested to see what DT readers might be able to add on this…

– Christian