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Missiles

To Kill or not to Kill

Thursday, February 26th, 2009

Kim Jong II
Back in 2008, US Pacific Command scored big when they knocked down a decay­ing US satel­lite with a sea-launched inter­cep­tor. Now ABC reports that CINCPAC, Adm. Timothy Keating, is ready to break out the fly­swat­ter again — this time under oper­a­tional conditions.

In an exclu­sive inter­view with ABC News’ Martha Raddatz, Adm. Timothy Keating, head of the U.S. Pacific Commands, said that the mil­i­tary is pre­pared to shoot down any North Korean bal­lis­tic mis­sile — if President Obama should give the order.
If a mis­sile leaves the launch pad we’ll be pre­pared to respond upon direc­tion of the pres­i­dent,” Keating told ABC News. “I’m not a bet­ting man but I’d go like 60/40, 70/30 that it will, they will attempt to launch a satel­lite. There’s equip­ment mov­ing up there that would indi­cate the pre­lim­i­nary stages of prepa­ra­tion for a launch. So I’d say it’s more than less likely.”

With plenty of Aegis assets float­ing around the ring of fire, ground-based inter­cep­tors at Vandenberg AFB, CA and Alaska, and a whole mess of radars that put Superman’s x-ray vision to shame.… there’s no doubt we could pull this off. But, like with all things defense, the ques­tion is whether or not we should.
Sure, the idea might appeal to those of us whose respon­si­bil­ity for national secu­rity and state­craft stop at the “pub­lish” but­ton on our blogs — watch­ing the Norks hopes for both a space pro­gram and a cred­i­ble nuclear deter­rent dis­si­pate in a cloud of inter­cep­tor smoke sure to hell appeals to me– but what about the State depart­ment wonks who are respon­si­ble for turn­ing off the North Korean nuclear pro­gram? What hap­pens if the North Koreans step up raids along their bor­ders, seize an American ship, or send nuclear sci­en­tists and sup­plies to Iran — or Syria?
The North Koreans are, by nature, aggres­sive crea­tures. But that doesn’t mean they’re stu­pid. In the fifty plus years since the cease­fire, they’ve fre­quently pushed us right up to our absolute, no shit limit, then quickly backed down. It’s a strange amal­ga­ma­tion of diplo­macy, pol­i­tics, and war­fare –a harsh cal­cu­lus of slaps and hand­shakes– that the Norks have mas­tered in their half-century of deal­ing with the West.
In other words, Kim Jong Il is damned good at being a gigan­tic pain in the ass.
So do we pro­voke him? Is it nec­es­sary? Does the ben­e­fit out­weigh poten­tial cost? I ven­ture a cau­tious yes (let our new CiC play a lit­tle hard­ball), but what say you?
–John Noonan

I’m Not a Laser Expert but I Do Play One on TV

Tuesday, August 12th, 2008

Can you say “inter­con­ti­nen­tal”? I can’t …

– Ward

Eh, Our Bad

Friday, August 1st, 2008

Been quite a year for Minot AFB…

Truck car­ry­ing mis­sile booster tips in N.D.

A mil­i­tary trans­port vehi­cle car­ry­ing an unarmed Minuteman III booster tipped over Thursday morn­ing on its way to a 91st Missile Wing launch facil­ity at Minot Air Force Base, N.D.

PT van.JPG

Early reports show the vehi­cle tipped over on the gravel access road after the road gave out under the truck, accord­ing to an Air Force offi­cial. The acci­dent occurred between the sparsely pop­u­lated towns of Makoti and Parshall, N.D., about 70 miles south­west of Minot, right off County Road 24.
They are still inves­ti­gat­ing now but we know there is no dan­ger to the pub­lic and no nuclear mate­ri­als were onboard the vehi­cle at the time of the acci­dent, said Maj. Laurie Arellano, an Air Force Space Command spokeswoman.

The stan­dard fir­ings usu­ally ensue after pub­lic ker­fuf­fles with nukes. But at this point, I’m not sure there’s any­one left at Minot to fire…
–John Noonan

Another Missile Defense Success (yawn…)

Monday, October 1st, 2007

Isnt it funny how news like this is greeted with a col­lec­tive yawn from most of the media?
gmd-test.jpg

Its another exam­ple of what they call in the jour­nal­ism world a dog bites man event.

Boeing announced this week­end a suc­cess­ful inter­cept of a bal­lis­tic mis­sile in space of its mis­sion rep­re­sen­ta­tive exo-atmospheric kill vehi­cle. In the past, there would have been much made of this suc­cess­ful test, but now, its only news of a test fails the man bites dog event.

The test of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) sys­tem began at 4:01 p.m. Eastern when a long-range bal­lis­tic mis­sile tar­get lifted off from the Kodiak Launch Complex in Alaska. Seventeen min­utes later, mil­i­tary oper­a­tors launched an inter­cep­tor from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. As the inter­cep­tor flew toward the tar­get, it received tar­get data updates from the upgraded missile-warning radar at Beale Air Force Base, Calif. After fly­ing into space, the inter­cep­tor released its exoat­mos­pheric kill vehi­cle, which pro­ceeded to track, inter­cept and destroy the tar­get warhead.

The test, GMD’s sev­enth inter­cept over­all, was the sec­ond inter­cept with an oper­a­tionally con­fig­ured inter­cep­tor since September 2006.

WATCH THE MISSILE TEST VIDEO…

With another inter­cept under our belts, we have even greater con­fi­dence that the GMD sys­tem, if called upon in a real-world sce­nario, will defend the nation against a lim­ited bal­lis­tic mis­sile attack,” said Scott Fancher, Boeing vice pres­i­dent and pro­gram direc­tor for GMD. The Boeing-led test was highly com­plex, involv­ing a wide range of assets, includ­ing the Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX). SBX, a pow­er­ful new sea-based sen­sor devel­oped by Boeing, tracked the tar­get mis­sile to pre­pare for the next GMD flight test, which will see SBX pro­vide tar­get updates to an in-flight inter­cep­tor for the first time. 

I guess its an exam­ple of how far the mis­sile defense debate has come. Its no longer about whether you can hit a bul­let with a bul­let, as oppo­nents used to say, was impos­si­ble. Now the debate is more about whether a radar in the Czech Republic will alien­ate the increas­ingly para­noid Russian government.

GMD defends the nation against a lim­ited num­ber of long-range bal­lis­tic mis­siles, with inter­cep­tors deployed in under­ground silos at Vandenberg and Ft. Greely, Alaska. An inte­gral ele­ment of the global bal­lis­tic mis­sile defense sys­tem, GMD also con­sists of radars, other sen­sors, command-and-control facil­i­ties, com­mu­ni­ca­tions ter­mi­nals and a 20,000-mile fiber optic com­mu­ni­ca­tions net­work. The U.S. gov­ern­ment has announced plans to extend this capa­bil­ity to Europe. 

Yes it has been expen­sive. Yes its been a long time com­ing. Yes there are many more hur­dles to over­come. But the fact that this story gained lit­tle trac­tion, is an even louder endorse­ment of the sys­tem than the actual space kill.

Christian

More Tomahawks May Fly

Monday, June 18th, 2007

tomahawk-web.jpg

The con­tin­ued prob­lems being encoun­tered in flight tests of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) could lead to res­ur­rec­tion of the air-launched Tomahawk mis­sile. The JASSM — des­ig­nated AGM-158 — was ini­ti­ated in 1995 fol­low­ing can­cel­la­tion of the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) because of mas­sive cost increases. 

The Lockheed Martin AGM-158 had won out in com­pe­ti­tion with the McDonnell Douglas AGM-159 design. Procurement of the Lockheed Martin JASSM began in December 2001 with the mis­sile intended for use on the F-15 Eagle, F-16 Fighting Falcon, F/A-18 Hornet, and F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter) as well as on the B-1B, B-2A, and B-52H Stratofortress strate­gic bombers. 

Some 600 JASSMs have been pro­duced, but test­ing con­tin­ues to indi­cate poor reli­a­bil­ity. During tests launches from December 2006 to April 2007, the Air Force reported a sys­tem reli­a­bil­ity of only 58 per­cent. Coupled with increased costs, this reli­a­bil­ity fac­tor has led Department of Defense offi­cials to ques­tion the effi­cacy of the pro­gram, even at this late date.

(more…)

Russia’s New BMD-Beater

Tuesday, June 5th, 2007

Topol-M-web.jpg

Russia recently launched a new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capa­ble of car­ry­ing Multiple Independently tar­geted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) war­heads, osten­si­bly intended to pen­e­trate the U.S. bal­lis­tic mis­sile defense sys­tem. The improved Topol-M mis­sile launched on 29 May was fired from a mobile launcher at the Plesetsk launch site in north­west­ern Russia. Its test war­head was reported to have landed on tar­get about 3,400 miles down range on the Far Eastern Kamchatka Peninsula. 

The TOPOL-M — given the Soviet des­ig­na­tion RS-24 and the NATO des­ig­na­tion SS-27 — also has a submarine-launched vari­ant known as the Bulava (NATO SS-N-30).The naval mis­sile will be car­ried by the new sub­marines of the Borey class. Statements from Russian offi­cials indi­cate that the Topol-M and Bulava are being upgraded with new war­heads and other coun­ter­mea­sures (prob­a­bly decoys) to counter the U.S. bal­lis­tic mis­sile defense sys­tem now being deployed. If these mis­siles are specif­i­cally intended to over­come U.S. defenses, their war­heads can be expected to have maneu­ver­ing re-entry vehi­cles, called MaRVs in the strate­gic lexicon. 

MaRV war­heads were devel­oped by the United States dur­ing the Cold War in response to Soviet bal­lis­tic mis­sile defenses, but were never installed on ICBMs.

(more…)

The JASSM Spasm

Tuesday, May 15th, 2007

Lockheed Martin, which builds the Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile, had some dis­ap­point­ing results dur­ing a test last week that raised even more dif­fi­cult ques­tions about the ongo­ing devel­op­ment pro­gram.
JASSM-web.jpg

(Photo from Lockheed Martin) 

From the Orlando Sentinel:

Last week, the com­pany con­firmed that “anom­alies were expe­ri­enced” in four JASSM tests con­ducted at a mis­sile range in Utah in early May. 

Lockheed would not pro­vide details or spec­u­late on the cause, cit­ing an ongo­ing inquiry into what went wrong. 

Three mis­siles appar­ently missed the tar­get area entirely and one hit pay dirt but failed to det­o­nate properly. 

“If you’re a JASSM sup­porter, this could not have come out at a worse time,” noted Christopher Hellman, a defense ana­lyst for the Center for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation, a think tank in Washington, D.C.

(more…)

Navy Missile Intercept

Friday, April 27th, 2007

Navy-missile-defense-web.jpg

The Pentagons Missile Defense Agency tested a key leg in its mis­sile shield triad yes­ter­day, shoot­ing down both a sub-sonic cruise mis­sile in the atmos­phere and a bal­lis­tic mis­sile in space with a ship-based interceptor.

To say the least, mis­sile defense has been extremely con­tro­ver­sial over the years, and it is a sub­ject of heated debate over whether the hun­dreds of bil­lions of dol­lars spent on sys­tems over the years have been worth the cost.

But it is worth chalk­ing up this test in the win col­umn for the embat­tled agency.

From a Raytheon release:

In a first of its kind dual mis­sile defense test, Raytheon Company-produced Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) simul­ta­ne­ously engaged tar­gets over the Pacific Ocean.

This was the first time a U.S. Navy ship demon­strated simul­ta­ne­ous ship engage­ments against both cruise and bal­lis­tic mis­sile tar­gets. It was the eighth suc­cess­ful inter­cept for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense sys­tems SM-3.

The SM-3 Block IA destroyed a short-range bal­lis­tic mis­sile tar­get in space while SM-2 Block IIIA engaged a cruise mis­sile threat at a lower alti­tude. Both inter­cept­ing mis­siles were fired from guided mis­sile cruiser USS Lake Erie (CG 70) by the ships crew. The bal­lis­tic mis­sile tar­get was launched from the U.S. Navys Pacific Missile Range Facility on Kauai. The sub­sonic cruise mis­sile tar­get was launched from a range aircraft.

This test, Flight Test Mission-11, was the sec­ond with the Block IA ver­sion of SM-3, and the first IA with a full-capability solid divert and atti­tude con­trol sys­tem. Raytheon is deliv­er­ing Block IA rounds for oper­a­tional use on Navy cruis­ers and destroyers.

The SM-3 Block IA pro­vides increased capa­bil­ity to engage short– to intermediate-range bal­lis­tic mis­siles. The SM-3 Block IA incor­po­rates rocket motor upgrades and com­puter pro­gram mod­i­fi­ca­tions to improve sen­sor per­for­mance, mis­sile guid­ance and con­trol, and lower cost. It also includes pro­ducibil­ity and main­tain­abil­ity fea­tures required to qual­ify the mis­sile as a tac­ti­cal fleet asset. 

Its defi­nately worth not­ing the com­plex­ity of such a test. Two dif­fer­ent kinds of mis­sile threats, tracked by the Aegis radar sys­tem that was feed­ing infor­ma­tion to two dif­fer­ent inter­cep­tors — each with its own seeker tech­nol­ogy — to a ter­mi­nal kill. Experts on both sides of the debate rec­og­nize the steril­ity of such tests. In the real world, adver­saries might incor­po­rate decoys and other defenses to keep their mis­siles from being shot down.

But, despite the incred­i­ble costs, its impor­tant to remem­ber that well-meaning peo­ple are hard at work try­ing to solve a prob­lem and a threat that has so far kept most nations help­less to con­front militarily.

(Gouge: MS)

– Christian

Just Another Day on the Big Blue Ball

Saturday, March 3rd, 2007

Earth.jpg

See if you can fig­ure out what makes this par­tic­u­lar cap­ture at Google Earth note­worty to the Defense Tech audience.

What is it?

Where is it?

Why would it be there?

(Gouge: CM)

Ward

Copters’ Missile Threat (and How to Stop it)

Monday, February 12th, 2007

We do not have any direct evi­dence that insur­gents in Iraq are using advanced surface-to-air mis­siles (some­times called MANPADS from MAN-portable Air Defense System); just best guesses, for now. But with the loss of five (and maybe even six or seven) heli­copters in quick suc­ces­sion — and an insur­gent video appar­ently show­ing the lat­est loss to be a mis­sile casu­alty — the pos­si­bil­ity needs to be con­sid­ered.
manpads.jpgEarly MANPADS like the Russian SA-7 are fairly prim­i­tive, hom­ing in on exhaust heat. As they steer towards the hottest object in their field of view, they can eas­ily be lured away by decoy flares (or even the sun).
With more advanced mis­siles, it becomes a game of cat and mouse between the elec­tron­ics in the mis­sile seeker head and the coun­ter­mea­sures seek­ing to con­fuse it. Advanced seek­ers can not only dis­crim­i­nate flares from engines, but they can be smart enough to home in on the source of the flares. Advanced laser-based coun­ter­mea­sures like CLIRCM do not blind or daz­zle seek­ers as is some­time sup­posed, but pro­duce a sig­nal which gen­er­ates false tar­gets and sends the mis­sile off course.
Some mis­sile mak­ers claim that their seek­ers can beat all known coun­ter­mea­sures; some coun­ter­mea­sures man­u­fac­tur­ers claim to be able to defeat all known mis­siles.
Certainly bet­ter mis­siles need bet­ter coun­ter­mea­sures. It’s inter­est­ing that the pro­posed defenses for civil­ian air­lin­ers against ter­ror­ist MANPADS only goes up to the level of Stinger Basic, a tech­nol­ogy now 20 years old.
Earlier mis­siles were intended to get close enough to have some chance of dam­ag­ing an air­craft with shrap­nel; mod­ern war­heads are con­tact fuzed, indi­cat­ing that they are expected to actu­ally hit the tar­get. And hit in a spe­cific place: the mis­sile can dis­crim­i­nate between single-engine, multi-engine air­craft and heli­copters and select the opti­mum point of vul­ner­a­bil­ity. The recent mod­els are designed to send a dense pat­tern of high-speed frag­ments through the tar­get for max­i­mum dam­age, and the explo­sion may be enhanced by fuz­ing which det­o­nates any unused fuel. Their destruc­tive power is for­mi­da­ble.
This leads to last-ditch defenses like aim-point bias­ing, rel­a­tively cheap coun­ter­mea­sures (com­pared to the multi-million dol­lar laser jam­mers) to get the war­head to strike the less flight-critical parts of a heli­copter and make the dif­fer­ence between a hit that results in a hard land­ing and one that destroys the heli­copter com­pletely.
Another way of deal­ing with the threat is to gets the MANPADS first. While Rules of Engagement are unlikely to be changed to alow heli­copters to open fire at will, the AirCrcaft CounterMeasures (ACCM) laser pro­vides one option. This is a laser daz­zler fit­ted to heli­copters to illu­mi­nate poten­tial threats on the ground. The laser makes it much harder to tar­get a heli­copter, but more sig­nif­i­cantly the reac­tion of the per­son tar­geted gives a clue as to whether they are an insur­gent get­ting ready to fire or an inno­cent civil­ian.
Another new approach, Ares notes, is DARPA’s Battlefield Helicopter Emulator, an expend­able decoy drone which pro­duces the same noise and heat sig­na­ture as a real heli­copter. It may seem like an expen­sive option — but los­ing heli­copters is a far more costly prospect.
Helicopters oper­ate at low speed and low alti­tude, mak­ing them espe­cially vul­ner­a­ble to MANPADS. Heavy armor is not an option except for attack chop­pers like the AH-64 Apache; trans­port, util­ity and scout craft carry much lighter pro­tec­tion. And in Afghanistan, even the Soviets’ armored Mil-24 Hind gun­ships proved vul­ner­a­ble to Stinger MANPADS.
The sit­u­a­tion in Iraq has its par­al­lels with the con­flict then. The main impor­tance of new mis­siles would not be in shoot­ing down heli­copters, but on the morale of both sides. The Mujahideen took new heart that the pre­vi­ously invin­ci­ble Devils Chariot could be defeated. Soviet heli­copter crews found them­selves fac­ing an oppo­nent who could shoot back, and were forced to adopt more eva­sive tac­tics which lim­ited their effec­tive­ness.
A sim­i­lar decrease in effec­tive­ness could hap­pen in Baghdad.
“Based on what we have seen, we’re already mak­ing adjust­ments in our tac­tics and tech­niques and pro­ce­dures as to how we employ our heli­copters,” Maj. Gen. William Caldwell was reported as say­ing ear­lier.
Previously, US heli­copter cover has pre­vented insur­gents from oper­at­ing from rooftops. If expos­ing heli­copters becomes too risky, then that cover will be more lim­ited. In this way, just a hand­ful of MANPADS could have a sig­nif­i­cant impact on the ground bat­tles. Which makes the tim­ing of these lat­est heli­copter losses — just before the surge of US troops arrives for a make-or-break oper­a­tion in Baghdad – highly sig­nif­i­cant.
(My thanks to Jim O’Halloran, edi­tor of the author­i­ta­tive Janes Land Based Air Defence for pro­vid­ing an insider view on this topic.)
David Hambling