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Armor-​​Piercing Grenade Hitting US Troops

Friday, September 7th, 2007

Heres an inter­est­ing and dis­turb­ing report from CBS news on a new weapon being used against US troops in Iraq: Russian-​​made armor-​​piercing hand grenades. I’ve never heard of these before, but I’d be inter­ested to hear what DT read­ers know about them.

– Christian

F-​​16 Shoot-​​down Mystery

Thursday, July 19th, 2007

F16-dive.jpg

Well it looks like the most recent F-​​16 crash might not have any­thing to do with camel spi­ders, but some­thing much more serious.

Tactical Report blog reports that there are indi­ca­tions the F-​​16 that crashed four days ago was shot down. This is a dis­turb­ing devel­op­ment if true, since the U.S. mil­i­tary had seem­ingly got­ten its arms around the spate of crashes and shoot-​​downs of helicopters.

The indi­ca­tion that the shoot-​​down occurred dur­ing the air­crafts take­off is also alarm­ing because it points to the pos­si­bil­ity that MANPAD teams are able to get close enough to U.S. air bases to launch in the open­ing moments of an air­crafts flight.

The Tactical Report arti­cle follows:

Another US F-​​16 air­craft crashed on 15/​7/​07 dur­ing take­off at Balad air base, 80 kilo­me­ters north of Baghdad. This was the sec­ond F-​​16 air­craft crash in just a month, as a crash had taken place on 15/​6/​07 shortly after tak­ing off from the same base.

While the pilot of the first crash was killed, the pilot of the sec­ond one sur­vived. But what caused both crashes remains under inves­ti­ga­tions by the US Air Force.

Reports from Baghdad sug­gest that hos­tile fire caused both crashes.

According to these reports, it is not just a coin­ci­dence that both air­craft crashed dur­ing takeoff.

Circles close to the Iraqi Defense Ministry sus­pect that a shoulder-​​held anti-​​aircraft mis­sile might have been fired at both air­craft from an area not far from the air base.

These cir­cles add that it is too dif­fi­cult for any air­craft to maneu­ver and avoid a mis­sile dur­ing takeoff.

According to these cir­cles, the Iraqi insur­gency has dif­fer­ent types of anti-​​aircraft mis­siles, includ­ing SAM-​​7, SAM-​​8 and SAM-​​11, which can hit an air­craft dur­ing tak­ing off or fly­ing at low altitude. 

UPDATE: Astute read­ers pointed out that while the SA-​​7 is a MANPAD, the oth­ers listed are not. It would be pretty unlikely for the USAF to not notice a truck-​​mounted sys­tem parked close by its air field, which casts even more doubt on the authen­tic­ity of this report. But it’s still worth keep­ing and eye on what MNF-​​I deter­mines might have been the cause of the crashes.

(Gouge: NC)

Christian

Dirty Bomb? Grab a Llama

Wednesday, May 2nd, 2007

llama.jpg

The cur­rent issue of The American Legion mag­a­zine has an inter­est­ing tid­bit about how “an unusual pro­tein found in the blood of lla­mas has enabled sci­en­tists to deveop a quick, sim­ple method for mak­ing ani­bod­ies that could be used in a new gen­er­a­tion of bio sen­sors that could help detect delib­er­ate envi­ron­men­tal con­t­a­m­i­na­tion, such a bioterrorism.”

According to the arti­cle, researchers at the Naval Research Laboratory say that lla­mas are among cer­tain ani­mals that pro­duce “heavy chain anti­bod­ies” from which “single-​​domain anti­bod­ies” can be iso­lated by genetic engi­neer­ing. Camels and sharks also pro­duce the same anti­body but you sel­dom see either of those in a pet­ting zoo, do you?

NRL researchers claim to have used single-​​domain anti­bod­ies to com­bat a small­pox virus sur­ro­gate, cholera toxin, along with other biothreats.

Ward

How Israel’s Drones Fought the War, Part II

Friday, October 6th, 2006

Israeli mil­i­tary chiefs are being taken out to the wood­shed for rely­ing on air­power dur­ing the sum­mer cam­paign in Lebanon. “But after-​​action data and bat­tle­field imagery are reveal­ing great advances in the abil­ity to respond to asym­met­ric threats,” says Defense News’ Barbara Opall-​​Rome. Thanks largely to unmanned aer­ial vehi­cles (UAVs), “more than 90 per­cent of the medium-​​range mis­sile launch­ers used by Hizbollah were destroyed almost imme­di­ately after they fired their first weapon.“
WATCHKEEPER_2.JPG

By the third night [of the war], the IAF [Israeli Air Force] attained full oper­a­tional capa­bil­ity of the worlds first Boost Phase Launch Intercept (BPLI) force [maybe it’s more of a “a search and destroy oper­a­tion,” as Bill noted in the com­ments — ed.] a tightly linked net­work of manned air­craft and UAVs that sat­u­rated the air­space to hunt and imme­di­ately kill small, mobile, medium-​​range mis­sile launchers.

It didn’t work against the ter­ror group’s teeny-​​tiny Katyusha rock­ets. But Israels BPLI capa­bil­ity did man­aged to knock out “more than 100 launch­ers dur­ing the more-​​than month-​​long war.” UAVs “like the Elbit Hermes 450S Zik, the Shoval (Heron-​​1/​Crusher) and Searcher-​​2 built by Israel Aircraft Industries” did the lion’s share of the work.

This was the first large-​​scale use of UAVs, not only for pro­vid­ing a con­tin­u­ous pres­ence over the entire bat­tle area, but in [assist­ing the direc­tion and deliv­ery of] smart muni­tions to these very small, well hid­den, mov­ing tar­gets, said Isaac Ben-​​Israel, a retired IAF major gen­eral and for­mer direc­tor of Israeli defense research and devel­op­ment…
This is not like a tar­geted killing where we have two weeks to plan, Ben-​​Israel said. Here, theres only a mat­ter of sec­onds between the time the ter­ror­ists emerged to launch these mis­siles to the time when they returned to their hid­ing places among inno­cent civil­ians. Those medium-​​range mis­sile launch­ers became sui­cide launch­ers. They were destroyed either before or imme­di­ately after they fired their first missile.

The Israeli Air Force also got bet­ter about detect­ing — and tak­ing out — Hezbollah drones. By tweak­ing “mul­ti­ple radars never designed to detect such small, slow-​​moving, pin­point tar­gets.… F-​​16C fighter pilots on air patrol [were able] to blast the [unmanned] offend­ers from Israeli and Lebanese skies with Python-​​5 dog­fight­ing missiles.”

According to Israeli mil­i­tary data, Hizbollah launched four Iranian-​​made Ababil UAVs dur­ing the war. One appar­ently exploded upon launch; another pen­e­trated Israeli air­space, but crashed just south of the Lebanon bor­der; and the other two were downed over the sea south­west of Haifa and near the area of Tzur in south­ern Lebanon.
Remnants of the downed drones showed that at least one was equipped with nearly 10 kilo­grams of explo­sives, which Israeli intel­li­gence sources believe was des­tined for Tel Aviv. According to offi­cials here, the UAV that crashed upon launch may have car­ried a pay­load of up to 50 kilo­grams.
Examination of cock­pit imagery from one of the engage­ments shows detec­tion of the tar­get at extremely short range close enough for the pilot to actu­ally see the UAV. From an extra­or­di­nar­ily low alti­tude of less than 2,000 feet and at very low speed, the pilot launched his Python-​​5, which imme­di­ately arched and locked on to its tar­get. Imagery shows the mis­sile maneu­ver­ing at nearly 90 degrees for a mat­ter of sec­onds before blast­ing the gnat-​​sized tar­get with its explo­sive war­head.
This is an his­toric first for us, and pro­fes­sion­als will under­stand how com­pli­cated the mis­sion is. Its not the clas­sic engage­ment of an F-​​16 ver­sus a MiG, where you have a com­pet­ing air­craft and radar. In this sce­nario, its not plane against plane, but rather net­work against an asym­met­ri­cal tar­get you can barely see, said the senior IAF official.

Hez Hacked Israeli Radios

Tuesday, September 19th, 2006

This is down­right shock­ing, if true. “Hezbollah guer­ril­las were able to hack into Israeli radio com­mu­ni­ca­tions dur­ing last month’s bat­tles in south Lebanon, an intel­li­gence break­through that helped them thwart Israeli tank assaults,” Newsday reports.
gaza147.jpg

Using tech­nol­ogy most likely sup­plied by Iran, spe­cial Hezbollah teams mon­i­tored the con­stantly chang­ing radio fre­quen­cies of Israeli troops on the ground. That gave guer­ril­las a pic­ture of Israeli move­ments, casu­alty reports and sup­ply routes. It also allowed Hezbollah anti-​​tank units to more effec­tively tar­get advanc­ing Israeli armor, accord­ing to the offi­cials…
The Israeli mil­i­tary refused to com­ment on whether its radio com­mu­ni­ca­tions were com­pro­mised, cit­ing secu­rity con­cerns. But a for­mer Israeli gen­eral, who spoke on the con­di­tion of anonymity, said Hezbollah’s abil­ity to secretly hack into mil­i­tary trans­mis­sions had “dis­as­trous” con­se­quences for the Israeli offen­sive…
Like most mod­ern mil­i­taries, Israeli forces use a prac­tice known as “frequency-​​hopping” — rapidly switch­ing among dozens of fre­quen­cies per sec­ond — to pre­vent radio mes­sages from being jammed or inter­cepted. It also uses encryp­tion devices to make it dif­fi­cult for enemy forces to deci­pher trans­mis­sions even if they are inter­cepted. The Israelis mostly rely on a U.S.-designed com­mu­ni­ca­tion sys­tem called the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
With frequency-​​hopping and encryp­tion, most radio com­mu­ni­ca­tions become very dif­fi­cult to hack. But troops in the bat­tle­field some­times make mis­takes in fol­low­ing secure radio pro­ce­dures and can give an enemy a way to break into the frequency-​​hopping pat­terns. That might have hap­pened dur­ing some bat­tles between Israel and Hezbollah, accord­ing to the Lebanese offi­cial. Hezbollah teams likely also had sophis­ti­cated recon­nais­sance devices that could inter­cept radio sig­nals even while they were frequency-​​hopping.
During one raid in south­ern Lebanon, Israeli spe­cial forces said they found a Hezbollah office equipped with jam­ming and eaves­drop­ping devices. 

It was my impres­sion that this kind of sig­nal inter­cep­tion was really, really hard to do — espe­cially for an irreg­u­lar force like Hezbollah. I know there are some radio and comm­sec gurus who read the site reg­u­larly. Weigh in here, guys.
Or maybe the arti­cle itself con­tains the seed of what actu­ally hap­pened. “Besides radio trans­mis­sions, the offi­cial said Hezbollah also mon­i­tored cell phone calls among Israeli troops,” Newsday notes. A raided Hezbollah base had list of “cell phone num­bers for Israeli com­man­ders.“
Cells are, of course, way eas­ier to inter­cept. “Israeli forces were under strict orders not to divulge sen­si­tive infor­ma­tion over the phone.” But maybe they talked any­way. Maybe they thought Hezbollah would never be sophis­ti­cated enough to grab their calls.
UPDATE 3:25 PM: Weeks ago, the Times of London and Asia Times had hints of this.

Apparently using tech­niques learnt from their pay­mas­ters in Iran, they were even able to crack the codes and fol­low the fast-​​changing fre­quen­cies of Israeli radio com­mu­ni­ca­tions, inter­cept­ing reports of the casu­al­ties they had inflicted again and again. This enabled them to dom­i­nate the media war by announc­ing Israeli fatal­i­ties first.
They mon­i­tored our secure radio com­mu­ni­ca­tions in the most pro­fes­sional way, one Israeli offi­cer admit­ted. When we lose a man, the fight­ing unit imme­di­ately gives the loca­tion and the num­ber back to head­quar­ters. What Hezbollah did was to mon­i­tor our radio and imme­di­ately send it to their Al-​​Manar TV, which broad­cast it almost live, long before the offi­cial Israeli radio.

(Big ups: JQP, /​.)

Hezbollah, Deadly Hybrid

Sunday, July 30th, 2006

We’ve hinted at this a cou­ple of times since the fight between Israel and Hezbollah began. But the ter­ror group, “with the sophis­ti­ca­tion of a national army… and the lethal invis­i­bil­ity of a guer­rilla army” is a new breed of mil­i­tary ani­mal. “A hybrid,” Thom Shanker writes. “Old labels, and old plan­ning, do not apply.“
Hezbollah.jpg

Hezbollah still pos­sesses the most dan­ger­ous aspects of a shad­owy ter­ror net­work. It abides by no laws of war as it attacks civil­ians indis­crim­i­nately. Attacks on its posi­tions carry a high risk of killing inno­cents. At the same time, it has attained mil­i­tary capa­bil­i­ties and other sig­nif­i­cant attrib­utes of a nation-​​state. It holds ter­ri­tory and seats in the Lebanese gov­ern­ment. It fields high-​​tech weapons and pos­sesses the fire­power to threaten the entire pop­u­la­tion of a regional super­power, or at least those in the north­ern half of Israel.…
“We are in a world today where we have a non-​​state actor using all the tools of weaponry,” from drone air­craft to rock­ets to com­puter hack­ing, said P.W. Singer, a senior fel­low at the Brookings Institution who spe­cial­izes in the impact of new tech­nolo­gies on national security. 

But John Robb, who’s been exam­in­ing this kind of “open source war­fare” for years, says that “the cen­tral secret to Hezbollah’s suc­cess” isn’t in its weaponry. It’s in the ter­ror­ists’ abil­ity to have its “guer­ril­las to make deci­sions autonomously… at the small group level.”

In every area — from fir­ing rock­ets to defend­ing pre­pared posi­tions… — we have exam­ples of Hezbollah teams decid­ing, adapt­ing, inno­vat­ing, and col­lab­o­rat­ing with­out ref­er­ence to any cen­tral author­ity. The result of this decen­tral­iza­tion is that Hezbollah’s aggre­gate deci­sion cycles are faster and qual­i­ta­tively bet­ter than those of their Israeli coun­ter­parts… the con­tin­ued suc­cess of its efforts has put the Israelis on the horns of a dilemma: either request a cease­fire or push for a full inva­sion of south­ern Lebanon (each fraught with dis­as­trous consequences). 

And not just for Israel. “Other ter­ror­ists are learn­ing from Hezbollahs suc­cesses,” Shanker notes. Iraqi insur­gents are show­ing a sim­i­lar blend of oper­a­tional flex­i­bil­ity and mod­ern tech­nol­ogy. To beat these groups, the U.S. is going to have to learn that it “takes a net­work to fight a network.”

American intel­li­gence agen­cies and the mil­i­tary proved it can fight this kind of war, as it did in Afghanistan to rout Al Qaeda, when intel­li­gence offi­cers and small groups of Army Special Forces worked with local fight­ers to call in dev­as­tat­ing air strikes and drive the Taliban from power.
Within the Bush admin­is­tra­tion and across the mil­i­tary, a clearer view is emerg­ing out of the chaos in south­ern Lebanon. It is that nation-​​states know they can­not directly take on super­pow­ers either regional or global with­out get­ting their clocks cleaned, and so they use prox­ies they train and sup­port to take the fight to those super­pow­ers. The fight against groups like Hezbollah requires a strat­egy for deal­ing with their spon­sors. These net­works, Hezbollah included, dont float around in the ether like free elec­trons bump­ing into each other. They alight. They attach them­selves to ter­ri­tory. In Afghanistan it was with the full sup­port of the Taliban. In Pakistan, its an ungoverned space. In Lebanon, its a state within a state. Cut off state sup­port, or elim­i­nate the abil­ity of the net­works to sur­vive in ungoverned areas, and they col­lapse on them­selves.
No solu­tion has been writ­ten. But it would include mil­i­tary force along with diplo­macy, eco­nomic assis­tance, intel­li­gence and infor­ma­tion cam­paigns.
“Most crit­i­cally, we have to get bet­ter at its such a clich win­ning hearts and minds,” said a mil­i­tary offi­cer work­ing on coun­terin­sur­gency issues. “That is influ­enc­ing neu­tral pop­u­la­tions toward sup­port­ing us and not sup­port­ing our ter­ror­ist and insur­gent enemies.”

And so the zillion-​​dollar ques­tion becomes: Do big air cam­paigns and large-​​scale inva­sions really influ­ence those opin­ions in a pos­i­tive way? Or do they just play into the ter­ror­ists’ hands?
UPDATE 07/​31/​06 4:07 PM: Anthony Cordesman’s answer: The U.S. — and Israel’s — cur­rent course is “stu­pid, incom­pe­tent, and obso­lete.” Youch.

Hez’s 30-​​Mile Missile

Friday, July 28th, 2006

Here’s some more on those longer-​​range Hezbollah rock­ets men­tioned in today’s Rapid Fire:
DSC_0015_wa.jpg

Hezbollah called the rock­ets the Khaibar-​​1. They fell more than 30 miles south of the Lebanese bor­der. A few other rock­ets have trav­eled this far, but it was still unusual, accord­ing to the Israeli mil­i­tary and police.
The rock­ets are capa­ble of car­ry­ing more than 200 pounds of explo­sives, mak­ing them much more pow­er­ful than the Katyusha rock­ets that Hezbollah has been fir­ing most of the time, Israeli author­i­ties said.
American and Israeli offi­cials believe that the rocket Hezbollah referred to as a “Khaibar-​​1″ appears to be an upgraded ver­sion of the Fajr-​​3, a rocket that Iran has sup­plied to the ter­ror­ist net­work and that Hezbollah has used often dur­ing the con­flict. The rocket fired today has an esti­mated range of 90 kilo­me­ters, which makes it the longest range rocket fired thus far. Officials said that it is still unclear whether the rocket is actu­ally a Fajr-​​5 which Iran has also given to Hezbollah or a new model alto­gether.
[The Jerusalem Post and Ynetnews both argue dif­fer­ently — ed.] Hezbollahs leader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, said ear­lier in the week that his Shiite group would strike beyond Haifa, about 20 miles inside Israel, which has been the south­ern­most city to come under reg­u­lar attack.

One thing the weapon was not, accord­ing to Israeli author­i­ties, was “an Iranian-​​made ‘Zilzal’ rocket, which has a range of about 210 km (130 miles) and would have put the Israeli com­mer­cial cap­i­tal Tel Aviv within reach.“
That hon­ey­moon is look­ing less and less likely, all of the time…
(Big ups: SOI)

Hezbollah’s Surprise Weapons

Wednesday, July 19th, 2006

Wonder why the Israelis thought their ship had been hit by a drone last week — when it turned out to be a radar-​​guided mis­sile instead? Or why the crew of the Hanit corvette didn’t use their coun­ter­mea­sures to pro­tect them­selves? Simple: the Sabras knew that Hezbollah had been play­ing with drones; they had no idea that the ter­ror­ist group had such a sophis­ti­cated mis­sile in their arse­nal. It’s one of a num­ber of ways that the “power and sophis­ti­ca­tion” of Hezbollah’s arms “has caught the United States and Israel off guard,” the Times reports. “Officials in both coun­tries are just now learn­ing the extent to which the mil­i­tant group has suc­ceeded in get­ting weapons from Iran and Syria.“
c-802_3.jpgThe mis­sile that hit the Hanit was a C-​​802, an Iranian-​​made vari­ant of a stealthy, turbojet-​​powered, Chinese weapon. It’s “con­sid­ered along with the US ‘Harpoon’ as among the best anti-​​ship mis­siles” in the world, GlobalSecurity​.org says.
“Iran began buy­ing dozens of those sophis­ti­cated anti­ship mis­siles from the Chinese dur­ing the 1990s,” the Times notes. “Until Friday, how­ever, Western intel­li­gence ser­vices did not know that Iran had man­aged to ship C-​​802 mis­siles to Hezbollah.“
Now that the Israelis know, it’s influ­enc­ing their choice of tar­gets to hit. The C-​​802 was most likely “fired it from a truck-​​mounted launcher cued by a coastal radar instal­la­tion,” Situational Awareness says. So “Israel has stepped up its attacks against coastal radar sites, as any sort of surface-​​search set would be able to pro­vide data for the ini­tial launch.”

After launch, the mis­sile takes care of itself with its own iner­tial guid­ance sys­tem and onboard radar seeker. Since the launch­ers are mobile, the trucks car­ry­ing them could scoot after fir­ing. And we all know how noto­ri­ously dif­fi­cult it can be to locate mobile units, even when you have lots of recon­nais­sance assets.

The ter­ror­ists’ more tra­di­tional weapons, like Katyusha rock­ets and Fajr-​​3 mis­siles, have con­tained sur­prises, too. “In the past, wed see three, four, maybe eight launches at any given time if Hezbollah was feel­ing feisty,” one unnammed offi­cial told the paper. “Now we see them arriv­ing in large clus­ters, and with a range and even cer­tain accu­racy we have not seen in the past.“
70 Katyushas were fired at Israel “within the space of an hour” on Wednesday after­noon, Ha’Aretz writes. Israel is respond­ing by send­ing small group of ground troops into Lebanon, and by strik­ing tar­gets in Beruit — includ­ing ones in the Christian part of town.
The Times says that “while Iranian mis­sile sup­plies to Hezbollah, either by sea or over­land via Syria, were well known, offi­cials said the cur­rent con­flict also indi­cated that some of the rock­ets in Hezbollahs arse­nal includ­ing a 220-​​millimeter rocket used in a deadly attack on a rail­way site in Haifa on Sunday were built in Syria.”

Officials have since con­firmed that the war­head on the Syrian rocket was filled with ball bear­ings a method of destruc­tion used fre­quently in sui­cide bomb­ings but not in war­head tech­nol­ogy.
“Weve never seen any­thing like this,” said one Western intel­li­gence offi­cial, speak­ing about the warhead. 

Conflicts Forum’s Mark Perry, on the other hand, isn’t as alarmed as most about Hezbollah’s weaponry. {Joe Katzman says that’s because the guy is a ter­ror­ist shill.} Perry declares that the mili­tia only has a hand­ful of sophis­ti­cated and long-​​range mis­siles. Check out his All Things Considered inter­view here.

UPDATE 1:43 PM
: “Israeli mil­i­tary offi­cials have warned that the next Palestinian upris­ing could be ‘a bal­lis­tic intifada,’” the Washington Post reports.
(Big ups: Umansky)
UPDATE 7:13 PM: The Jerusalem Post is report­ing that “IAF fighter jets dropped over 20 tons in bombs late Wednesday night on a Hizbullah bunker, pos­si­bly the hid­ing place of the group’s leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, in the Bourj al-​​Barajneh refugee camp in south­east Beirut. It was still unclear who was in the bunker at the time and what their fate was, but IDF sources said the bunker was totally destroyed and that all that was left was a crater.”

Hezbollah’s Biggest Missile Yet

Sunday, July 16th, 2006

Watching the news over the last few years, we’ve grown accus­tomed to see­ing ter­ror­ists as a low-​​tech threat — guys who hijack air­planes with pocket knives and make bombs out of left­over parts. And that threat has been plenty scary, on its own.
a491.jpgBut in recent days, we’re start­ing to see what hap­pens when Islamic extrem­ists get their hands on the rel­a­tively sophis­ti­cated arse­nal of a coun­try like Iran. Talk about ter­ror.
On Sunday, Hezbollah again struck Haifa — a city untouched by the mili­tia until a few days ago — using its biggest and most pow­er­ful mis­sile yet. It’s one of 800 rock­ets Hezbollah has launched against Israel in the last five days.
The weapon “hit a busy rail­way main­te­nance build­ing, destroy­ing the roof, killing eight, wound­ing more than 20 and leav­ing con­geal­ing pools of blood on the plat­form,” the Times reports. “Israel said [the mis­sile] was a Syrian-​​produced model of a Iranian Fajr-​​3 model, [which Tehran claims can avoid radars and carry mul­ti­ple war­heads — ed.]. [It] has a range of more than 30 miles and car­ries a war­head with about 100 pounds of high explo­sives, which includes antiper­son­nel shrap­nel, a sig­nif­i­cant change from the smaller Katyushas that Hezbollah has mostly been using.“
And there may be worse to come, Ha’Aretz warns.

The fight­ing between Israel and the Hezbollah, which is backed by Syria and Iran, has still not reached its zenith. The Israel Defense Forces’ oper­a­tional plans against the Shi’ite orga­ni­za­tions have not yet been car­ried out. The next two days are the most crit­i­cal and a lot depends on whether Tehran decides to take a chance and autho­rize Hezbollah to launch long-​​range mis­siles with more pow­er­ful war­heads. This is a capa­bil­ity Hezbollah still retains, despite the heavy blows it has suf­fered in the IDF air strikes.

UPDATE 10:44 PM: Kathryn Cramner has worked some of her Google Earth magic, and come up with a fas­ci­nat­ing pic­ture of how far Hezbollah can now reach.

Iran Missile Drone Bomb Hits Israelis, U.A.V. Pioneers

Friday, July 14th, 2006

UPDATE 07/​15/​06 11:19 AM: There’s an old saw about war: that first reports are always wrong. Looks like that the case about this unmanned plane attack. “A mis­sile fired by Hezbollah, not an unmanned drone laden with explo­sives, dam­aged an Israeli war­ship off Lebanon,” Fox News reports.

The attack on Friday night had raised wide­spread con­cern in the Israeli mil­i­tary because ini­tial infor­ma­tion indi­cated that the guer­ril­las had used a drone for the first time to attack Israeli forces.
But the army’s inves­ti­ga­tion into the attack, which left four Israeli sailors miss­ing, showed that Hezbollah had fired an Iranian-​​made mis­sile at the ves­sel from the shores of Lebanon, said Brig. Gen. Ido Nehushtan.
“We can con­firm that it was hit by an Iranian-​​made mis­sile launched by Hezbollah. We see this as very pro­found fin­ger­print of Iranian involve­ment in Hezbollah,” Nehushtan said in an inter­view with The Associated Press.
Another Hezbollah mis­sile also hit and sank a nearby civil­ian mer­chant ship at around the same time, Nehushtan said. He said that ship appar­ently was Egyptian, but he had no other infor­ma­tion about it.

UPDATE 07/​15/​06 12:29 PM: Bill Roggio is now throw­ing cold water on the mis­sile the­ory. “The use of a ground based anti-​​ship mis­sile sys­tem in these attacks, while cer­tainly a pos­si­bil­ity, is unlikely as the char­ac­ter­is­tics of this sys­tem would cer­tainly have been detected by the Israeli Defense Forces,” he writes. “A UAV launched mis­sile sys­tem, on the other hand, would be a more stealthy sys­tem. The UAVs are dif­fi­cult to detect as they can fly in below radar, [and] can be flown by remote visual meth­ods.“
Stay tuned.
“An unmanned Hezbollah air­craft rigged with explo­sives slammed into an Israeli war­ship late Friday, caus­ing heavy dam­age to the ves­sel,” the AP reports. It’s the first time the ter­ror­ist group — any ter­ror­ist group — has used a drone in com­bat, as far as I know.
Mersad-1.jpgHezbollah has flown sim­ple “Misrad-​​1″ unmanned aer­ial vehi­cles, or UAVs, twice before, in November 2004 and April 2005. But those were recon­nais­sance flights, last just a cou­ple of min­utes each. And the drones were spot­ted fairly quickly, both times.
But, as Defense Tech noted in the Spring, the UAV had the poten­tial to be much, much worse — “a sui­cide bomber on steroids, basi­cally.“
That’s what seems to have hap­pened around 8:30pm Friday night to a Saar 5 navy gun­ship, ten miles off of the Lebanese coast, accord­ing to Ynetnews.

It was reported that the stern of an Israeli navy war ship suf­fered a direct hit in an attack by Hizbullah, which dam­aged the heli­copter land­ing pad area. The hit caused a con­fla­gra­tion, which was extin­guished. No one was hurt in the fire.
Shortly after­wards, crewmem­bers assessed the dam­age to the ship and dis­cov­ered the hit was more severe than orig­i­nally thought, and had caused dam­age to the ships inter­nal oper­at­ing systems…

Four crewmem­bers are reported to be miss­ing.
There’s more than bit of irony in Israel being hit with drone attacks. For years, the Israeli mil­i­tary was the world’s leader in unmanned avi­a­tion. During the first Gulf War, Iraqi troops sur­ren­dered to Israel-​​made, American-​​run Pioneer UAVs. U.S. Army drone mechan­ics had to learn Hebrew, to repair their Israeli drones.
But in recent years, the rest of the world has caught up. “Some 32 nations are devel­op­ing or man­u­fac­tur­ing more than 250 mod­els” of UAVs, accord­ing to the Defense Department.
In response, Pentagon extreme sci­ence arm Darpa has launched a $5 mil­lion per year effort to build a drone-​​killing UAV. But the results of that effort are still years away. For now, more con­ven­tional meth­ods will have to be used to guard against ter­ror­ists’ robotic air force.
(Big ups: SMT)