CSBA’s whip smart strategist Jim Thomas contends that as precision targeting and guided weapons proliferate, both high-end and low-end wars will unfold in far less “permissive” operating environments. Battlefield advantage has swung back in favor of the defender, he says, with the further maturation of reconnaissance-strike networks warfare may be entering the “post-power projection era.”

The weapons acquisition choice, Thomas said, is either to go cheap and disposable, with drones, long range missiles and robots that can be thrown at an enemy’s missile magazines without much regret, or ultra-costly, high-end and stealthy and try to slyly maneuver your way past an enemy’s defenses.

A good example of that debate is going on right now in Israel as it considers whether to spend $2.7 billion for the first 19 of a larger planned buy of the stealthy fifth-generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, or, to upgrade the current fleet of attack jets with better sensors and very-long range guided missiles. Not to say that Israel’s current fleet of modified F-15s and F-16s are cheap and disposable, but as Aviation Week’s David Fulgham reports, some in the Israeli brass think hanging newer and more standoff missiles on the jet’s wings is smarter than spending so much on the platform itself.

“The [shrinking] force structure problem points us toward fewer, but more sophisticated platforms,” says Air Force Lt. Gen. Dani Halutz, former chief of the Israel Defense Force. “The F-35 fits this trend exactly. If its performance is as advertised, it will allow us to cope with a shrinking budget and force size.”

The counterpoint is offered by retired Army Maj. Gen. Giora Eiland, a former head of Israel’s national security council. His argument is that it makes more sense to pit salvoes of long-range air-launched guided missiles against an enemy’s air-defense missile magazines than a limited number of very prized platforms.

“If we continue to use the very advanced [versions of the] F-16 and F-15 and upgrade some of the systems, we could save so much money that we could buy other important systems like ground-based missiles. And you can use more [air-launched] standoff weapons because they have extreme precision and a very long effective range. You don’t have to put all your effort into the aircraft.”

I think this debate is just getting going as defense planners wrestle with flat or declining budgets, platform cost growth and the proliferation of relatively low-cost guided weaponry. It’s a debate I expect will take place in all three domains: maritime, air and on land.

– Greg Grant

By Colin Clark
Defense Tech Chief Pentagon Correspondent

It’s wide. It’s not light. It’s learned lessons from MRAPs and is survivable. It manages bandwidth so big fat transmission pipes like the doomed T-Sat satellites aren’t needed. It’s BAE Systems and Northrop Grumman’s offering for the Ground Combat Vehicle (a larger pic can be found here).

The base version is 53 tons. Going into a highly lethal environment? Then commanders may well want their troops to bolt on modular armor and storage pods that bring the weight up to 75 tons. Powering this vehicle that looks an awful lot like a tank, is a hybrid electric drive, technology that worries some in the Army who don’t believe it is sufficiently tried and true yet.

Mark Signorelli, BAE’s vice president and general manager for ground combat vehicles, told reporters that the decision to go with hybrid technology –“key enabling technology for the vehicle” — was one of the most “painful I’ve gone through.” The drive, produced by QintiQ NA, is the same as was proposed for BAE’s FCS offering. Signorelli said he knows the Army is split on the technology’s risk and benefits but argues that the commercial sector has used them for almost a decade in heavy construction equipment. Hybrid technology has “gone from being a radical idea to something we all ride” in on America’s streets, he said.

Among the benefits of hybrid drive: enormous torque; huge power supply for the vehicle and to power other equipment; 50 percent fewer parts so maintenance costs are lower; 10 percent fuel savings over comparable vehicles; added protection because the hybrid drive allows them to add some 4 tons of armor compared to a traditional engine. Will Army leadership buy BAE’s arguments and will testing bear out their claims? Wait and see time.

The GCV also uses something that Signorelli called a “hit avoidance system.” It is a combination of “hard kill protection” — something like what the FCS program called “active protection” — along with “soft kill” protection, a combination of jammers and decoys. Readers will remember that the active protection system was one of the failed promises of FCS. This will be an area to watch closely as the program develops.

Among the other attributes of the BAE’s GCV offering are a crew compartment designed for today’s larger soldiers who also carry larger and heavier loads. Signorelli said the new vehicle was designed to keep troops as rested as possible so they could go into action with minimal fatigue incurred by the miseries of riding in a cramped and bouncy ride.

Defense Tech has been doing some document exploitation over the last couple of days to help provide some interesting tidbits to our readers from the release of US military reports dumped by WikiLeaks. We know you’re all busy, so our team will keep reading them so you don’t have to.

In our first couple of scrapes, we noticed some pretty intensive use by SOF of the AC-130 gunship. In the following excerpt, check out the amount of ordnance expended during their gun runs…

Hell hath no fury like a Spectre scorned.

(17957)At 1300Z TF Bushmaster reported the enemy ambushed an ANA convoy SE of FOB Tagab at the mouth of the Tagab Valley.  The ANA reportedly detained multiple enemy.
At 1538z TF Bushmaster reported recieving SAF from 2x pax w/AKs
1700Z SE 44 TAKING RPG AND SMALL ARMS FIRE, CAS REQUESTED AND WILL BE PROVIDED BY F-18s,  1725Z MIRAGE WILL BE ON STATION, LOCATED AT CHECK POINT 4, 1724Z CAS AND JTAC ATTEMPTING TO GAIN CONTACT, 1747Z SE 44 JTAC IS IN CONTACT WITH AIRCRAFT, 1744Z JTAC IS IN CONTACT WITH CAS WHICH IS 2 F-18s, 1813Z AC-130 IS SCREENING THE ROUTE TO SE 44s FRONT, 1830Z SE 44 JTAC HAS RELEASED F-18s, 1830Z A-C130 IS ENGAGING TARGETS, 1833Z SE 44 IS BEING ENGAGED WITH SAF AND RPG AT LOCATION 42S WD 599 614, 1848Z SE 44 IS IN A LINEAR AMBUSH AT THIS TIME, 1854Z LEAD ELEMENT OF SE 44 CONVOY FOUND AN IED, SE 44 WILL MARK IT WITH A CHEM LIGHT AND C-130 WILL DESTROY IT WITH DIRECT FIRE, LOCATION OF IED IS 42S WD 590 607, 1931Z SE 44 MOVING BACK TO FIRE BASE LOCATION IS 42S WD 59563 60670, 1934Z AC-130 (SLASHER) REPORTS ESTIMATED 27 ENEMY KIA, IED WAS DESTROYED AND CAUSED NO DAMAGE,  2008Z SE 44 CALLED IN AT CHECK POINT TWO WITH NO FRIENDLY BDA AND APPROXIMATELY 4K UNTIL THEY REACH FIRE BASE TAGAB,  2036Z SE 44 HAS REACHED CP1, 2039 AC-130 EXPENDED 202 X 40MM ROUNDS AND 52 X 105MM ROUNDS,  2049Z SE 44 HAS RETURNED TO FIRE BASE TAGAB AND CALLED TIC COMPLETE

…and this one…

(19981)At 1448Z TF Bushmaster reported 12 enemy attempting to break contact 3km northeast of Camp Echo.  CAS has been requested and B1B arrived on station at 1510Z to support.  B1 dropped 2 GBU 38s and 1 GBU 31.  AC-130 arrived on station at 1600Z.  QRF was launched.  TF Bushmaster cleared caves and discovered caches.  At 1800Z the AC130 engaged targets.  At 1830Z F-15s arrived on station and the AC-130 departed for refueling.  At 1840Z Gunship reported 16 to 20 enemy KIA and 10 enemy motorcycles destroyed.  At 1940Z the AC-130 was back on station and engaged motorcycles.  At 2010Z TF Bushmaster conducted SSE and located another 2 EKIA.    At 0010Z TIC complete.  Total enemy KIA was 24.  No friendly BDA.  ISAF Tracking# 04–245.

There were also some interesting AARs on improvized bombs and suicide vests with very detailed descriptions of how they’re made and what the explosives are…

(7957)At 0340Z, TF Wolfpack received a report from NDS. NDS  reported 3 suicide bombers were in the village of Metakhan Soh in the Mando Zayi district 17 KM West of Khowst City.  As one of the bombers attempted to attach the device to himself, it detonated killing him and wounding the 2 others.  The 2x injured individuals are fleeing to Pakistan in an unkown vehicle using the Torkubay road, and PCC is unable to locate the road on their map.  These 2x individuals are believed to be traveling towards BCP4. At 0420Z, TF Wolfpack reported that PCC reports the vehicle is yellow, with license plate #2265 and traveling on an improved road S of Gurbuz to Bori Khal that leads to Pakistan. Authorities in the area have been notified.  At 0615Z, NDS reported that KPF arrested an injured LN Male at BSP 3.  They believe he is one of the suicide bombers who was wounded earlier today.  At 1035Z, ODA reported that KPF brought three detainees, one of whom was wounded and believed to be the 3rd suicide bomber to FOB Chapman. One individual is critically wounded and is being ground CASEVAC''d to FOB Salerno for treatment. ODA has questioned the other two individuals and believe that there is not enough to keep in detention. ODA will turn over the other two to NDS.  [UPDATED ON 05/02/2006 0048]:

…when bombmaking goes wrong, huh?

And this one…

(50018)SNAPSHOT OF CIRCUMSTANCES HOW INCIDENT OCCURRED (FACTS):  On 052220ZFEB09 755A EOD TM8 was tasked to respond to two IEDs turned in at FOB Fortress.  The IED was stored at 42S XD 78702 42631.  Team ensured the IED was safe and collected forensics. The first IED was a suicide vest with two pockets.  One pockets contained 1ea Russian RGD5 Hand Grenade with an UZRG fuze.  It also had an electric blasting cap with red & green wires connected to the blue & white wires running through the vest.  The other pocket contained 1ea Russian O-832 82MM mortar with UBE and a 14.5MM bullet in the nose well.  Both pockets contained UBE, approximately 20-LBS (identified as Sulfur Powder 77% & Phosphorus pentabromide 23% in the Ahura) with pieces of small metal for fragmentation.  The other IED was 2 bottoms from North Korean AT Landmines, ATM-72, merged together.  Inside was approximately 20-LBS of UBE (identified as Ammonium nitrate 80.7%/Silver Nitrate 6.5%/Ammonium Carbonate 5.3% in the Ahura) and 1ea electric blasting cap with red & green wires.  Team ensured all items were safe, removed initiators from explosives, and collected forensics to turn over to CEXCE. RECOVERED ITEMS:  Vest (1), UBE (1), Russian RGD5 hand Grenade w/ fuze (1), Russian O-832 82MM Mortar (1), plastic bags (4), blasting cap (2), ATM-72 bottom halves (2), tape, wires

And here’s an interesting one showing some sophistication in how the Taliban is building, detonating and implanting IEDs:

(72866)11/15/2009TF STEEL REPORTS AN IED FIND AT GRID WB 79646 87883. BDA: NO INJURIES OR DAMAGES TO REPORT.

UNIT: 2–377 (TF STEEL)

TYPE: IED

WHO: TRIDENT 32

WHERE: WB 79646 87883

REPORT:0508Z

*******SALTR********
S– UNK
A– LAND MINES PLACED
L-WB 79646 87883
T-0507
R-  TRIDENT 32 REPORTS THAT THEY HAVE FOUND MINES ATTACHED TO AN ANA VEHICLE  WITH A CELLULAR DEVICE ATTACHED TO MINES.

******SALT**********

UPDATE:0709Z ANA CONDUCTED A CONTROLLED DET BEFORE EOD ARRIVED, NO PBA CONDUCTED

CLOSED 0710Z

While lots of papers and reports centered on how the US/Pakistan relationship didn’t work, here’s an example of how just picking up the Bat Phone stopped the bullets from flying…

(21591)At 0949Z, per telephone conversation between CJTF-82 CHOPS and J3, 11th Corps (PAKMIL), all firing had ceased along the border IVO BSP 12.  The cease fire had been holding for 30 minutes prior to the call.  The 11th Corps J3 requested an immediate Border Flag Meeting between PAKMIL, ANSF, and coalition forces.  We are currently working to facilitate a meeting between the on-scene PAKMIL and ANSF commanders as well as Diablo 6.

The cease fire was brokered using a number of different paths.  CJTF-82 CHOPS contacted ISAF to begin engaging IRoA government, particularly the MOI to implement a cease fire by the ANSF.  We also used our PRD LNO at CSTC-A to engage the senior mentors for the MOI.  We also contacted the Pakistan LNO in Islamabad to work of cease fire by the PAKMIL.  The Commander, CJTF-82 also engaged the MOD.

At 0430Z TF Bushmaster reported the ABP and Pakmil were involved in a direct fire engagement near BSP 11.  Bushmaser observed from FB Chamkani.  No US forces involved. ISAF Tracking# 05–271

There’s been a lot of talk about how the WikiLeaks document dump has cause harm to US national security and may have endangered lives in the field. I tend to agree with most critics that the military classifies way too much information basically in the “better safe than sorry” mentality. Well, we did run across several instances where reports name names and could either endanger the lives of those named or imperil US intelligence operations by revealing that that person was captured and interrogated…

(22358)At 0528Z TF Bushmaster reported that 3 MVTs Mullah Salim, Mohamad and Mullah Abdula are in SC 23''S immediate AO(w/in 3-5k) and planning an IED ambush.  Bushmaster intercepted TB Comms wih hostile intent over the past 36 hours.  TF Bushmaster believes they have emplaced up to 4 IEDs on routes they expect them to take.  TB in area are re-directing civilian traffic away from suspect IED locations.  We do not have eyes on TB Re-direction location.

TF Bushmaster is not in immediate danger, holding the high ground and the tactical advantage ATT.  TF Bushmaster believes they are at fixed pos and they have eyes on the general locations. Bushmasetr is not planning to call "game on" because they do not plan on moving ATT

A lot of old (and maybe new) Russian equipment making up the insurgents’ kit, as we know. But this entry seems to confirm that North Korea is helping supply the enemy in Afghanistan…

(2194)(S REL GCTF) TF BRONCO 2–5 IN REPORTS CACHE IVO FOB RIPLEY. AT 1527Z THE FOLLOWING SALT REPORT WAS SENT: S– 29X 82MM TYPE-63 RUSSIAN MORTAR ROUNDS, 12X 82MM HE83LD YUGOSLAVIAN MORTAR ROUNDS, 16X 82MM MODEL 64 RUSSIAN RECOILLESS RIFLE ROUNDS, 124X 82MM TYPE-65 CHINESE RECOILLESS RIFLE ROUNDS, 8X PG7S, 4X 82MM MODEL 0–881 NORTH KOREAN RECOILLESS RIFLE ROUNDS, 28X MORTAR PRIMERS, 12X MORTAR PRIMER KITS, 92X M6 MORTAR FUSES, 1X M1102C ANTI-TANK MINE FUSE, AND 50 FEET OF NON-MIL DET CORD, A– CACHE, L– 42S TB 24 21, T– 101151ZFEB05. REMARKS: CACHE WAS CONFISCATED BY ORUZGAN GOVERNORS AMF AND TURNED OVER TO UNIT AT FOB RIPLEY.

There was some talk around the blogosphere a couple years ago about US forces seeing so-called “air burst” RPGs being used on the battlefield. The Chinese and Iranian knock off Type 69 RPG round detonates a shroud of steel balls in a 15 meter radius, and reportedly Pakistan has developed a similar knock-off of its own. But in this report below, it seems that the bad guys are using it not just for personnel on the ground…

(38930)At 0230Z, the 24th MEU reported 2x USMC helicopters were engaged with RPG and SAF by an unknown number of Anti Afghan Forces while supporting ground elements IVO 41R PQ 160 352, 9.7KM SE of FOB Garsmer.  An AH-1 was engaged with 4x rounds air burst RPG’s and SAF.  pon completion of ground support, both aircraft returned to Bation AF to conduct BDA.  The AH-1 had a small hole in the tail boom.  Event closed at 1715Z.  ISAF Tracking #05–065.

And here’s a sad report on the recovery of the pilots and crew of two Marine helicopters that collided in mid air in Helmand back in October. One thing you might notice is that the man-killers from TF 373 were involved in the recovery. It’s also kind of scary to see that at one point, the military thought one of the crew was missing in action…

(70802)WHEN: 26 0136D OCT 09
WHO: RP 68/69 (HMLA-169)
WHERE:
NORTHERN CRASH SITE: 41R PQ 05253 44212 (AH-1W)
SOUTHERN CRASH SITE:  41R PQ 05132 44064 (UH-1N)  4.1 KM NE OF FOB DWYER
WHAT: MIDAIR COLLISION

EVENT: TF373 REPORTED A MIDAIR COLLISION WITH RP 68/69. AN ASSAULT FORCE WAS LAUNCHED FROM DWY TO SECURE THE CRASH SITE AND LOCATE SURVIVORS. INITIAL REPORTS: (1) URGENT,  (1) PRIORITY, (3) KIA AND (1) MIA.

AT 0146D, A PR EVENT WAS OPENED FOR (1) MIA. AT 0228D, (2) CAS AND (1) KIA WERE CASEVACD TO DWYER STP. AT 0242D,  QRF ALONG WITH CRASH FIRE/RESCUE ARRIVED AT THE CRASH SITE.  AT 0325D, (1) MIA WAS CONFIRMED TO BE KIA BY BATTLE FIELD COMMANDER. AT 0415D, MWSS-372 EOD WAS DISPATCHED TO THE SCENE FOR ANY UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE AT THE CRASH SITE. AT 0544D, MRAP CO LINKED UP WITH TF-373, TOOK CONTROL OF THE CRASH SITE, AND SET A CORDON. AT 0612D, MWSS-373 EFL (DYWER) FROM THE CRASH SITE. AT 0713D, PITCHBLACK 40 DEPARTED TO RECOVER THE REMAINING (3) FALLEN ANGLES. REPORTS INDICATED ENEMY FORCES WERE PREPARING FOR AN ATTACK ON THE CRASH SITE. CONTAINMENT FIRES WERE CONDUCTED NEAR THE ENEMIES POSITION BY TF 373.

CASUALTIES:
THE (1) URGENT MARINE WAS TRANSPORTED TO BSN ROLE 3, CURRENTLY IN CRITICAL CONDITION. THE (1) PRIORITY MARINE IS CURRENTLY STABLE AT DWYER STP AND WILL LATER BE TRANSPORTED TO BSN.

BDA: (2) WOUNDED, (4) KIA, (1) DESTROYED AH-1W, AND (1) DESTROYED UH-1N.
ISAF REF# 10–2301
MEDEVAC# 10-26A (DWY TO BSN)
PR EVENT# 09–032

These are but of few of the interesting stories living deep within the 91,000 pages of reports released by WikiLeaks. As Greg pointed out earlier, the media’s read on at least one of the “revelations” was way off. But there are some technologies, tactics and equipment highlighted in these reports that have been either not previously reported, or not given their proper due. We’ll keep peeling out some of the more intriguing items to share as we discover them.

– Christian Lowe

As independent panel reports go here in Washington, D.C., this one just released by the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, co-chaired by former Bush administration National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and Clinton-era defense secretary William Perry, is really awful.

It recommends buying more of pretty much every weapon system or at least replacing the current inventory on a one-to-one basis, maintaining ground forces at current levels, expanding the Air Force, greatly expanding the Navy’s battle fleet and to pay for all of that the panel recommends increasing the defense budget.

For an example of how unserious this report truly is, the panel took as its force planning default the 1993 Bottom Up Review. How a strategic analysis conducted in 2010 can look backwards 17 years to come up with a force planning model is beyond me. Has the strategic landscape not changed dramatically over the past two decades?

The problem with so many of these various exercises masquerading as strategic thinking is they do their best to maintain a force that was designed to fight a massive land and sea war against a monolithic, hyper-militarized Soviet Union. Here is an analysis of the 1993 BUR by two of this nation’s foremost strategic thinkers, Andrew Krepinevich and Bob Work contained in A New U.S. Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era:

“Although the BUR cautioned against planning for the last war, it proceeded to do just that. In essence, it used Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm to help explain and justify a regionalization of the Cold War military problem of forward defense along the inner German border and the demilitarized zone that separated North and South Korea.

Regionalizing the Cold War planning problem thus ensured that little substantive change would come to the US defense program beyond shaving force structure and the total numbers of weapons systems. After all, weapons and systems designed for fighting along the inner German border were likely to be just as relevant against regional aggressors fielding combined-arms, mechanized forces like Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guards. More importantly, however, it made US defense planners lazy; they had little new thinking to do other than concentrating on winning regional wars as efficiently as possible.”

Intellectual laziness abounds in this new QDR assessment that should be thrown into the trash faster than most reports of its kind. The report’s drafters even write: “we had neither the time nor the resources to conduct a detailed force-structure analysis.” Well then, what the hell good are you?

For what its worth, here’s a summary of the force structure recommendations the report made without putting in the time to do the analysis to back them up:

• Maintain the Army and Marine Corps at current levels.

• Expand “substantially” the Navy toward the BUR recommended 346 ships and keep 11 carriers, “the reason being the potential challenges in Asia.”

• Make deep strike a priority for the Air Force.

• “Replace inventory on at least a one-for-one basis, with an upward adjustment in the number of naval vessels and certain air and space assets.”

– Greg Grant

At his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this week, newly nominated Central Command head Gen. James Mattis reaffirmed his support for a turboprop aircraft to provide ground pounders with long loitering time, on-call recon and strike. The project called “Imminent Fury” was run out of the Navy’s irregular warfare office.

Mattis described it as a test program to see if inexpensive turboprops could replace the much more costly jets currently used in counterinsurgency battles. As we’ve described it before, the sought after design falls somewhere between the Vietnam era OV-10 Bronco and A-1 Skyraider.

While the Navy’s request for additional funds for the program was recently denied, Mattis said he’s still trying to build support for the concept, to at least gather data that could inform future spending decisions.

He’s going to have his work cut out for him as sources from the Navy’s irregular warfare community recently told Defense Tech the program is as dead as Julius Caesar. Who killed it? The Air Force, we’re told, and its powerful fighter community, which was not at all interested in sticking their pilots in a low and slow ground support aircraft. The Air Force is still having trouble choking down the “drone driver” mission.

As we wrote a couple of months ago, Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Norton Schwartz, shot down his own idea for an irregular warfare wing, arguing that the current, and future, inventory of jet aircraft can perform any and all close air support missions that a new, light strike fighter could. He could not envision replacing existing F-15, F-16 and A-10, or future F-35s for that matter, with a light strike aircraft.

Mattis made an important point in front of the SASC earlier this year:

“Today’s approach of loitering multi-million dollar aircraft and using a system of systems procedure for the approval and employment of airpower is not the most effective use of aviation fires in this irregular fight,”

Yet, without Air Force buy-in, it’s hard to see this effort goes anywhere. I’m not sure Mattis’ powers of persuasion will have much impact on the Air Force’s dominant constituency.

– Greg Grant

(hat tip: Bill Gertz)

Newly installed Afghan theater commander Gen. David Petraeus has issued new “Counterinsurgency Guidance” to troops under his command. The 24 points are largely plucked from Field Manual 3–24 Counterinsurgency and David Kilcullen’s 28 COIN principles albeit with an Afghan flavor; for example, it includes the familiar “human terrain” is the “decisive terrain” and “people are the center of gravity.”

Petraeus has brought lessons from his Iraq command experience to Afghanistan, urging troops to get out and live among the people by positioning “combat outposts” as close to the people as feasible, similar to changes he implemented in Baghdad in 2007. Troops are told to get out of their vehicles and walk, another less from Iraq. While patrolling on foot troops should ditch the high-speed shades: “Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass or Oakleys.”

The new commander’s guidance includes many of the rules laid down by the previous commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, behave politely while in foreign lands and don’t do stupid things that piss off the locals. “Alienating Afghan civilians sows the seeds of our defeat.”

On the always hot-button rules of engagement issue, Petraeus’ new guidance doesn’t say a whole lot; it’s quite likely that a separate “guidance” will address ROE in more detail. It does say that troops must fight with discipline, using only the “firepower needed to win a fight.” As is repeated in every COIN tome, the document says killing civilians or damaging their property serves as an excellent recruiting tool for the insurgents.

To this Afghanistan specific distillation of COIN best practices, Petraeus has added “confront the culture of impunity,” identifying Afghan corruption and abuses as an enemy of the people and giving U.S. troops the mission of reforming a failing government in addition to defeating a virulent insurgency. Corrupt “networks” of Afghan government officials are to be added to targeting lists. Once identified the COIN guidance extols troops to “confront, isolate, pressure and defund malign actors.”

Petraeus’ COIN guidance continues the careful recalibration of expectations I’ve been noticing in recent official statements and briefs regarding Afghanistan. “Avoid premature declarations of success… Strive to under-promise and over-deliver.”

– Greg Grant

As frenetic stock-picking, carnival barker Jim Cramer, host of CNBC’s Mad Money, says: listen to company quarterly earnings reports, you can learn a lot. On Lockheed Martin’s 2nd quarter conference call yesterday, CEO Bob Stevens told Wall Street analysts (transcript here) the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program was at a “critical juncture” as it transitions from development into production.

The systems development and demonstration phase is about 80 percent complete, he said. Of the 19 planned test aircraft, 15 have been delivered; only 13 will actually fly, the others are for structural tests. Nine of the “flyers” have so far completed a total of 136 test flights: the F-35A has flown 56 times; the F-35B short-takeoff and landing version has flown 74 times: and the carrier variant F-35C has flown six times.

While the 74 test flights of the F-35B might look impressive, its actually behind schedule; it was supposed to have flown 95 times by now, Stevens said. “Higher than predicted” failure rates of component parts have grounded some F-35B test aircraft. Stevens described the failing parts as sub-components, not major parts such as the engine, which has been performing well.

“The components that are failing are more of the things that would appear either smaller or more ordinary like thermal cooling fans, door actuators, selected valves or switches or components of the power system.”

Yet, testers have had to pull the engines out to access those failed components and the follow-on maintenance has taken far longer than expected, Stevens said. Lockheed and its suppliers are trying to figure out whether the problems lie in botched manufacturing (Friday jobs), whether the design of the parts must be changed or whether the program needs to buy more spares. Stevens said the problem is fixable.

On the production side, Stevens said 31 airplanes are in various stages of assembly. “We continue to see improved cost performance… I think it’s fair to say that the production cost trends overall remain on the favorable side of prior estimates which is where we all want them to be.”

Crackerjack Morgan Stanley aerospace analyst Heidi Wood asked Stevens about F-35 requirements creep, which has been the death knell for many a program. “[T]he hardware is progressively locking into a good configuration,” he said, “and there are no major technical showstoppers to date on the program.”

“I know the numbers of airplanes are big, the size of the program is large, and therefore the cost numbers are significant… But again, I want to disabuse you of any sense you might have that requirements turn or creep are driving either our performance on the airplane or within the program or the overall cost of the program because that’s really not a source of cost concern at present.”

As for international sales, Stevens threw around a bunch of notional figures, muttered something about European commitments among declining defense budgets and said there is “growing” interest in Asia, including Japan, Singapore and South Korea, and the Middle East.

– Greg Grant

By Kevin Coleman
Defense Tech Cyber War Analyst

Private contractors have proven vital in the current wars, providing services that range from security and fighting in battles to training and supply chain management. Recently there has been a lot of attention being given to the number of contractors used within both theaters of operations – Afghanistan and Iraq.

Well, if they think the ratio for conventional military operations is too high, wait till they see what it is in the cyber domain! While I can find no real numbers, actual experience suggests that the private sector is where the hard-core cyber talent is. After all, the private sector was responsible for creating the vast majority of hardware and software used by the military, intelligence and homeland security organizations.

A recent story on NPR stated that U.S. security officials say there is a severe shortage of people who have the sophisticated skill and knowledge needed to do battle in the cyber warfare domain. In addition, last week a CSIS report said there is a shortage of between 20,000 and 30,000 well trained cyber soldiers needed in the near term to address the offensive, defensive, intelligence and leadership needs in the cyber domain.

Training this number of individuals will take time and then there is the question of experience in the information security field. Nationally enrollment in computer science began to decline in 2000. This trend is not limited to computer science programs. It extends to all technology centric programs and tracks. This trend began a slight turn-around in 2007 and now enrollment has increased 14 percent since then. Even with this increase we fall far short of what we need.

Where are we going to get these people and how can we bridge the gap until we can train them and get them the experience they need to defend our nation in cyber space?

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak arrives in Washington, D.C., next week. And he’s coming with a list of demands for U.S. defense officials. Topping that list: Israel wants money to build-out its multi-layered missile and rocket defense shield and it wants to get its hands on advanced technology from the Joint Strike Fighter program.

If it gets what it wants, Barak suggested Israel wouldn’t oppose the proposed U.S. sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia; although perhaps not in the numbers being discussed. In an interview with the Washington Post last week, Barak evoked Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME), suggesting that Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of dozens of brand new F-15 fighters could tilt the regional military balance.

“[W]e would appreciate it if we could be compensated and the qualitative edge will be assured as well as certain aspects of the quantity. Beyond certain point, quantity turns into quality especially when the planes themselves are extremely sophisticated one.”

Israel isn’t in a position to dictate who the U.S. sells advanced weaponry to, Barak said; although it really is. If Israel so desires, it can mobilize its powerful allies in Congress to hold up arms sales to Arab nations, especially when it’s something as big as the sale of 84 F-15s.

So what does Israel want for compensation? Barak said he wants money to erect a multi-layered rocket and missile defense shield over Israel, which has been his “vision from day one” in office. Hostile non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas have turned to the poor man’s strategic bomber, the rocket, to menace Israeli cities.

Israel’s in-development, multi-layered defensive shield includes Iron Dome (which we wrote about here) to catch short ranged rockets and artillery rounds and David’s Sling, intended to intercept larger Scud sized missiles. The top layer of the shield, the Arrow and Super Arrow interceptors, are designed to protect against possible ballistic missiles launched from Syria and Iran, Barak said.

“And that kind of system that combined together will cost, in order to be fully deployed and fully protect Israel; we need tens of thousands of the short-range interceptors, thousands of the David Slings interceptors and many hundreds of the upper layers. That’s a big package.

It’s extremely successful science and technology being put together, extremely short R&D schedule. But in order to fully deploy we need some $7–8 billion and expect that in the framework of making peace with our neighbors we will be able to give this answer to make Israelis feel secure.”

As for the JSF, Barak said Israel ultimately wants “several dozen” of the advanced aircraft, although the buys would be stretched out over time. Israel wants to be able to put its own electronics warfare package in the JSF, he said, but also:

“We need of course to be able to participate in production of some parts in our industry as well as making sure that we can continue keeping our real edge which stems out from Israeli electronics and from our weapons’ systems to find the balance, an agreed upon balance between our needs and the American readiness to give us access to these advanced planes.”

It sure sounds like Israel wants some kind of technology transfer in the deal. Considering how desperately the JSF program needs an Israeli buy, I’m guessing Barak won’t leave Washington empty handed.

– Greg Grant

The chart above shows monthly IED “incidents,” defined as IEDs placed by insurgents and either found or detonated, in Afghanistan from January 2004 to April this year. It comes from an alarming report from the Pentagon’s Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) that was provided to CSIS’s Anthony Cordesman.

The JIEDDO data shows an astounding jump in IED incidents occurred beginning summer 2009 — coinciding with the Marine offensive in the Helmand River Valley — and IED attacks have steadily mounted. There were more than 1,000 IED incidents during March, April and May of this year; nearly half of total incidents involved IEDs detonating. As the JIEDDO brief notes, a “significant number” of IEDs may have been emplaced but were never found or detonated.

The JIEDDO data shows “that IEDs have become the equivalent of the Stinger in allowing irregular forces to pose a major threat even to the most advanced military forces in the world,” Cordesman writes. While the jump in insurgent IED attacks is indeed alarming, the data does show some good news: “the counter-IED effort has kept successful attacks far below the rate of increase in total attacks.”

As can be seen from the chart labeled “Lethality of IEDs Over Time,” the number of deaths per IED attack has “stabilized” at below 20 percent since April 2009. In March of this year, 434 IEDs detonated, resulting in 22 coalition troops killed and 252 wounded. In April, 475 IEDs detonated, resulting in 17 killed and 230 wounded. In May, 544 IEDs detonated, killing 34 coalition troops and wounding 250.

Coalition troops casualty rates from IED attacks approaching 300 per month is a grim statistic. Yet, it is a marked improvement over casualty rates per incident from summer 2009. During July 2009, 450 IEDs detonated, killing 49 and wounding 237 coalition troops. The next month, 554 IEDs detonated, killing 55 troops and wounding 333.

The lower casualty rate is likely due to the fact that the military has rushed large numbers of IED resistant vehicles to Afghanistan; another reason might be due to an increase in available medevac flights for wounded troops.

One bit of data that is not so good: the percentage of IEDs turned in by local Afghans has actually declined over time and is running at below five percent of total incidents. A 2009 report from the Center for New American Security (CNAS) identified the number of IEDs reported by local Afghans as an important metric of success:

“[A] a rise in the proportion of IEDs being found and defused (especially when discovered thanks to tips from the local population) indicates that locals have a good working relationship with local military units—a sign of progress. Conversely, a drop in the proportion of IEDs found and cleared indicates the population is not passing on information to security forces, and is standing by while they are attacked—a sign of deteriorating security.”

– Greg Grant