First of all Happy New Year from Defense Tech. I hope you all had a wonderful holiday season and are ready to get back to work helping us decipher the strategic and technological dilemmas facing the world's militaries.

I heard today that a friend and colleague of mine Tom Ricks of the Washington Post has started a new gig blogging with Foreign Policy online -- relaunched by the Washingtonpost/Newsweek/Slate publishing group after it purchased the magazine from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in September.

Let's just say the so-called "Best Defense" blog is off to a ho-hum start, with two-to-three sentence entries that don't add very much to the news of the day. But that's OK, Tom will hit his stride and learn that he needs to shed some of that journalistic punch pulling he's been trained to do for his entire career. And there have been a bunch of updates since I first checked the blog this morning.

Anyway, he summed up for me a thought I'd had since this whole Gaza goat rope started. Seems to me Israel can't possibly "win" with Operation Cast Lead as it stands. I just don't understand the goals here and can't put together the logic that must have led them to this decision -- unless of course it's PURELY politics (don't forget, FM Livni and DM Barak are both running for PM in February against Likud hawk Netanyahu).

Here's what Ricks pulled from his sources:

Terry Daly, one of the smartest people I know on counterinsurgency issues, doesn't see much hope for Israel's crackdown in Gaza. "Don't ask me what the solution is to Israel's strategic problem," he comments in a note. "Thomas Henriksen's excellent 2007 Joint Special Operations University monograph, 'The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the United States,' clearly relates how the Israelis have tried most of the usual solutions. For 60 years, though, Israel through the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), basically has relied on 'the utility of force.' The IDF became and remains a shining example of conventional military excellence, but it also seems to be heading for defeat in 'war amongst the people,' where the objective is to win peoples' support not to kill them and break all their toys. . . . Meanwhile the Muslim nihilists must be salivating at the thought of getting the IDF on the ground in the Gaza Strip."

Ricks suggests reading this analysis from the Guardian newspaper...

"Islamic Jihad - the extremist group behind many of the rocket attacks on Israeli towns - has got the war it wished for at least."

Some food for thought and I'd like to hear your thoughts on this too...

And, again, a hearty welcome to the new medium, Tom. We'll be keeping close tabs on your stuff and cribbing like a third grader who forgot his homework.

-- Christian

The most controversial naval issue of the post-Cold War era has been whether or not China is planning to procure aircraft carriers. In late December the senior national defense spokesman, Huang Xueping, declared that China is "seriously" considering adding an aircraft carrier to its navy.

While this may be the most definitive statement to date by a Chinese official, more significant was the Chinese Navy's decision this past fall when 50 naval officers began a pilot training program at the Dalian Naval Academy to provide a cadre of carrier-based aviators.

Thus, speculation about a future Chinese carrier force continues albeit still without any public indications of whether such ships would be constructed in China or possibly purchased from a foreign source, in particular Ukraine, which contains the Black Sea Shipyard in Nikolayev. That yard produced all Soviet-era aircraft carriers. Also, no definitive time table has been put forward by any Chinese officials.

And, much more significant from a viewpoint of the future of China's Navy, on 26 December a three-ship task force departed Sanya in Hainan Province for operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to help deter pirate attacks on international merchant shipping. Although Chinese warships have carried out long-range visits to other countries, those could not be considered operational missions. 

(The last time that China sent a naval expedition to East Africa was during the Ming Dynasty when the emperor's envoy Zheng He led a large armada in the early 15th Century to the region for goodwill port calls.)

The modern Chinese task force consists of two missile destroyers and a replenishment oiler. The destroyers are the Haikou and Wuhan. These are two of China's newest warships. The Haikou, completed in 2005, is an advanced air-defense ship, the Chinese equivalent of a Western Aegis-type warship. With a full load displacement of about 6,500 tons, the Haikouhas a heavy anti-air and anti-ship missile armament as well as anti-submarine weapons. Two helicopters are embarked.

The Wuhan, completed in 2004, is the same size, also with a multi-mission capability, although without the advanced 30N6E multi-function radar (Western code name Tombstone). One helicopter is carried.

The replenishment oiler Weishanhu, a 22,000-ton ship, completes the anti-pirate force. 

About 800 officers and sailors man the three ships, commanded by Rear Admiral Du Jingchen. Upon sailing, Admiral Du stated that, "China definitely has neither the intention of threatening interests of any sovereign parties nor the interest in breaking up power equilibrium in the region."

A Defense Ministry spokesman said in an earlier statement that Chinese naval forces would observe United Nations Security Council resolutions and relative international laws in fulfilling its obligations. Almost 1,300 Chinese merchant ships have passed through the Gulf of Aden in 2008, with seven being attacked. One fishing ship and her 18 crew members are still being held by pirates. Negotiations for their rescue are underway.

China's increasing world-wide political and economic interests have rarely been supported by military forces. Thus, the anti-pirate operation will provide excellent training for Chinese naval forces in such operations while at the same time giving their officers experience in tactical operations with other navies. And, for Western navies operating in the area, it will provide an excellent opportunity for intelligence collection against modern Chinese warships their procedures.

-- Norman Polmar

"Some of the world's lead experts on Africa are convening a symposium to discuss security issues on the continent at Maxwell Air Force Base on February 13th. Co-hosted by the Air Force research Institute, the AF's brand new strategic think tank which advises the AF Chief of Staff, and the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA), the day-long event promises to cover Somali piracy, militias in Congo, Hezbollah terrorists around the region and many other critical topics. It is open to the military and governmen, civilian academics, and interested others who request an invitation. For more, and to register, go to www.asmeascholars.org."

Africa is the largest vacuum in the world and thus the most fertile ground for the breeding of dangerous non-state actors (the Somali piracy issue being proof enough of that fact). If you're in the military and do anything with irregular warfare, this could be an easy, interesting TDY -- though I'd recommend that anyone with interest in the regional or functional study of irregular warfare attend.

-John Noonan

I just got some information on the Heckler and Koch bid for the Marine Corps Infantry Automatic Rifle.

You can see the picture here and below, check out the stats:

IAR specs

To me, it basically looks like a 416 with a longer barrel and more robust butt stock. I will say that troops love the H&K box magazines for their lack of hangups in when feeding on burst fire.

Thing is, I hope the deck isn't stacked against FN and H&K because of Colt's submission of two weapons. I have absolutely nothing against Colt or its IAR variants (though for some reason they declined to provide me with any details of their weapons for DT or Military.com), I just for once want to see a free and fair competition for the Corps' new version of the BAR (though in 5.56, much to many's chagrin)...Without any ole boy networking or bias.

We'll see though, huh?

-- Christian

Here's a pretty interesting piece of defense tech sent over by DT reader Travis the other day about an innovative mast system that can be used in unmanned ground vehicles that allows the diminutive bots to see over high walls.

The so called Situational Awareness Mast uses a patented interlock system that differentiates it from telescoping masts that take up a lot of room and weight when stowed, thereby limiting their extension height.

Here's what Hizook blog said about it...

The Situational Awareness Mast (SAM, also known as a Zipper Mast) from Geosystems Inc. is a telescoping linear actuator that has a unique property -- it's stroke length is an order of magnitude greater than its nominal height! For example, the SAM8 is a 10 lb device with a stroke length (8ft) that is 24 times it's nominal height (4 inches)! This can be used to vertically translate a robot's sensor suite for better visibility while still allowing for a low profile. Read on for information on the different Zipper Mast variants, the patent describing the system, and an exclusive video of a Zipper Mast on an iRobot Packbot!

Be sure to check out Hizook for more details on how Geosystems accomplishes the low-profile boom. They've got pics from the patent and other schematics. As with UAVs, UGVs are beginning to come into their own and I know from personal experience they're a potential lifesaver on a battlefield strewn with IEDs, mines and other boobie traps.

And here's a video of the system that best explains how it works.

Geosystems Situational Awareness Mast (aka Zippermast) from Travis on Vimeo

-- Christian

As the new administration takes office, the defense budget will come under extensive scrutiny. A recent editorial in The New York Times entitled "How to Pay for a 21st-Century Military" calls for a halt to the F-22 Raptor fighter, the DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer, SSN 688 Virginia-class submarines, and MV-22 Osprey programs, among others.

Some "big dollar" programs could be cut, in part to demonstrate the seriousness of the Obama administration to reform the U.S. military establishment. But there will be many programs at risk that have less visibility. One of the leading candidates for cancellation is the long-gestating Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), the advanced "amtrac" that has been under development for almost two decades.

The Marine Corps now has ten of the EFVs -- that designation being assigned in 2003 to replace the more prosaic but useful AAAV -- Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, which in turn replaced the LVT -- Landing vehicle Tracked -- designation in 1982.

The EFV can carry 17 Marines on land or sea, at a speed up to 45 mph on land and about 25 knots at sea.  The EFV’s range is 325 miles on land and 65 nautical miles at sea.

But those specifications are the "rub." How does the EFV fit into the Marines Corps concept of Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS)? That concept calls for launching an assault from 25 to 100 nautical miles from the objective -- which may be an inland location, such as an airfield, capital, or military base. Recent studies by the Defense Science Board (DSB) and Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) call for amphibious ships to stand offshore at least 50 miles because of the threat of land-launched cruise missiles (as struck the Israeli frigate Hanit operating off the Lebanese coast in 2006).

Thus, launching an assault from 25 or more nautical miles offshore would see the assault troops flown in by MV-22 tilt-rotor STOVL aircraft and CH-46E and CH-53E helicopters, the former at more than 300 mph and the helicopters at more than 100 mph. And, of course, they could land troops on an inland objective.

Follow-up equipment that was not air landed would be brought ashore by Air Cushion Landing Craft (ACLC), with a new design being developed, and the few remaining LCU landing craft.

Where does the EFV fit in? It cannot be launched from more than about 30 miles offshore because of its limited waterborne range if it is to return to the launching ship; it could be launched farther out if it is to then climb ashore and operate as a personnel carrier. And, even at 30 miles the transit time would be more than an hour, or longer if the seas are rough. If too rough, of course, the EFVs could not be employed.

After the EFVs "hit the beach" they must then travel to the objective. At that point the troops will have been "in the box" for at least an hour. Once ashore, an EFV operating as a personnel carrier has the benefit of a relatively heavy gun armament -- a 30-mm cannon and 7.62-mm machine gun. But it will lack support from armored vehicles -- tanks or even the Marines’ valued LAV (Light Armored Vehicle) -- making the EFV particularly vulnerable to the widely proliferated anti-tank weapons found in the Third World.

The official cost of the EFV is $10 million per vehicle, with several hundred planned to replace the existing AAV-7 series. The total EFV force will not be fielded until at least 2020.

With some "bugs" still to be worked out after two decades of development and the high cost per vehicle, coupled with the operational limitations or at least questions about how the EFV fits into the OMFTS concept, the EFV must be considered a highly visible target for administration budget cutters.

-- Norman Polmar

No one would dispute how convenient thumb drives are, or how they’ve made the transfer of files form one machine to another so easy. These drives offer numerous advantages over other portable storage devices. They are more compact, and operate much faster. The new thumb drives using USB 2.0 operate faster than an optical disc drive, while storing a larger amount of data in a much smaller space.

They also have no moving parts, making them more robust than mechanical hard drives. These types of drives use the USB mass storage standard, supported by modern operating systems such as Windows, Mac OS X, Linux, and other Unix-like systems. However, that convenience comes with risk.

FACT: The flash-memory market was until recently one of the fastest-growing segments of the global semiconductor industry. The total worldwide revenue of the market in 2008 is estimated to be about $12 billion.

The recent news of this significant cyber incident at the Pentagon has called into question the use of thumb drives. According to one report, senior military leaders said the malware infection incident affected the U.S. Central Command networks. This incident included systems both in the headquarters and in the combat zones. Thumb drives are reportedly banned within the U.S. Department of Defense. The ban comes after they were identified as the most likely point of compromise that transferred what has been termed a “global virus” according to Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman. Inside sources leaked a message distributed to employees saying that all flash drives, whether purchased or provided by the Department of Defense, would be confiscated.

This is a problem not just for DoD, but for all computer users, so tell us about your use of thumb drives.

-- Kevin Coleman

With a Comptroller, William Lynn, who outdid all of his predecessors and successors with the most populous and preposterous budget gimmicks post-Cold War Pentagon spending has seen, with a level of spending that out-did the plan left on the table by that penny-pincher Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, and a level of shrunken, aging forces unready to fight, the Clinton era was the absolute low for post-World War II Pentagon management, up to then. That it was outdone by the mangling of the Bush years - even today - is no reason to think that a return to the precepts of Clinton-esque defense thinking is a good idea.

This argument is clearly and strongly articulated by a Pentagon insider who has seen it all before and who has demonstrated frequently the character and insight to call it as it is. Franklin ("Chuck") Spinney wrote for "CounterPunch" an important and informative analysis of the NY Times' vision of the past guised as Pentagon reform for the 21st Century. Here it is:

The New York Times Flames Out in Defense Dogfight

By CHUCK SPINNEY
Counterpunch (http://www.counterpunch.org/spinney12232008.html)

The 21 Dec 2008 editorial in The New York Times, "How To Pay For A 21st-Century Military" purports to advocate tough-minded pragmatism to reform a Pentagon that is clearly out of control. Yet its logic is really another example of the kind of hackneyed thinking that serves to protect the status quo. It also suggests indirectly why the mainstream media are in such trouble.

The editors of the Times present a cut list that includes terminating the F-22, the DDG-1000, the Virginia class attack submarine, the V-22 Osprey, halting premature deployment (not R&D) on ballistic missile defense, cutting nuclear weapons, de-alerting nuclear weapons, cutting two air wings from the active Air Force, and cutting one carrier from the Navy. Some of these recommendations make a lot of sense, but even if one assumes unrealistically that there is no cost growth elsewhere and there are no contract termination costs or base closing costs, the cutbacks would "save" $20 to $25 billion. While $25 billion may sound impressive, bear in mind, the upcoming Defense Department's core budget could be as high as $580 billion in Fiscal Year 2010, according to news reports.

Put another way, even if we believe in the vanishingly small probability of a best case scenario with no cost growth or contract termination costs, these cuts would reduce the defense budget Mr. Obama is about to inherit by only a little over four per cent -- and that would be a reduction from a budget level that the editors say is bloated, because the defense budget was increased recklessly by 40 per cent in inflation-adjusted terms since 2001 (not including the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan).

Furthermore, the editors at the Times do not even want to pass on this piddling amount to the taxpayers or Mr. Obama's infrastructure program, because they say that the "savings" should be plowed back into the Pentagon to increase the size of the Army and Marine ground forces, to buy the Navy's littoral combat ship, and to resupply the National Guard and Reserve forces. But then they conclude by observing that the era of unlimited budgets is over and that Secretary Gates must make procurement reform a priority.

This is very peculiar logic. And it is made even more bizarre by what the editors of the Times did not say. Consider please just a few things they forgot to mention:

The F-35 will cost of over $300 billion, making it the most expensive program in the history of the Department of Defense and the world. Moreover, the F-35 is rapidly becoming the heaviest jewel in the Pentagon's crown of mismanagement. The F-35 has serious technical problems; it is way behind schedule; and is way over cost -- facts apparently lost on editors at the Times. Last March, for example, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported another cost increase of $38 billion, bringing the total estimated cost to $338 billion or 45 per cent more than when the program was approved for its risky concurrent engineering and manufacturing development (i.e., buy before you fly) program in 2001. On November 26, 2008, Bloomberg News reported that an internal team of DoD analysts concluded the F-35 program could cost 40 per cent more than budgeted in the 2010-2015 plan that Mr Bush is about to bequeath to Mr. Obama (and these teams have a track record of underestimating future cost growth).

One of the biggest cost drivers and sources of technical risk in the F-35 is its stealth requirement, but this requirement is a shopworn legacy of the cold war. Set aside the valid criticisms of how well stealth technologies work in the real world or the equally valid criticisms relating to the technical limitations of real-world air defense systems, and just consider where the logic shaping the stealth requirement came from.

The "requirement" for stealth, which is now taken for granted in just about everything, reached a fever pitch during the cycle of threat hysteria that emerged in the mid 1970s and lasted until the Soviet Union collapsed. The Air Force claimed the Soviet Union was ringed by an impenetrable air defense system, made up of dense, overlapping, multi-layered air defense radars. Technologists claimed (falsely as it turned out) that this system was so redundant that it would be impossible to disable it by electronic jamming or to penetrate it at low level, and that the only recourse, therefore, was to reduce the radar reflectivity of our own airplanes. The reduction in reflectivity would in theory shorten the detection range of the Soviet radars. In effect, the idea was to create "holes" in the Soviet's radar coverage that our planes could then fly through undetected. At the time, no one ever claimed that any other country had such a multilayered air defense system, and since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is clear that no country has yet developed or deployed anything remotely close to the massive overlapping capabilities portrayed by the Air Force's threat inflators during the waning years of the Cold War.

In fact, one reason why the F-22 is so expensive was that it had to be stealthy. Now the editors of the Times say correctly that the F-22 should be terminated because it was tailored to the Soviet threat, which has ceased to exist. But in the next breath, they make the peculiar assertion that we should preserve a far more costly and more troubled turkey, the F-35, even though it has a distinction that even the F-22 can not claim: namely it is tailored to meet the same threat that has ceased to exist at least three years before the F-35 R&D program began in 1994.

Omission No. 2: The Times wants to kill the DDG 1000 and the Virginia class submarine, rely on the DDG 51 Aegis destroyers for fleet defense, and plow the "savings" into the littoral combat ship.

Even the Navy wants to dump the problem-plagued DDG 1000. Last July, in a congressional hearing, Navy leaders testified that they intended to truncate the DDG-51 program at 2 ships, nixing earlier plans to buy up to 32 ships. While the editors of the Times recognize this cutback, they say that "Cutting the last two could save more than $3 billion a year." But for how long? In fact, termination creates only a short term saving (again, assuming unrealistically that there are no contract termination costs), because each DDG-1000 is estimated to cost $3 billion, so the best case estimate is a one shot saving of $6 billion, probably spaced over several years.

And what about the Littoral Combat Ship? A case can be made for a low cost combat ship designed to fight in the shallow littorals, if only for attacking pirates. But plowing the money back into the $600 million Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is asking for trouble. Like in the case of the F-35, the editors of the Times forgot to do mention the widely-reported facts this program had turned out to be a grotesque technological, organizational, and economic monster, albeit on a smaller scale than the F-35. It is hard to see how anyone with a modicum of curiosity could miss these problems; all the research you need to do is to google "littoral combat ship" and "cost growth" and your screen will sink under the weight of reports describing of this particular horror story.

If there was ever case for reforming the Pentagon's acquisition process, it is the LCS. This ship, conceived initially as a small, fast, maneuverable and relatively low-cost ship, came unglued in 2007-2008, when it became clear that technical and organizational problems would take years to solve, if they could be solved at all. It is now clear the LCS will cost more than twice as much as its original cost estimate of $220 million per ship, if it ever gets built in significant numbers, which I doubt.

Omission No. 3: The editors of the Times want to halt premature deployment of a missile defense system to save $9 billion, but continue spending for research, even though they acknowledge that after spending $150 billion over the last 25 years the Pentagon has yet to produce anything close to being a workable solution. Of course, they ignored the billions poured into the earlier efforts going back to 1946 when the USAAF began its ABM efforts with Project Thumper. These efforts (the most prominent efforts being Projects Thumper and Wizard, Nike Zeus, Project Defender, Nike X, Spartan, Sprint, Sentinel, and Safeguard) and others continued with varying degrees of intensity, including one other premature deployment fiasco (Safeguard in 1975) until early 1983, when President Reagan unleashed yet another torrent of spending .

The logic of continuing to pour money down a 50 year old missile defense rathole that has no workable weapon to show for it is a little like the logic which induced Sir Douglas Haig to conclude he should try to redeem failure for four months after taking 60,000 casualties in the first day of the battle of the Somme in 1916 -- he just didn't get the message, and neither, apparently, have the editors of the Times.

Moreover, many theorists of nuclear war argue that a ballistic missile defense targeted against ICBMs is destabilizing because it threatens the deterrent effects of other nations' nuclear weapons. The Times makes a puzzling recommendation in this regard: The editors say we should reopen negotiations with the Russians to bring about reductions in warheads and that we take missiles off hair-trigger alert. While both these actions would reduce the horror of nuclear war, and would be perceived as mutually stabilizing, they would also be a variance with a vigorous missile defense program, which would make the Russian deterrent less effective. Actively pursuing missile defense would have a more predictable effect of causing the Russians to hedge against our "shield" by fielding more missiles and returning them to hair trigger alert to neutralize the effects of our first strike "sword," which they would see as being made safer by our shield. That a missile defense system is unlikely to work simply makes such an evolution and exercise in madness.

Omission No. 4: The editors of the Times concluded by saying that reforming the procurement system should be a priority and that Gates has to make some tough calls. True to form, they said nothing about the nature of the reforms. Moreover, their recommendations discussed above make clear that they do not even understand what they want to reform. To understand what is needed, one needs to understand what is really driving budgets up record levels while force structure melts down and why forces readiness is hollowing out under the pressure of two very small wars, when compared to the less costly Korean or Vietnam wars (in terms of the total size of the force level operational tempos). In fact, as has been documented for at least twenty years, patterns of repetitive habitual behavior in the Pentagon have created a self-destructive decision making process. This process has produced a death spiral having three undeniable outward manifestations:

The first manifestation is the long term trend of shrinking forces made up of aging equipment. This is caused by the central fact that unit procurement costs increase much faster than budgets, even when budgets blow through the roof, like they did in the last 8 years. That means new weapons do not replace old weapons on a one for one basis. Over the long term, the changes have been mind boggling: In 1957 for example, the Air Force had an inventory of over 9,000 fighter airplanes with an average age of around 5 years; today, even though the Pentagon is spending more money than at any time since the end of World War II, that inventory is less than 2,000, with an average age of 23 years. The editors of the New York Times call for reform but would have us continue this evolutionary process by protecting the high-cost F-35, while calling for a reduction of two Air Force tactical fighter force by two wings and one Navy's tactical fighter wing.

The second manifestation of the defense death spiral takes the form of continual pressure to reduce combat readiness. This is due to the high wages of the not-so-all-volunteer force (stop loss is a backdoor draft) and the increased costs of operating more complex weapons that, for the reason stated above, are getting older and more worn out more on average, and hence more expensive to operate. Today, there is general agreement that our military is being hollowed out by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the scales of today's warfighting efforts are miniscule when compared to equivalent efforts at the peak of the Vietnam War, the Pentagon had a smaller budget in inflation adjusted dollars. For example, today we are fighting two wars with about 180,000 deployed troops, whereas in 1967 and 1968, forces peaked at over 550,000 deployed troops in Vietnam. In terms of airpower, the Air Force was flying tens of thousands more sorties and was dropping more bombs on North Vietnam that it dropped on Germany in World War II. Bear in mind some other differences from today: in the mid-1960s, the United States was also engaged in a Cold War with the Soviet superpower, and we maintained over a million forward-deployed troops in Europe and other parts of east Asia; we also maintained world-wide sea control with a Navy of more than a 1000 ships, and we keep hundreds of strategic bombers and thousands of missiles on hair trigger alert. Yet we had a smaller defense budget then that we have today.

The third outward manifestation of the Pentagon's death spiral is the corrupt accounting system. As I described in my final testimony to Congress in June 2002, the Pentagon's bookkeeping system is so broken that it can not pass the simple audits required by the spirit of the Constitution and the letter of the law (i.e., the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990). This makes it impossible to produce the information needed to sort out the priorities needed to fix the first two problems. Until this problem is addressed no amount vapid editorializing about program cuts or swaps will result placing the Pentagon on an evolutionary pathway toward fielding a military force that protects the real security interests of the American people.

Bottom line: The Pentagon is in a crisis, the editors of the New Times would unknowingly reinforce it. Readers interested in how we might reform the Pentagon's self-destructive-decision process are referred to my testimony cited in the previous paragraph or the somewhat different recommendations in a remarkable new anthology, America's Defense Meltdown, published by the Center for Defense Information. This new anthology is designed to give President Obama and Congress a guide to placing the Pentagon back onto a pathway toward an effective defense at a cost a nation in recession can afford. Written by retired military officers and civilians with over 350 years experience in the defense business, this book is unique in that it provides a view from the trenches by people who have struggle to reform the way the Pentagon does business.

Franklin "Chuck" Spinney is a former military analyst for the Pentagon He currently lives on a sailboat in the Mediterranean and can be reached at chuck_spinney@mac.com.

From all of us here at Defense Tech, we'd like to wish you all a merry Christmas.

-- Christian

While there still is no official announcement, Granite Gear and their partner Montgomery Marketing Inc have announced that they have captured at least some of the SOCOM Pack program. Two packs were out for competition and they have won the Patrol Pack category with their 2400 cubic inch Raid pack and they will begin manufacturing within 60 days.

Mystery Ranch, long thought to be the leader in the large Recce Ruck category has won and will be offering a custom design based on their internal frame technology.

Congratulations to both Granite Tactical and Mystery Ranch!

The Granite Tactical Gear line is currently available from Extreme Outfitters. Mystery Ranch information can be accessed here.

Picture from Extreme Outfitters.

-- Soldier Systems

I just took a closer look at the picture I used for the post on SOF surge in Afghanistan. Am I seeing what I think I'm seeing?

Here's the caption that accompanied the picture on the Army's own Web site:

Detachment in Afghanistan
Photo by Sgt. David N. Gunn
December 15, 2008
Members of Operational Detachment Alpha 3336 of the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) recon the remote Shok Valley of Afghanistan where they fought an almost seven-hour battle with terrorists in a remote mountainside village.

Awesome!

-- Christian

My boy Gordon Lubold called me and told my his paper, the Christian Science Monitor, finally ran his story on a surge of SF for Afghanistan and the internal debates going on within the community that the current commando force isn't being used properly, so why send more...

My take is that special operations forces are the best way to mitigate the impact of a "surge" in Afghanistan on the Afghan people. I'd rather have more culturally astute commandos rubbing shoulders with xenophobic Afghans than some specialist from the 10th Mountain Division.

Let's see how Gordon reports it...

The Pentagon is likely to send up to 20 Special Forces teams to Afghanistan this spring, part of a new long-term strategy to boost the Afghan security forces' ability to counter the insurgency there themselves.

The "surge" of elite Special Forces units would represent a multiyear effort aimed at strengthening the Afghan National Army and police units that the US sees as key to building up Afghanistan's security independence, say defense officials who asked to remain anonymous because the controversial decision has not yet been announced. The US already plans to send thousands of additional conventional forces to Afghanistan sometime next year. But it is hamstrung by limited availability since so many of those forces are still in Iraq.

The deployment of the Green Berets, the independent, multifaceted force skilled at training indigenous forces, could fill critical gaps in Afghanistan almost immediately, defense officials say....

...However, the proposal is controversial. The plan is being pushed by Lt. Gen. Doug Lute, the so-called war czar under President Bush, who is poised to release a set of recommendations for how to reverse the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan in coming days. Defense officials say General Lute believes the deployment of the Green Berets could go a long way toward making up for a significant shortfall in the number of troops needed in the region.

Yet many within the tightly knit Special Forces community say the Special Forces teams already in use in Afghanistan should be employed far more effectively before any new teams, which number about a dozen men each, are deployed.

"I just don't think it's a very good use of the units if they are not going to be doing combat advising in an effective way," says one Special Forces officer with recent experience in Afghanistan. "I don't know any Special Forces who think that's really what we need over there."

"Textbook" operations for Special Forces dictates that the 12-man teams, known as Operational Detachment Alpha teams, or ODAs, should be paired with units of at least a few hundred Afghan security force soldiers.

But in many cases, the Green Berets are paired with much smaller groups of Afghan forces, sometimes even one-on-one. In other cases, they are used to man checkpoints, say some Special Forces officers.

Critics worry that Lute's plan is to simply send more Special Forces units to Afghanistan without a coherent plan to support them. "Don't just throw ODAs out there as an answer," says another senior officer. "That's just the easy, lazy answer out there."

There are other gripes with the way the teams now deployed to Afghanistan are being used.

Too few of the Special Forces teams are partnered with Afghan forces for longer than, say, a month at a time, creating an unsustainable and unproductive training relationship that runs counter to Special Forces doctrine.

Special Forces officers blame the problems on a lack of a coherent strategy for using the Green Berets in Afghanistan. Others say some Special Forces teams operate under NATO commanders from other countries and don't know how to employ the teams properly.

Perhaps most significant, Special Forces officers and experts say it would be a waste of time and resources to send additional Special Forces teams to Afghanistan unless there is a "surge" of helicopters, remote-controlled aircraft for surveilling the enemy, and other "enablers" to allow the teams that are there now to be more effective.

Roger Carstens, a retired Special Forces officer who is now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a think tank in Washington, visited Afghanistan a couple months ago and asked members of the Special Forces community what they thought about "surging" Special Operations Forces.

"Everyone of them said 'no SOF surge,'" he says. "What they need is an enabler surge and enduring partnerships with Afghan military and police units," he says.

Adm. Eric Olson, the senior commander of US Special Operations Command, Tampa, Fla., is expected to convey the concerns of the special operations community to Gen. David Petraeus, the new commander of US Central Command.

The proposal would also include the creation of a new Special Forces command position, to be filled by a one-star general in Afghanistan this spring, whose job it will be to marshal resources to ensure the Special Forces units are employed properly.

The Afghan National Army, the pride of the country's budding national security apparatus, and the Afghan National Police, which is still seen as largely corrupt and weaker, need help to build up into a larger, more effective force.

Ultimately, the US would like to see at least 134,000 soldiers trained and ready to provide for their own country's security.

But trainers have been hard to come by, and the mix of foreign and US forces has muted the training effort, US defense officials say.

-- Christian

Can we please now say that the "Cut and Run"-ers were dead wrong. That America could be successful in Iraq and that it wasn't the Sunnis who did it; it was Americans who supported an unpopular "surge" strategy that proved to be the real solution to the security problem...

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON - The number of daily attacks in Iraq has dropped nearly 95 percent since last year, a U.S. military official said yesterday.

Iraq suffered an average of 180 attacks per day this time last year. But over the past week, the average number was 10, Army Brig. Gen. David G. Perkins, a Multi-National Force Iraq spokesman, said.

"This is a dramatic improvement of safety throughout the country," Perkins told reporters during a wide-ranging news conference in Baghdad yesterday.

He added that the country's murder rates have dropped below levels that existed before the start of American operations in Iraq. In November, the ratio was 0.9 per 100,000 people.

-- Christian

The Marine Corps has awarded a limited contract to three rifle manufacturers for a weapon to replace its M249 Squad Automatic Rifle.

The contract awarded Dec. 19 calls for a minimum of 10 weapons from each company to conduct further evaluation for an eventual down-select to one weapon. The final manufacturer could garner nearly $27 million for 6,500 of the so-called Infantry Automatic Rifles.

Ashburn, Va.-based Heckler and Koch USA and FN Herstal of Belgium won two of the contracts, with West Hartford, Conn.-based Colt Defense winning two separate contracts for two different weapons they offered.

Representatives of the three companies were not available for comment.

The Corps plans to replace its entire inventory of FN Herstal-made M249 SAWs equipped to rifle squads and Light Armored Reconnaissance scout Marines with the 5.56mm IAR beginning in 2010.

"The IAR seeks to enhance the automatic rifleman's maneuverability and displacement speed while providing the warfighter the ability to suppress or destroy those targets of most immediate concern to the fire team," said a Marine Corps release announcing the award.

Unlike the belt-fed SAW, the IAR will pull its ammo from an attached magazine. Most of the 10 original candidate systems had a low-profile, M16-like appearance since the Corps wanted the IAR to be easier to maneuver "through constricted terrain" like houses and buildings. ]]>The SAW weighs nearly 17 pounds without its 200-round ammunition box and has an overall length of 41 inches. An M-16A4 weighs about nine pounds and is 39 inches long.

The Corps also asked for IAR systems that could fire from both a closed and open bolt feed.

"The IAR shall provide accurate automatic or semi-automatic fires against point (550 meters) and area (800 meters) targets in all light, environmental, and terrain conditions," Marine Corps Systems Command told Military.com in October. "The IAR will be operated by a single Marine and employed from all doctrinal firing positions … [and] demonstrate improved portability, reliability and maneuverability through constricted terrain and conditions over the current M249 SAW."

The Corps hopes to take delivery of the first 10 weapons from each candidate by mid-March 2009 and conduct evaluations and operational testing -- including endurance and reliability testing at "government facilities" -- to decide a winner. The Corps hopes to have its first units equipped with IARs by 2010.

--Christian

The Netherlands has followed Norway in recommending procurement of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, both defense ministries ranking the aircraft's mission capabilities higher and costs lower than competing multirole fighters.

"The F-35 best meets the requirements drawn up by the Netherlands for the successor to the F-16," says the Dutch defense ministry, citing its better mission capability and operational availability, and lower price and anticipated lifecycle costs.

JSF-maker Lockheed Martin welcomed the report, noting "the Netherlands is already a major industrial partner on the F-35 program, and substantial work opportunities remain."

The Netherlands, like Norway, is participating in JSF development, but the Dutch parliament ordered another comparative analysis of the candidates before the government committed to the purchase of two F-35 test aircraft, expected by April 2009.

Unlike Norway, which last month recommended the F-35 over the Saab Gripen Next Generation, the Netherlands did not conduct a full competition, but instead evaluated the candidates based on non-binding information supplied by the manufacturers.

The Dutch report is "no surprise," says Gripen International general manager Johan Lehander. Although the Dutch were provided information, it never rose to the level of a formal offer, he says, noting the report does not represent a final government decision and that the Dutch military, in particular, has been pro-JSF.

The F-35 was pitted against Lockheed's Advanced F-16 and the Gripen NG, and all three were evaluated on mission effectiveness, operational availability, price and delivery, with the Netherlands aiming for initial operation capability around 2015.

According to the defense ministry, the comparative evaluation was baselined on the initial Block 3 version of the F-35 but also analyzed the improved Block 4 standard, which the Dutch expect to be available around 2015.

The JSF beat the other two candidates on mission effectiveness, the ministry says, scoring higher on five of the six mission profiles evaluated. The Gripen NG was ranked first on non-traditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, but was judged unable to perform four of the missions to the desired operational level. The Gripen NG was also judged to have insufficient growth potential.

The F-35 will perform four of the missions to the desired level in initial Block 3 form, and all six missions successfully when updated to Block 4, the evaluation concluded.

Read the rest of this story, check out some pics of Aussies in The Stan, listen to a podcast and see who's getting their Christmas MiGs from our Aviation Week friends exclusively at Military.com.

-- Christian